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Summary 
Despite calls for collaborations across animal and human health sectors to control 
zoonoses, a ‘black-box’ approach to collaborations means there is limited understanding of 
their drivers, characteristics and dynamics. In this thesis, I develop insights into 
multisector ‘One Health’ collaborations by examining the case of three zoonotic diseases in 
two states in India. Over nine months of fieldwork, I interviewed policy actors spread 
across different sectors, functions and administrative levels, and observed the practices of 
professionals in the field and in their offices. I used the examples of anthrax, brucellosis 
and leptospirosis to examine One Health collaborations in the states of Tamil Nadu and 
Gujarat in India. 
The identification, measurement and response to zoonoses are complex undertakings 
requiring specialist expertise. Consequently, discourses and practices around zoonotic 
diseases are dominated by technical experts. The process of synthesizing and 
reinterpreting scientific knowledge, in turn, is influenced by politics and power dynamics 
underlying the experts’ disciplines, sectors and institutions. 
Across all three zoonoses, I found that it is narratives about diseases, rather than actual 
disease burdens or risks, which drive public perception and policy response. The way 
collaborations ultimately emerge is conditioned by the disease characteristics and is 
influenced by an interplay of the disease discourses, the political cultures of the state and 
the practices employed by decision-makers at all levels.  
In all cases, collaborations do occur, sometimes facilitated by formal guidelines, but very 
often through everyday practices, in spite of bureaucratic strictures. All cases of 
collaboration are underpinned by informal networks. Such initiatives, frequently led by 
middle-level bureaucrats, while responsive to local concerns, are much messier than the 
processes envisioned in the dominant programmatic literature on ‘One Health’.  
In order for One Health partnerships to be sustainable, I argue that it is important to 
develop a nuanced approach to understanding the politics and dynamics underlying 
multisector collaborations.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Zoonotic diseases are those that are transmitted between animals and humans (WHO, 
2010). Zoonoses have gained increasing visibility internationally, especially following the 
landmark reviews that identified and quantified the ‘threat’ posed by animal origin 
diseases to human populations. Sixty percent of all human diseases come from animals, 
both wild and domestic (Woolhouse and Gaunt, 2007). These zoonoses present some of 
the major challenges for global public health. Avian influenza, SARS, MERS, Zika and Ebola 
are all zoonoses. Major human illnesses such as malaria and HIV emerged first from 
animal populations, and subsequently spread dramatically among humans (Wolfe et al., 
2007). Beyond the headline ‘outbreak’ focused zoonoses, there are many others; more 
neglected by science and policy, but nevertheless devastating to often poor and 
marginalised communities across the world. Examples include bovine tuberculosis, 
brucellosis, and sleeping sickness. The total burden from zoonoses related diseases is huge 
– the economic losses from six major outbreaks of highly fatal zoonoses from 1997 to 
2009  was estimated to be more than $80 billion (The World Bank, 2012, p. 39). The 
potential cost of a single major outbreak of influenza could run into $6 trillion (The World 
Bank and EcoHealth Alliance, 2018, p. 34). Even those zoonotic diseases that are relatively 
less discussed are estimated as causing 2.7 million deaths annually (Grace et al., 2012b, p. 
6). Zoonoses are therefore a major development issue.  
In order to address zoonoses outbreak prevention and control, many approaches have 
been proposed. Huge sums have been invested in vaccines and drug programmes, in ‘virus 
hunting’ and genomic profiling and in early warning and response programmes1. 
Regardless of the specific approach, everyone seems to agree that early response focused 
on the origins of zoonotic emergence is essential for preventing its spread (Garrett, 2018).  
However a missing element in this discussion is often how to encourage collaboration 
between professionals operating in different sectors – notably between those dealing with 
wild and domestic animals (such as veterinarians, wildlife ecologists and agriculturalists) 
and those dealing with human public health (clinicians, microbiologists, epidemiologists 
and public health officials). In bureaucratic systems such professionals often work in 
different departments, with different incentives, and with different disciplinary 
                                                             
1 For example, the ongoing $100 million USAID ‘Predict’ project and the even more ambitiously 
proposed Global Virome Project, costing $1.2 billion (Carroll et al., 2018) 
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backgrounds and professional priorities. Yet their interaction and collaboration is 
essential in addressing zoonoses. 
In recent years, particularly following the avian influenza outbreaks of the mid-2000s, the 
concept of One Health has been promoted (which itself builds upon discussions around 
One Medicine, Ecohealth and Conservation Medicine) (Waltner-Toews, 2009; Zinsstag et 
al., 2012, 2011). This makes the case for a holistic, integrated approach linking human, 
animal and ecosystem health (Bardosh, 2016; Cunningham et al., 2017) (also see chapters 
2 and 4). But how this should happen in practice, and why it often doesn’t, is not explored. 
This thesis aims to fill this gap by exploring the politics and practice of intersectoral 
collaboration, comparing the experience across three zoonotic diseases (anthrax, 
leptospirosis and brucellosis) and across two states in India (Gujarat and Tamil Nadu).  
Through this chapter, I will introduce my research, offering a general background and my 
motivations for choosing my research question. Lastly, I will describe how the thesis is 
organised, so as to answer my research question. 
1.1 A FOCUS ON ZOONOSES AND COLLABORATION 
There are important biological and ecological reasons why zoonoses are a significant 
health threat. As explained by Daszak et al (2000) viruses and bacteria normally circulate 
within wild populations without causing human disease. However, when conditions 
change, these can then emerge as disease causing pathogens:  
“Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) of free-living wild animals… have two major 
biological implications: first, many wildlife species are reservoirs of pathogens that 
threaten domestic animal and human health; second, wildlife EIDs pose a 
substantial threat to the conservation of global biodiversity. (Daszak et al., 2000, p. 
443) 
While it is important to recognise that microorganisms circulate naturally within different 
species, disease emergence can be linked to specific ~ecological, environmental, or 
demographic factors that place people at increased contact with a previously unfamiliar 
microbe or… promote dissemination” (Morse, 1995, p. 7). Factors alluded to in the 
preceding quote include climate change, change in land use, agricultural intensification, 
increased contact with and trade in wildlife, as well as globalization and air travel (Daszak 
et al., 2013; Hahn, 2010; Jones et al., 2013; Karesh et al., 2005; Kilpatrick, 2011; Patz et al., 
2004).  
Addressing such a broad array of factors and preventing diseases from ‘spilling over’ 
across different species required more intellectual and capital resources than could be 
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afforded within the physician dominated public health sector. At a stage where the global 
health community was becoming more aware of the importance of emerging and other 
infectious diseases, the early 2000s were marked by SARS and avian influenza outbreaks 
that highlighted the role played by animal populations as potential sources for new 
infections (King, 2004; Scoones and Forster, 2008).  
As Cassidy (2018) points out in her insightful account of the origins of the One Health 
movement, the increased awareness about the health threats posed by wildlife was 
capitalised upon by a group of researchers and policy makers who were already working 
on transboundary diseases to make the case for a collaborative approach to health. The 
resultant One Health vision reformulated the ‘One Medicine’ approach popularised by the 
veterinarian Calvin Schwabe (1998) to go beyond veterinary and clinical collaborations 
and aim to prevent diseases from emerging from wildlife and affecting humans (Karesh 
and Cook, 2005).  
Collaborations between the animal and human health sector in itself is not a new 
phenomenon, and in fact, both the disciplines have a shared history of conducting 
academic, research and disease control activities together before institutionalisation had 
set in (Woods and Bresalier, 2014). However, given the fact that animal and human health 
sectors are now governed by different bureaucracies and have different operational 
incentives, establishing a working animal-human health partnership seems like a big ask 
at all levels of operation. Policy discussions around zoonoses famously include references 
to ‘silos’ and ‘falling through the cracks’(Jerolmack, 2013; Schmidt, 2009).  
Interestingly, some of the earliest acknowledgement of the need for breaking these 
disciplinary and bureaucratic silos came from agencies like WHO & FAO – institutions that 
are themselves large bureaucracies (Weiss, 2016). This intervention took the form of 
institutional reforms, starting with the development of a veterinary public health unit 
within WHO in 1958 which later urged member-states to replicate the same structure at 
country level (FAO and WHO, 1975; Woods and Bresalier, 2014).  
The floating of the One Health agenda in early 2000s allowed officers within these 
institutions to again make a case for intersectoral collaboration using the arguments of 
practicality and efficiency, as voiced in the following WHO document:  
“The key to detecting and controlling the emergence or re-emergence of 
zoonoses is coordinated action on the part of animal and human health 
sectors. In particular, it is crucial to detect and control early any emerging 
and re-emerging zoonoses at the animal source to prevent it from infecting 
human population… Thus it is critical to establish good collaborations 
between animal and human health sector to ensure synergistic actions, make 
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rational use of available resources, improve efficiency.” (WHO South East 
Asian Regional Office et al., 2008, p. 6) 
The CDC Stone Mountain Meeting subgroup on self-assessment has come the closest to 
discussing the operationalization of One Health at the national and sub-national levels. It 
proposes an inclusive definition of One Health; “an interdisciplinary approach to 
minimizing harms and maximizing benefits from the co-management of human, animal and 
environmental health”. It highlights the importance of having a shared vision of expected 
goals and outcomes as one of the necessary elements of One Health, but stops short of 
proposing a framework for operationalization of One Health. (CDC Stone Mountain 
Meeting Group, 2013) 
This instrumentalised use of One Health, even as its meanings were contested, did not go 
unnoticed – leading Woods et al. to refer to it as a ‘scientific bandwagon’ (2018, p. 215). 
The One Health movement faced multiple critiques throughout its history. The criticisms 
included comments on the challenges of governing One Health, the skewed nature of the 
political economy of One Health, as well as its disconnect with local contexts and practices 
(Bardosh et al., 2017; Galaz et al., 2015; Hinchliffe, 2015; Lee and Brumme, 2012). Social 
scientists have argued about the need for studying practices within  local contexts in 
conceptualising One Health (Craddock and Hinchliffe, 2015; Dzingirai et al., 2017a). 
Therefore, in this research, I aimed to examine the understandings and practices of 
animal-human collaborations within the context of zoonoses in India.  
1.2 ZOONOSES IN INDIA 
Zoonotic diseases pose an especially important public policy challenge to India for a range 
of reasons. Firstly, as described below, despite the challenges in assessing disease burdens 
and risks, it is accepted by most that India faces a dual challenge of outbreak-causing 
exotic as well as endemic zoonoses.  
India has among the highest numbers of livestock and human populations living in close 
proximity (Robinson et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2002), including the highest numbers of 
livestock owners living in poor, and possibly, unhygienic, conditions (Grace et al., 2012b). 
In addition, the ecological diversity and rapidity of ecological changes in the country, 
exemplified by its two ‘biodiversity hotspots’ (Myers et al., 2000) have resulted in its 
identification as one of the four global ‘hotspots’ likely to witness emergence of newer 
zoonotic pathogens (Jones et al., 2008). Not surprisingly many states in India have 
reported the emergence or re-emergence of several pathogens over the last two decades 
(Table 1).  
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Table 1: Reported outbreaks of some emerging / re-emerging zoonoses in India 
Chandipura virus Tamil Nadu, 1988; Andhra Pradesh, 2003; Gujarat, 2006, 
2015; Maharashtra 2012; Odisha 2014(Damle et al., 2017; 
Dwibedi et al., 2015; Jacob John, 2010; Sudeep et al., 2014)  
Crimean-Congo 
Haemorrhagic fever 
Gujarat, 2011, 2012, 2013; Rajasthan, 2014(Makwana et al., 
2015; Mourya et al., 2012; Pragya D Yadav et al., 2014; 
Pragya D. Yadav et al., 2014a; Yadav et al., 2013)  
Avian influenza Various states, 2006 – 14  
Japanese Encephalitis Uttar Pradesh, 2005, 2009; Bihar & Assam, 2010(Campbell 
et al., 2011; Parida et al., 2006)  
Kyasanur forest disease 
(KFD) 
Karnataka, 2011, 2012, 2014; Tamil Nadu, 2012; Kerala, 
2014; Goa, 2016; Maharashtra, 2016(Gurav et al., 2018; 
Kasabi et al., 2013; Murhekar et al., 2015; Sadanandane et 
al., 2017; Pragya D. Yadav et al., 2014b)  
Nipah virus West Bengal, 2001, 2007; Kerala 2018(Chattu et al., 2018; 
Kulkarni et al., 2013)  
Plague Gujarat, 1994; Himachal, 2002; Uttarakhand, 2004(Gupta 
and Sharma, 2007; Mavalankar, 1995; Mittal et al., 2004)  
Scrub Typhus Multiple years in Himachal Pradesh, North East, Rajasthan & 
Tamil Nadu(Chogle, 2010; Ganesh et al., 2018; Isaac et al., 
2004; Sinha et al., 2014)  
Trypanosomiasis 
(evansi) 
Maharashtra, 2005(Joshi et al., 2005)  
At the same time as being a hot spot for emerging infections, due its size and population 
density, India has also been identified as a major contributor to the global burden of 
different endemic zoonoses. Many of these endemic zoonoses are also referred to in the 
global health literature as 'neglected zoonoses’ (Maudlin et al., 2009) because of their 
associations with poverty and lack of scientific studies.  
A complicating factor for zoonoses is the uncertainty surrounding the disease incidence as 
well as identification of appropriate control strategies. For example, in the case of rabies, 
multiple studies conducted over two decades have shown India to account for the largest 
share of the global burden of rabies. (Hampson et al., 2015; Knobel et al., 2005; Sudarshan 
et al., 2007; Suraweera et al., 2012) However, even a relatively well-studied zoonosis like 
rabies continues to be referred to as a neglected disease because of lack of epidemiologic 
information (Taylor et al., 2015) and policy hesitancy on part of decision-makers (Kakkar 
et al., 2012; Lembo et al., 2010). This, in turn, is possibly due to the disconnect between 
the information needs of the decision-makers and the research output produced in the 
country (Abbas and Kakkar, 2013). 
Even more than rabies, very limited epidemiological information exists for other zoonoses 
endemic to India. Systematic reviews  seeking to estimate global disease burden of 
diseases like brucellosis (Dean et al., 2012) and bovine tuberculosis (Müller et al., 2013) 
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continue to depict the Indian subcontinent as white spaces in their maps denoting lack of 
sufficient epidemiological studies. On the other hand, based upon existing smaller studies, 
current scientific opinion points towards a significant burden of these diseases in India. 
(Bose, 2008; Dhand et al., 2005; Grace et al., 2012b; Smits and Kadri, 2005; Thappa and 
Karthikeyan, 2001) 
This wider debate on public health policy and practice intersected with my own 
experience working in India, and in turn resulted in the definition of the research question 
for this thesis, as discussed below.  
1.3 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS 
As a public health researcher in India working on zoonotic diseases since 2008, I had been 
exposed to many of these discussions. The term One Health itself wasn’t particularly 
common in the country at the time. However, over the years most people in the infectious 
diseases community in India, including researchers and government officers, had started 
acknowledging the importance of animal-human linkages in disease transmission, 
especially for well-reported diseases such as avian influenza, even if the mechanisms for 
fostering such collaborations remained vague. 
I personally began to recognise the importance of multisector partnerships after 
participating in a discussion on rabies control in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu 
in 2011. I was a part of the organizing team for what was essentially a discussion 
structured around our assessment of Tamil Nadu’s rabies control efforts. (Abbas et al., 
2011b) However, soon after the discussions started we realised this was possibly the first 
time that the experts and government officers from national and state level had come 
together to discuss rabies policies in a non-academic, non-government setting in India.  
The result was an enthusiastic exchange of ideas and opinions among the participants 
hailing across different sectors (animal, human, municipality, environment), functions 
(programme manager, policy maker, researcher, donor) and administrative levels (state, 
national, regional). We realised that there were many differences in different actors’ 
perspectives and commitment to the key rabies control interventions and discussed how 
best to accommodate these differences in designing rabies control policies.  
We got good feedback from the discussants afterwards and the meeting resulted in a 
recommendation document, several proposals and publications (Abbas et al., 2014, 2011a; 
Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; Kakkar et al., 2012). However, the major takeaway for me was the 
realisation that collaboration did not mean that collaborating actors should all agree on 
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the same problem definition; rather the challenge was to develop a shared vision that 
accommodates the difference in individual perspectives.  
The insights on local decision-making I gained from my work in India played an important 
role in influencing my choice of discipline and research question for my PhD. In my 
readings around zoonoses and One Health, I had come across multiple documents 
highlighting the need for working together on the grounds of increased efficiency, 
effectiveness and as a political response to the upcoming series of health threats. (Coker et 
al., 2011; Rushton et al., 2012; Zinsstag et al., 2007) However, most of the papers, even 
those authored by veterinarians, seemed to be making the case from the human health 
perspective, with little discussions on the rationale for veterinarians to collaborate.  
In addition, at the time of starting my PhD I had found very little discussion around the 
mechanics of building such a cross-sector collaboration.2 Indeed, beyond defining One 
Health, there seemed to be no acknowledgment of the different kinds of collaborations 
that could emerge at the national and sub-national levels. (Lee and Brumme, 2012)  
I therefore felt that, despite my training as a physician and public health researcher, I 
needed to go beyond the health sector needs in order to get a more complete 
understanding of multisector collaborations, and consequently, chose to base myself at a 
social science research centre with expertise in conducting research around cross sector 
issues and zoonoses.  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question that I proposed for my PhD was therefore: 
Under what conditions do intersectoral collaborations for prevention and control of 
zoonoses in India occur (or don’t)? 
In order to gain a comparative insight into ‘conditions’ I decided to compare two very 
different states in India: Gujarat and Tamil Nadu (see chapter 3). Focusing on the state 
level makes sense for two reasons. First, within the federal structure of India, the state 
governments enjoy jurisdiction over the animal and human health sectors, and, 
consequently, the administrative units at the state level are often sites for bureaucratic 
and political innovation (Deshpande et al., 2017). Second, different states as a 
                                                             
2 As I describe in subsequent chapter 2, by late 2013, there were some documents from 
international agencies that attempted to describe the difficulty of establishing multisector 
collaborative mechanisms, but these seldom went beyond boilerplate understandings of 
multisectorality. Examples include (Khabbaz, 2010; The World Bank, 2010; World Health 
Organization et al., 2014). 
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consequence have long histories of practice, within a broad umbrella of federal policy. This 
means that the cultures, practices and experiences of state level bureaucracies, and their 
engagement with national and international science and policy can be quite different. 
Chapter 3 explains the contrasts between my study sites, and how these illuminate 
contrasts in ‘conditions’ for collaboration. 
In exploring ‘intersectoral collaboration’, I have taken a broad definition, encompassing 
both formal and informal processes. In the rest of the thesis, I use the terms collaboration 
and partnership and multisectoral and intersectoral interchangeably. While I do cite other 
researchers who have been strict in their use of these terms, I argue that these rigid 
categorisations were not pertinent to my research because my aim was to unpack the 
development and functioning of such inter/multisector collaborations/partnerships 
rather than develop a framework for evaluating their performance. In sum, I am interested 
in how different groups of people (or individuals) come together across institutionally 
defined sectors to tackle zoonotic disease issues, whether through formal or informal 
means, whether mandated by policy or institutional mission or not; whether sustained 
over time or just a one-off event, and whether formally part of a job description or part of 
everyday practice. Moreover, instead of studying the performance of existing cross-sector 
partnerships, which is the case with most One Health literature, I wanted to make space 
for selecting other, non-traditional partnerships as well, which could be informal or 
temporary in nature.  
I chose three zoonotic diseases (two diseases in each of my two study states) as exemplars 
around which multisector collaborations could be studied. I explain the rationale for my 
choice subsequently in chapter 3 on methods.  
1.5 THESIS ORGANISATION 
Having introduced the research question in this chapter, I use chapter 2 to explain its 
grounding in the academic literature and key policy debates to lay the conceptual and 
empirical contours of my research. I have structured chapter 2 according to my analytical 
framework. Adopting this structure helped me to organize a discussion of literature from 
multiple disciplines and topics, to demonstrate the development of my analytical 
framework and to introduce my research sub-questions.  
Chapter 3 explains the methods employed to answer my research questions. In addition to 
discussing my study design, I also discuss the reasons for the methodological choices made 
and their possible implications on the study findings. These choices include the selection 
of states and disease as cases and my use of different sources of information. I explain the 
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reasons for studying collaborations at the state level (and not at national or community 
level) and my choice of middle-level programme managers as my key respondents. I 
justify these decisions by explaining how they helped me prioritise inquiry into my focus 
areas; viz. politics of using scientific expertise by middle-level managers in the aid of their 
respective agendas.  
The next chapter on One Health narratives in India builds upon the first two introductory 
chapters and provides a national contextual background to the disease-based and state-
level case studies presented in the subsequent chapters. The chapter introduces the key 
national-level actors who are involved in the zoonoses policy discussions at the national 
level in India and compares their stance on zoonoses and collaborations with the 
prevalent global discourse. This chapter, therefore, helps bring out the contrast between 
the global and national rhetoric as well as situates the state level policy debates discussed 
in the subsequent chapters. 
The next three chapters discuss the specific cases of different zoonotic diseases – anthrax, 
leptospirosis and brucellosis. In these chapters, I present the empirical data investigating 
the discourses, practices and politics around these diseases in my study states of Gujarat 
and Tamil Nadu. Chapters 5 and 6 examines the response of state governments to the 
outbreaks of anthrax in Tamil Nadu and leptospirosis in Gujarat, respectively.  
There is another level of comparison present in the case studies. While leptospirosis is 
understood as a human health problem, anthrax is generally understood as presenting 
first among the animals. Consequently, the response to outbreaks of both the diseases 
helps draw up a contrast in the approach of animal and human health agencies. In 
addition, the analysis of a real time outbreak of anthrax in Tamil Nadu in chapter 5 
provides a useful introduction and contrast to the more historical accounts of past 
outbreaks of leptospirosis in Gujarat in chapter 6. Discussions in both the chapters also 
highlight the contrast in the administrative cultures of both the states – a theme that is 
then built up further in the subsequent two chapters.  
In contrast to the discussions around the outbreak-prone anthrax and brucellosis, chapter 
7 describes brucellosis as being a more widespread, if under-recognised, disease that is 
common to both the study states. Instead, as recounted in the chapter by several policy 
actors, in another instance of the different set of incentives operating in the public health 
and veterinary sector, the push for action by the government came not because of the 
health burden of the disease, but its impact on the productivity of the economically 
important dairy sector.  
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Chapter 8 on collaborations brings together the key themes highlighted in the earlier 
chapters and compares intersectoral collaborations around zoonoses across diseases and 
states. The chapter refers back to the analytical framework to organize the discussions 
around politics, discourse and practices of intersectoral collaborations. It identifies some 
common threads running across different instances of collaboration allowing 
collaborations around zoonoses to be analysed and characterised more fully. The chapter 
concludes by suggesting ways of improving One Health in practice. 
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2 UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIONS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study focus and core question were defined in the previous chapter, this chapter looks 
at the four key strands of literature that help me to refine and structure my inquiry. These 
are: disease contexts, discourse around diseases and collaborations, the practices of those 
involved in collaborations, and the wider politics. First I will elaborate these themes while 
discussing the literature around these areas and then, subsequently, I will present the 
analytical framework that emerges out of these themes. These strands do not represent 
exclusive categories; rather, for the purpose of my thesis, they are best understood as 
interconnected themes, which are best used as pegs upon which to hang my explanation in 
a coherent and manageable way.  
2.1 DISEASE CHARACTERISTICS  
As discussed in chapter 1, zoonotic infections are those which are naturally transmitted 
between vertebrate animals and humans (WHO, 2010). This catch-all term of ‘zoonoses’ 
comprises different kinds of pathogens (bacterial, viral, etc.), transmission routes (food, 
water and vector-borne), involve various animal species as reservoirs or hosts, and, 
consequently, affect multiple professional sectors, including animal husbandry, food 
production, processing and safety, conservation and tourism, veterinary medicine and 
public health.  
Despite the longstanding and widespread interest in zoonoses cutting across multiple 
professional sectors and academic disciplines (Woods and Bresalier, 2014), we do not 
know much about most zoonoses, many of which continue to be classified as neglected 
diseases (Mableson et al., 2014). That zoonoses are a major problem is illustrated by the 
fact, noted in chapter 1, that approximately two-thirds of all known pathogens and three-
quarters of emerging/re-emerging ones have been found to be of zoonotic origins 
(Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005). 
Zoonotic diseases are generally categorised as being either outbreak-prone emerging/re-
emerging infections, or, alternatively as endemic and neglected diseases. The first category 
of zoonoses includes diseases like Ebola, MERS (Middle East Respiratory Virus), avian 
influenza and Nipah virus infections. The episodic and fatal nature of these infections, 
coupled with their rapid transmissibility have caused many to view them as threats to 
global health security (Hoffman, 2010; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011) and prompted huge 
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investments in early detection and warning systems against these and similar health 
threats (Elbe, 2011).  
The second category of zoonoses comprises of relatively lesser-discussed diseases that are 
endemic to geographic areas. These diseases are strongly associated with poverty, 
disproportionately affect poorer and marginalised populations and have traditionally been 
referred to as being neglected because of relatively little attention from researchers and 
policymakers alike. (Mableson et al., 2014; WHO, 2006) 
Zoonoses is therefore a catch-all category referring to a variety of disease conditions that 
can be caused by a variety of pathogens, affect different species, require a variety of 
interventions, and consequently, might affect the economy and society in a myriad of 
different ways. While recognizing the variety in zoonotic pathogens and their responses, 
and the fact that most interventions are still tailored against specific pathogens, for this 
study I chose a selected number of disease-based case studies, based on their disease-
specific characteristics, and use them as illustrative examples to understand the policy 
challenges posed by them and the resultant policy responses against the identified 
diseases at the state and local levels (see chapter 3 for choice of diseases). 
As referred to earlier, the term zoonoses, refers to a wide variety of infections having 
different characteristics. Consequently, the policy response inspired by different zoonoses 
is likely to vary as well, as described below.  
Within infectious diseases, it is generally accepted that epidemic-prone diseases that can 
adopt a crisis framing are likely to elicit a stronger and more urgent policy response than 
silent diseases with complicated underlying dynamics (Leach, 2008). Because of the way 
the threat of emerging zoonoses has been portrayed in academic and popular literature3, 
and the international consensus around pandemic preparedness that has emerged over 
the last two decades (Stöhr, 2002) has resulted in research and policy actors to prioritise 
pandemic-prone (Leach et al., 2010a; Mehand et al., 2018). Consequently, while research 
to predict disease emergence in Africa has received hundreds of millions of US dollars in 
funding, endemic zoonoses resulting in millions of deaths annually continue to be starved 
of attention and resources (Carroll et al., 2018, p. 872; Grace et al., 2012b, p. 6).  
This is also a reason why a biomedical understanding of disease  has tended to dominate 
over more contextual understandings, and is possibly the reason for the research-policy 
disconnect we see in zoonoses globally as well as in India (Bardosh et al., 2017; Kakkar et 
                                                             
3 For critical analysis of infectious disease literature, see (Garrett, 2018; King, 2004; Leach, 2008; 
Weldon, 2001) and section around discourse 
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al., 2012). This has prompted many researchers to make a case for a more holistic, 
contextual understanding of the zoonotic diseases (Bogich et al., 2012; Craddock and 
Hinchliffe, 2015).  
Another aspect of epidemic prone diseases that helps influence policy response, and 
eventual collaborations, is the previous history of disease. Anxieties related to viral 
haemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Africa, as well as the anticipation of the next influenza 
pandemic at the turn of the century, were  major reasons for increased investments by the 
United States and international agencies in developing Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response (IDSR) capacities in many counties across the world (King, 2004; Perry et 
al., 2007; WHO et al., 2003).  
Similarly, two high profile outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARS) and 
avian influenza in the early-mid 2000s built upon these efforts and led to development of 
pandemic preparedness plans and discussions around intersectoral collaborations 
(Mounier-Jack and Coker, 2006; Scoones and Forster, 2008).  Likewise, within the Indian 
context, it was the infamous plague outbreak of 1994 in Gujarat, that led to the 
development of a national disease surveillance programme and which continues to fuel 
anxieties around disease outbreaks in the state even now (Garrett, 2000; 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2011; Suresh, 2008). 
A focus on disease characteristics encounters a basic lack of epidemiological data on many 
diseases, especially in places like India. This is further compounded by limited awareness 
of zoonoses generally and the social context of the diseases specifically (Kakkar et al., 
2011b; Paige et al., 2015). Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of social 
factors in influencing disease risk (Dzingirai et al., 2017a; Scoones et al., 2017) as well as 
the need for understanding how different understandings contribute to construction of 
disease knowledge (Waldman et al., 2015; Wilkinson, 2015).The need to acknowledge 
social realities in disease assessments has prompted some epidemiologists to call for 
greater engagement of researchers with disease-affected communities and incorporate 
participatory approaches in epidemiologic studies. (Wood et al, 2012). The characteristics 
of the zoonotic disease itself, such as ecological settings, affected species, sectors, disease 
severity, etc. will therefore influence how it is perceived.  
Thus, the emerging sub-question, and associated domains of enquiry, all responding to my 
overarching thesis question posed in chapter 1, can be presented as follows:  
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2.2 POLITICS 
Collaborations play out in particular political and policy contexts. In this thesis I explore 
cases in both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Drawing on literatures in political science and 
public administration, I wish to ask questions about the historical origins of these states, 
as well as contemporary political economy, and how these factors shape state 
bureaucracies, through historical legacies, revenue flows, policy priorities and capacities. I, 
in turn, focus on the nature of state bureaucracies, and how these are constituted in a 
federal system, with implication for state capacity, role of technical advice, and incentives 
to collaborate and innovate. While within one nation state, the separate states of Gujarat 
and Tamil Nadu, with different histories, capacities and bureaucratic cultures, have, I 
hypothesise, different approaches to intersectoral collaboration around zoonotic disease. 
The literature discussed below informs my analysis.  
Even in an era of increased globalism, where localities provide the venue for multiple 
relational factors to come together, the importance of place-based, relational politics has 
been highlighted in India as well as elsewhere (Amin, 2004; Dirlik, 1999; Harriss et al., 
2005). However, the importance of conducting comparative analysis of state level politics 
becomes even more important in the context of India where cultural and political diversity 
among the states has resulted in some scholars referring to it as a ‘laboratory’ for 
comparative political analysis (Harriss, 1999, p. 3367), and led others to call for “research 
on how and why things vary so much from state to state” (Manor, 2010, p. 514).  
Comparative politics researchers like Sinha (2004, 2003) and Tillin (2017, 2013) have 
compared the functioning of political regimes in different states in the light of increased 
federalism in India. If political ideologies are reflective of social concerns and provide a 
framework for organizing political behaviour (Jost, 2006, p. 653), some political scientists 
argue that the diversity in Indian states’ social and economic history has resulted in states’ 
adoption of  differing political ideologies, and consequently, in different patterns of 
performance on the public policy front (Ghatak and Roy, 2015; Joshi and McGrath, 2015; 
Sinha, 2004) (also see Table 2).  
Sub question  
What are the disease characteristics that influence intersectoral collaborations at the 
state level? 
Key domains of enquiry: 
 Epidemic vs endemic 
 Species affected 
 Local outbreak histories 
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Table 2: Comparison of politics and policies of study states 
State Political regime Development priorities Rankings4 
Gujarat  Conservative, 
majoritarian 
 Consistently in power 
since 2001  
 Facilitative role of government 
 Promoting capital investments 
and community-based collectives 
 Examples: 
 Dairy cooperatives: Amul 
 Self Help Group: Sewa 
 Population 
9/29 
 Economy 
3/33 
 HDI 8/18 
Tamil 
Nadu 
 Linguistic & 
Technocratic populism 
 Power alternating 
between two political 
parties 
 Universal social welfare 
 Examples 
 Mid-day meals in schools 
 Health insurance 
 Population 
6/29 
 Economy 
2/33 
 HDI 6/16 
Tamil Nadu, for instance, has espoused a distinct form of populist political ideology 
referred to as ‘Dravidianism’. Dravida politics emphasised a regional Tamil identity in 
opposition to the Hindi-speaking and centralising influence of national government in 
Delhi. In the initial days, the leaders went as far as proposing accession from Indian 
republic (R. L. . Hardgrave, 1965; R. L. Hardgrave, 1965). The Dravida movement proved 
immensely successful in the state, with political power alternating exclusively among two 
Dravida parties in successive elections so far. As a result of competitive politics, aided by a 
well-motivated bureaucracy, Tamil Nadu has pioneered and successfully implemented 
many welfare schemes that went on to be replicated nationally. These include mid-day 
meal scheme for pre-school and in-school children, subsidised canteens and universal 
health insurance, among others (Rajendran, 2013; Rajivan, 2006). 
Politics and administration in Gujarat, on the other hand, are informed by a qualitatively 
different political ideology from that in Tamil Nadu and have, consequently, resulted in a 
different set of social priorities and understandings on how to achieve these. In contrast to 
the relatively egalitarian populism practised in Tamil Nadu with an emphasis on efficient 
delivery mechanisms, Gujarati politics has more neoliberal and majoritarian inclinations 
(Joshi and McGrath, 2015, p. 473).  
As Spodek (2011) recounts in his book on the state capital of Ahmedabad, even in pre-
independence India, politics was traditionally patronised by the mill-owning merchant 
class whose interests were influential in the development of political priorities in the state. 
Perhaps also influenced by the popular notion of caste-based networks of entrepreneurial 
culture in Gujarat, the traditional form of politics privileged economic growth using 
‘trickle-down’ principles over universal welfare schemes (Dixit, 2010).  
                                                             
4 Rankings calculated among different combinations of Indian states and Union Territories. Sourced 
from (Suryanarayana et al., 2016; Wikipedia Contributors, 2018a, 2018b)  
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Following a set of recombinations of caste dynamics by political parties in the 1970s and 
changing expectations, there were a series of major Hindu-Muslim riots in the state, and a 
shift towards majoritarian politics. This meant that the state prioritised development of an 
established as well as an aspiring middle class (mostly Hindu upper castes) at the expense 
of the weaker groups in the state, such as the muslims, dalits and adivasis (Jaffrelot, 2015).  
While Gupta (2010) describes Tamil Nadu as a model for public health policies to other 
Indian states, Visaria (2014) explains the amount of catching up Gujarat needs to do to 
bring its health outcomes at par with other similar states. Indeed, the paradox between the 
states’ “high growth and low welfare” runs throughout Hirway et al’s essay collection, 
provocatively entitled “Growth or Development: Which way is Gujarat going?” (2014, p. 
xxiii).   
This diversity in state politics has been enshrined within the constitutional demarcation of 
powers as well. As described in Table 4, most sectors relevant to zoonotic diseases come 
under the jurisdiction of the state government, thus making zoonoses decision-making 
more dependent on the local politics of a state.  
In addition to the political ideology, the actual performance of the government will depend 
upon having an effective administrative machinery at its disposal, making the study of 
bureaucracy indispensable to any analysis of public policy discussions. Given the federal 
character of the Indian republic, and its British colonial past, it was thought by the 
country’s founding fathers that its governance needed the presence of an impartial 
generalist cadre of highly privileged administrators, who carried on the traditions of the 
colonial Indian Civil Services (Potter, 1996, 1986).  
The conventional view of bureaucrats as policy elites sees them as privileged and 
dominant, and not subject to the pressures of politics as the normal citizenry is (Shurmer-
Smith, 1998). Pederson (1992) argues for a more nuanced understanding of these groups. 
Indeed, as any close examination even within the privileged Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) cadre in India shows, bureaucrats come with different temperaments and 
backgrounds and, by the virtue of working within a highly politicised system and a rigid 
hierarchy, are subject to political pressures of  different orders of magnitude (Gupta, 1990; 
Saxena, 2010).  
Studies tracking career progression of IAS officers have pointed to the role played by 
political pressures in influencing their assignments and tenure (Iyer and Mani, 2012; 
Vaishnav and Khosla, 2016). Ethnographic studies of bureaucracies echoes Pederson’s 
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claims above and demonstrate the limited nature of power exercised by the bureaucrats 
(Gupta, 2013, 2012).  
Therefore, in a system where bureaucrats themselves become tools for advancement of 
political objectives of the ruling regimes, it is important to study the mechanisms through 
which politics affects decision-making at multiple levels and in different states. While the 
IAS are supposed to be a generalist cadre of senior level bureaucrats, they are assisted in 
decision-making by parallel cadres of technical professionals. These include veterinarians 
in the Department of Animal Husbandry and public health experts in the Department of 
Health. Officers from technical cadres are generally ranked lower in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy compared to IAS officers. 
The importance given to advice of technical specialists tends to vary from state to state, 
and is often a function of the political culture prevalent in a state. For instance, Tamil Nadu 
politics is known for its strong emphasis on effective delivery of its welfare services, and 
therefore, enjoys a reputation for strong bureaucracy (Gupta et al., 2010; Malaney, 2000). 
Gujarat, on the other hand, still retains memory of international shame and economic 
losses following the 1994 plague outbreak (Garrett, 2000; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). This 
is possibly the reason why its achievements in controlling disease outbreaks seem to be 
equally focussed on controlling the narrative as much as the disease itself. This is best 
illustrated by the government’s decision to suppress news of Zika cases in India as the 
cases occurred at the same time as a major investment conclave (Biswas, 2017). 
The technocrats often provide the scientific justifications for what are inherently political 
decisions. In addition to negotiating a politically acceptable decision with the politicians 
and a technically appropriate one with the scientists, these ‘middle-level’ bureaucrats can 
also be seen as conducting the necessary, but often invisible, work of operationalising a 
new policy initiative. As discussed in the section 2.4 on practices, below, these 
professionals bear resemblance to the control room operators managing policy messes.  
The discussion above, thus, identifies several issues relevant to developing an 
understanding of the intersectoral collaborations existing at the state level. The 
importance of actor networks in interpreting and influencing policy narratives is 
especially important, given the governance architecture in India. The prevalent political 
and administrative cultures of the state will influence the relative priorities accorded to 
developmental and community concerns as well as the quality of response to these 
concerns. During the thesis, I will examine the role of the abovementioned factors in 
influencing the development of intersectoral collaborations for zoonoses prevention and 
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control in the two study states, suggesting the following sub-question and domains of 
inquiry:
 
2.3 DISCOURSES  
Policy making around zoonotic diseases requires navigating a wide range of stakeholders 
with varying nature and levels of interest. In such a context, any policy issue (such as 
burden of disease, or costing of interventions) will elicit contested understandings with 
different actors likely to draw upon their own interpretations based upon the nature of 
their interests and the type of information they have access to.  
As zoonotic disease discussions require a specialist expertise, in order to study policy 
outcomes, it is worth interrogating more closely the processes through which this 
‘exclusive’ information gets eventually translated into action.  
Other researchers investigating themes involving similar levels of information asymmetry 
and diversity of interests, such as environment policy and sustainability, have also pointed 
to the discretionary use of power in the knowledge to policy translation process (Hajer, 
1997; Keeley and Scoones, 1999).  
Scholars such as Fischer and Forrester (1993) and Roe (1994) highlight the importance of 
narrative stories and framings in communicating policy ideas. Simple storylines – with a 
beginning, a middle and an end – can encapsulate the way problems are defined and 
solutions are proposed by different actors.  Discourses – and their associated narratives -  
are thus ‘framed’ according to different power-knowledge configurations, requiring an 
analysis of who says what and why.  
However, the very act of reducing the complexity of reality to simpler framings is an 
exercise of authority, with the actors conducting the translation, exercising their authority. 
This act of interpreting evidence is in equal parts science and politics, and is mediated by 
power and practice. I explore the challenges of translating science and choosing evidence 
further in my thesis. Some concepts I draw upon include discursive analysis and narrative 
policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Roe, 1994). There are also 
Emergent Sub-question:  
How do the local political and administrative cultures influence intersectoral 
collaborations at the state level? 
Key domains of enquiry: 
 State history and politics 
 Bureaucratic cultures  
 Institutional capacity 
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examples that call into question multiple versions of the same story and we need to ask 
whose story counts, including the tensions between so-called high and low sciences 
(Campbell and Lee, 2003). 
Shore et al, drawing upon Foucault, describe policy as ‘political technologies’ whose 
“political nature is disguised by the neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are 
portrayed”. This is because, according to them, “the veiling of political power under the 
cloak of legal rational neutrality is a characteristic feature of modern power” (Shore et al., 
2011, p. 171). Accordingly, the identification and analysis of the power operating behind 
the translation process will be central to my analysis using this framework.  
Several social scientists have applied the lens of discursive inquiry to zoonotic diseases 
debates. They have described how both zoonotic diseases themselves, as well as the 
interventions proposed to address them were framed selectively (Craddock and Hinchliffe, 
2015; Dingwall et al., 2013).  
One particular framing of zoonoses dominated policy discourse in the early 2000s. As 
discussed in chapters 1 and 4, at the time the international community was anticipating 
the next pandemic and there were fears if it turned out to have characteristics of Ebola-
like virulence and transmissibility, and arising from countries with limited capacities for 
detection and response (Tomes, 2000; Weldon, 2001).  
The silent manner in which SARS was allowed to spread in China and the international 
‘haggling over viruses’ that occurred in the aftermath of avian influenza outbreak in South 
East Asia only served to highlight the global security implications of such outbreaks (Elbe, 
2010; Forster, 2014).  
As described by Cassidy (2018), several policy entrepreneurs who were already working 
on transboundary and wildlife diseases, capitalised on the policy window that had opened 
up to newer ways of addressing outbreaks of emerging infections. Their framing of disease 
emergence as a predictable and (by implication) controllable phenomenon (Jones et al., 
2008; Wolfe et al., 2007, 2005) became the dominant framing. It displaced alternative 
framings from social scientists that looked at zoonotic diseases as social constructs (Leach 
et al., 2008; MacGregor and Waldman, 2017) or those from epidemiologists that framed 
zoonoses as products of socio-ecological systems (Catley et al., 2012; Zinsstag et al., 2011) 
and those that portrayed zoonoses as being diseases of poverty (Grace et al., 2017; Perry 
et al., 2011).  
The various solutions proposed to address zoonoses, not surprisingly, emerged from the 
way the ‘problem’ of zoonoses was framed in the first place. Therefore, framing of 
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zoonoses as outbreak-prone emerging diseases, led to international research investments 
aimed at predicting disease emergence by screening millions of viruses in ‘hot-spots’ at 
increased risk of disease emergence (Carroll et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2008; Morse et al., 
2012).  
The global health community, on the other hand, appeared to be concerned more with the 
global health security implications of zoonoses and emerging infections. Accordingly, this 
led to huge investments in strengthening disease surveillance and response capacities in 
the last two decades. For instance, much of the work on disease surveillance was 
conducted under the intellectual leadership of the American Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) (Calain, 2007; Katz et al., 2011; WHO, 2003) and led to the establishment of CDC like 
institutions in Europe, China and India.  
As introduced in chapter 1, a key aspect of discussions related to prevention and control of 
zoonoses was a widely expressed intention of establishing intersectoral collaboration 
between animal, environment and human health sectors. This is not a novel development 
in itself. Scientists have been advocating collaborative relationships between animal and 
human health practitioners at least since the mid-nineteenth century when the term 
zoonosis was first coined by Virchow (Schultz, 2008) and possibly even earlier (Woods 
and Bresalier, 2014). The term ‘One Medicine’ was popularized in the mid-twentieth 
century building upon these discussions (Schwabe, 1984) (see also chapter 1). Table 3 
offers a characterisation of a series of ‘convergence movements’, each offering discourses 
on collaboration from different standpoints. 
Table 3: A brief overview of principle convergence movements related to zoonoses 
 Convergence 
movement 
Leading sector/agency Focusing issue 
One medicine  Veterinary sector Medicine – Veterinary collaborations 
Conservation 
medicine 
Wildlife ecologists Wildlife – Human health synergies 
Ecohealth IDRC; Ecologists, Agronomists 
& Veterinarians 
Research for development 
One World One 
Health TM 
WCS; Wildlife scientists Wildlife origin health threats 
One Health  Originated from above, now co-
opted by multiple agencies 
Emerging disease focus / Techno-
centric approach 
Planetary 
Health 
Public health, Ecologists Environment health as a 
determinant of human health 
outcomes 
 
Other approaches seeking convergence between animal and human health sectors, such as 
ecohealth (Waltner-Toews, 2001; Waltner-Toews and Wall, 1997) and conservation 
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medicine (Aguirre et al., 2012), had been initiated by veterinarians and ecologists over the 
last few decades, one can argue, with limited human health sector buy-in. 
Following the SARS and avian influenza scares in early 2000s, these concepts gained an 
increasing acceptance by the principal UN and technical agencies under the umbrella of 
‘One Health’ (CDC, 2013; United Nations, 2008). Planetary health is a new development 
that aims to increase the importance of managing environment (including socio-ecological 
systems) as a way of ensuring human health in the Anthropocene epoch (Seltenrich, 2018; 
Whitmee et al., 2015) 
As discussed in chapter 1, One Health is a newly coined term (Gibbs, 2014) that evolved 
due to exigent policy imperatives for responding to emerging infections (Karesh and Cook, 
2005). Therefore, for much of its history, it has been interpreted differently by different 
stakeholders without the benefit of an overarching conceptual vision. Over the years, 
several different conceptualizations emerged that tried to develop a sense of identity to 
the one health movement. The earliest set of discussions were in high profile meetings 
(CDC, 2010; Public Health Agency of Canada, 2009) in the immediate aftermath of SARS 
and H5N1 outbreaks that tried to define what was the scope of one health.  
Coker and colleagues (2011) utilised a programme theory approach for categorizing the 
kinds of domains that researchers can look into under the One Health umbrella. On the 
other hand, Wood and colleagues (Wood et al., 2012) used elements of the STEPS 
pathways approach (Leach et al., 2010b) and an epidemiologic perspective to develop a 
framework for exploring complex zoonoses emergence pathways. Zinsstag et al (2011) 
applied the lens of complexity thinking to combine Schwabe’s (1984) ‘One Medicine’ and 
Ostrom’s (2007) social-ecological system models to propose a framework for studying 
how health is influenced by other factors in social-ecological systems. 
However, despite the long history of the convergence movements described above, getting 
the sectors to come together remains a difficult goal to achieve. This is because of both 
philosophical as well as practical differences of ownership and operating incentives that 
prevent the sectors from coming together, as depicted in Table 4. 
While the human health sector works to promote human well-being and the environment 
health sector works on conservation issues, the animal health sector works to increase 
food production and food safety towards economic development. The differing goals, 
fractured ownerships, disciplinary rivalries and rigid bureaucratic silo-based functioning 
of these sectors mean that frequently cross-cutting issues such as zoonoses end up ‘falling 
through the regulatory cracks’ (Schmidt, 2009) and cooperation remains a distant goal.  
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Table 4: Contrasting the principle sectors related to zoonoses in India 
 Sector Underlying 
disciplines 
Operational 
incentives 
Nodal Ministry Jurisdiction5 
Animal 
Health 
Veterinary 
Medicine, 
Veterinary 
Public Health 
Food safety 
Food production 
Economic growth 
Animal Welfare 
Department of 
Animal 
Husbandry, 
Dairying & 
Fisheries 
State list  
Environment 
Health 
Conservation 
biology, 
Veterinary 
Medicine 
Species 
conservation 
Animal Welfare 
Ministry of 
Environment & 
Forests 
Concurrent 
list6 
Human 
Health 
Medicine, Public 
Health 
Human well-being Ministry of Health 
& Family Welfare 
State list 
 
While One Health approaches gathered steam, there have been several criticisms launched 
against the ways in which it has been put into action. For one, despite the increased 
mobilisation around pandemic preparedness and increased awareness around zoonoses, 
the global One Health narrative lacks ‘proofs of concept’ from national-level experiences. 
One Health proponents continue to organize meetings around the themes of 
‘Operationalizing One Health’ (CDC, 2010) and finding ‘Cross Sectoral Solutions’ for 
infectious diseases (Prince Mahidol Awards Conference, 2013) but, apparently, have little 
to show for it (Lee and Brumme, 2012; Valeix, 2014). 
As shown in a recent bibliometric network analyses, One Health discussions remain 
dominated by relatively small number of actors (Galaz et al., 2015; Valeix, 2014). There is 
limited country buy-in, as evidenced by lack of country case studies (Lee and Brumme, 
2012). Despite calls for transdisciplinary training to tackle emerging infections, (Parkes et 
al., 2005) and the launch of small learning platforms (McKenzie et al., 2016), medical 
(Kakkar et al., 2011b)and veterinary training (Kakkar et al., 2013) remains silo based in 
India.  
The dominant convergence narratives often highlight threats faced from the emerging 
zoonoses, ignoring their endemic nature within their natural habitats and they propose 
technical solutions that did not take into account the existing social contexts of these 
diseases (Leach and Scoones, 2013).  
Similar analyses of the local relevance of collaborative approaches have been undertaken 
within India as well. As demonstrated by a bibliometric analysis of research conducted on 
                                                             
5 As described in the Seventh Schedule of Indian constitution demarcating the powers of the federal 
and state governments (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2018)  
6 Refers to areas that come under the joint jurisdictions of Central and State governments 
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zoonoses in India, most of it tends to focus on biological factors and developing technical 
interventions that are divorced from the national policy requirements that are more to do 
with systems and policy research and research on improving effectiveness (Kakkar et al., 
2012).  
As noted above, there has been a reaction to the emergence of a powerful One Health 
narrative at the global level. Various counter-narratives are evident. One, supported by 
data on publishing trends, posits that One Health is a global imposition, dominated by a 
select group of northern country researchers and policymakers and, as in many 
international development initiatives, can divert funds away for much-needed local, 
sectoral work (Galaz et al., 2016). Another critical narrative questions the basic framing, 
asking ‘whose world, whose health?’, pointing to questions of power and inequality 
(Hinchliffe, 2015).  
This thesis will focus in on an examination of the policy discourses around intersectoral 
collaborations for zoonoses prevention and control, focussing upon two states in India, 
exploring the intersection of global and local discourses. In particular, I will investigate the 
multiple interpretations of the “problem” of zoonoses and the proposed “solutions” 
around collaborative approaches at different administrative levels and among different 
sectors. In turn, I will l study the perspectives of different sectors in approaching zoonoses 
and collaborations for different types of zoonoses across two states. 
The emergent sub-question, and associated domains of enquiry, can be presented in the 
following way: 
 
2.4 PRACTICES  
The concept of intersectoral collaboration is certainly not confined to zoonoses alone. 
Collaboration, partnership and integration are closely related concepts that have been 
applied in many other health as well as non-health settings, such as nutrition, sanitation, 
and social determinants of health (Cairncross et al., 2010; Garrett et al., 2014; Mcqueen et 
al., 2012). Researchers from many disciplines have also tried to explain these applications 
Emergent Sub-question:  
How have the understandings around zoonoses and collaborative response 
approaches developed in the study states? 
Key domains of enquiry: 
 Local priorities  
 Scientific expertise 
 Storylines 
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using their disciplinary lexicons, such as management and public affairs (Bryson et al., 
2006; Tennyson et al., 2008; Wood and Gray, 1991). 
However, in these discussions, the question of how collaborations emerge is rarely 
touched upon. There has been a widespread debate about the importance of changing 
practices – and associated behaviours, institutional mandates and policies – to encourage 
collaboration. This has been discussed in literatures on public health, nutrition and public 
administration (Bryson et al., 2006; Harris and Drimie, 2012; Rasanathan et al., 2017).  
Within the health sector itself, apart from the convergence movements, discussed earlier, 
multisector collaborations have been highlighted for addressing the social determinants of 
health. This has inspired discussions around Intersectoral action for health (Rasanathan et 
al., 2017), as well as around the concept of ‘Health in All Policies’ (WHO, 2013). As 
exemplified by the experiments to tackle social inequalities in England, these experiences 
did not always succeed in securing engagement from non-health sectors despite the 
visibility accorded to the policies (Exworthy et al., 2003; Exworthy and Hunter, 2011). 
Explanations have focused on the practices of the actors involved, as well as the wider 
institutional and policy environment.  
Nutrition is another sector that has a long history of advocating for mainstreaming or 
integrating of nutrition, agriculture and health policies since the 1970s (Berg, 1987; Harris 
and Drimie, 2012), despite persistent concerns around feasibility and lack of ownership 
from the implementing actors (Field, 1987). Several scholars have proposed collaboration 
be described based upon the degree of integration. This views collaborations on a sliding 
scale ranging from independent silo-based functioning to sharing of information, to 
conducting activities together and finally, merging resources and infrastructure (Grépin 
and Reich, 2008; Harris and Drimie, 2012; Shigayeva et al., 2010).  
Public administration scholars such as Agranoff (2013) have proposed concepts like 
intergovernmental relations that relate to the informal network of actors and negotiations 
engaged with them by local government agencies to execute their mandates. Others such 
as Bryson et al. (2006), Thomson & Perry (2006) and Emerson et al. (2012) have 
developed overarching frameworks for institutional collaboration that focus on themes 
like mutuality, co-dependence and prior relationships as affecting the scope and length of 
collaborations.  
Management researchers, Huxham and Vangen (2004), describe both the ‘advantage’ and 
‘inertia’ as possible effects of collaboration. Hardy et al. (2003) analyse the drivers behind 
three key effects produced as a result of organziational collaborations; namely, strategic 
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effects, knowledge creation effects and political effects. Lawrence et al. (2002) hint at 
transformative implications of collaborations and propose the the generation of proto-
institution as a possible effect upon the collaborating organziations thesmelves. I use this 
stream of literature to broadly inform the practices of collaboration, but use another body 
of work for a more nuanced and political understanding of collaborative practices, as 
described below. 
In this thesis, I focus on the practice of collaboration, both formal and informal. By 
‘practice’, I refer to the usage by Wagenaar and Cook (2003, pp. 2–3) who argue for the 
central place of action in policy analysis. Practice, they argue, has its own logic; it is a part 
of “phronesis or practical reason”, which is distinct from scientific or technical reason. I do 
not aim to make use of ‘practice theory’ formally, but in many respects the approaches 
have informed my understanding, as explained below. I am interested in exploring, 
through an ethnographic lens that encompasses both the formal, procedural and 
routinized and the informal, everyday and serendipitous, how the practices of 
bureaucrats, field agents, scientists, policymakers and others create, or impede, 
collaborations across sectors for the purpose of disease prevention and control.  
For the purpose of my study, I draw upon the concepts of the everyday state and everyday 
practices, as they relate to intersectoral collaborations for prevention and control of 
zoonoses. While both draw upon similar themes of informality and individual agency, they 
apply to certain different contexts. The concept of the everyday state in India draws from 
an anthropological understanding of how the state functions at the state-citizen interface 
(Fuller and Bénéï, 2001), and questions the ‘blurred boundaries’ between the state and 
citizens (Gupta, 1995). According to this conception, instead of working as “faceless 
automatons in the Weberian mould”, government officers were themselves part of the 
society, and reflected its social and political biases in the workings of the local government 
(Corbridge et al., 2003, p. 2379).  
A separate, but related, conceptualisation of the citizen-state interface is offered by 
authors such as Kaviraj (2012). This emphasises the differences between the ruling elites 
and the underprivileged vernacular citizenry. Given the differences in their world views 
(and privilege), the ruling elites might not always know what best works on the ground. 
Accordingly, “we should expect lower-level public officials to reinterpret and sometimes 
significantly to change the practices of government that are handed down to them by Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) officers at the District, State or Union levels” (Corbridge et al., 
2005, p. 5).  
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The themes of reinterpreting policy at the local level and the exercise of discretion by all-
too-human bureaucrats are also reflected in the discussions around everyday practices. As 
described by Wagenaar (2004), the focus seems limited to the study of large 
bureaucracies; for instance, as in discussions of street-level bureaucrats by Lipsky (2010). 
Such bureaucrats have to make decisions to ensure client needs are met and the larger 
policy goals are achieved, even if that requires creative interpretation of the implementing 
guidelines. In a similar vein, Gupta (2012, p. 9) also cites an instance in his ethnographic 
portrayal of the lower bureaucracy in India where the implementing officer instructs his 
subordinates to go beyond following the rules to making sure the job gets done.  
The reactive ways in which policy makers often seem to function is not a novel 
observation. Lindblom (1959) characterised policy-making as a practice of ‘muddling 
through’. Others have built upon the analogy, with Roe (2016a, 2013) terming policy 
making as a mess characterised by:  
darkening sky of: coping, muddling through, groping along, suboptimization, 
bounded rationality, garbage can processes, second-best solutions, policy 
churn and policy fiascos, rotten compromises, managing the unexpected, 
crisis management, and that deep wellspring of miserablism, implementation 
and policy failure. (Roe, 2016a, p. 352) 
Roe draws his understanding of reliable management of policy messes from his 
observations of ‘high reliability professionals’ – control room managers of critical 
infrastructure (Schulman et al., 2004). There are several parallels with the decision-
making around zoonoses given the environment of uncertainty, and a bounded rationality 
within which the bureaucrats have to operate. In addition, as most zoonoses discussions 
require a fair amount of specialist expertise, and often evolves around high-risk events 
such as disease outbreaks, it is likely that the decision-making process for zoonoses would 
also be operating like a rarefied ‘control room’ setting, with a strong role for scientific 
advice.  
Decision-making around zoonoses, therefore, requires constant interpretation and re-
interpretation of scientific knowledge in a way that facilitates decision-making for the 
actor concerned. The implication is each step of decision-making, consultation and 
implementation essentially becomes a form of agenda-setting (Shiffman and Smith, 2007; 
Zahariadis, 2007). In such settings, straightforward execution of orders from above is rare, 
and the opportunities for collaboration may emerge, even if not formally required, 
through new practices in response to fast-changing situations.  
In concluding this section, I return to the wider debate about collaboration, from the 
existing literature – from fields as dispersed as nutrition (Harris and Drimie, 2012) and 
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public administration (Emerson et al., 2012; Page et al., 2015; Thomson et al., 2007). Most 
conceptualisations of collaborations are depicted through an institutionalist perspective 
without taking into account the underlying networks, relationships and practices that 
often play catalytic roles in sustaining collaborations. 
 A range of literatures from fields ranging from anthropology, to political science and 
public administration point to the importance of the practices of key actors in shaping 
decisions around diseases (and associated collaborations). In the subsequent chapters, I 
draw upon practice theory, and an ethnographic lens on everyday life to highlight the 
importance of the informal, day-to-day responses, especially by front-line managers who 
have to innovate, improvise and respond to a messy world of non-linear policy and often 
poorly defined institutional mandates. Various incentives push people towards or away 
from collaboration, whether this lies in professional training, institutional hierarchies or 
formal policy. A practice focused approach therefore encourages an exploration of what 
actually happens and why, and suggests the following sub-question, and associated 
domains of enquiry:  
 
2.5 AN EMERGENT ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
Key takeaways from literature discussed above include the observation that 
collaborations do not appear to be mechanistic organizational tools for working; rather 
collaborations seem to be a product, both of the social as well as institutional politics 
associated with how specific diseases and associated interventions are framed and 
prioritized.  
Zoonoses is a catch-all term that comprises a variety of pathogens, transmission patters, 
with different species involved. These diverse characteristics of the disease itself (severity, 
outbreak potential, species involved, etc.) help determine the nature of collaborative 
practices developed around them.  
As already discussed, the disease characteristics, in turn, interact with the politics of 
knowledge, of institutions, and the resultant practices, and so influence the presence and 
Emergent Sub-question:  
What aspects of formal and informal practices of actors involved in zoonoses 
prevention control enhance or discourage intersectoral collaboration? 
Key domains of enquiry: 
 Everyday practices 
 Informality 
 Adaptive learning 
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nature of collaborations around an individual or a set of zoonotic diseases. All these facets 
will differ, I argue, according to the contexts of different states, including their histories, 
bureaucratic cultures and administrative capacities.  
If we are to understand how collaborations develop and sustain (and so answer my 
overarching thesis question), we will need to look at the following interrelated themes, 
linking the themes to the emergent sub-questions and domains of enquiry outlined above.  
 
 
By revisiting the proposed research question, and with the background of the reviewed 
literature, we can broadly describe the development and performance of state-level 
intersectoral collaborations as being influenced by four major sets of factors: viz. disease 
characteristics; discourses around intersectoral collaboration for zoonoses; the politics of 
bureaucracy and administration and the practices of key actors. As described in Figure 1, 
and also elaborated in Figure 3, these factors can explain how states convene and manage 
collaborations for zoonoses prevention and control.  
We expect each of these factors to differ across Indian states for ecological, historical, 
political, economic reasons. Therefore, the research question and four emergent sub-
questions that will be asked for comparatively contrasting Gujarat and Tamil Nadu are as 
follows: 
Figure 1: Analytical framework 
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OVERARCHING QUESTION  
Under what conditions do intersectoral collaborations for prevention and control of 
zoonoses in India occur (or doesn’t)?  
SUB-QUESTIONS 
1. Disease characteristics: What are the disease contexts that influence 
intersectoral collaborations at the state level? 
2. Politics: How do the local political and administrative cultures influence 
intersectoral collaborations at the state level? 
3. Discourse: How have the understandings around zoonoses and collaborative 
response approaches developed in the two study states? 
4. Practice: What aspects of formal and informal practices of actors involved in 
zoonoses prevention control enhance or discourage intersectoral 
collaboration? 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
Having introduced my research question and analytical framework in the earlier two 
chapters, I will now describe the strategies I adopted for answering my research question. 
Broadly, the aim of my study was to develop insights into the development and 
performance of multisector partnerships developed for prevention and control of 
zoonoses in India. I have sought to respond to this aim through a comparative assessment 
of disease-based collaborations operating at the state level in India.  
Drawing upon the four analytical themes identified in the previous chapter, I want to 
understand the role of disease characteristics, framings of the diseases themselves, the 
underlying politics and, finally, the practices on the ground in giving shape to animal-
human health sector collaborations. Given the specialist nature of zoonoses discourse, my 
focus in this study was on the knowledge, practices and relationships between the 
technical experts and decision-makers working on zoonotic diseases within the public 
health and veterinary sectors. 
I adopted an ethnographic approach, and focussed my efforts on developing an 
understanding of institutional and practical responses to zoonoses in India, focussing on 
key decision-makers in my two study states, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. I accomplished this 
by spending a period of fifteen months spread across three field trips to India between 
January 2015 and March 2016. In this chapter, I will, provide details of the study design 
and explain the reasons for my choices, citing methodological literature and practical 
realities. 
3.1 STUDY DESIGN 
I used a comparative case study design in order to examine the policy response elicited 
around two exemplar zoonoses each in both of my study states in India. Answering the 
research question required me to choose a methodology that allowed deep investigations 
into the dynamic process of decision-making around zoonoses, often made in conditions of 
uncertainty. The case study approach was particularly suited for my research, as shown by 
the definition of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
The reason for designing my research as a multi-sited case study was to exploit the 
differences in the states “to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and 
42 
 
observational issues”, develop “multiple converging lines of enquiry” and allow 
presentation of “full variety of evidence” (Hamel et al., 1993; Yin, 2009, pp. 118–9).  
I specifically chose to study decision-making around zoonoses at the state level, as 
opposed to national and district levels. This was for multiple reasons. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, there is considerable variation in health (animal and human) 
administration among the Indian states, due to the federal distribution of powers, the 
importance of place-based politics and distinct cultures of administration operating at the 
state level (Deshpande et al., 2017; Manor, 2010; Ministry of Law and Justice, 2018).  
While public health and agriculture fall under the jurisdiction of state governments, and 
therefore are state government responsibilities, the local bureaucracy and government are 
seen to be more politically accountable in ways that federal bureaucracy and political 
leadership are not (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Corbridge et al., 2005; Mookherjee, 
2014). This makes state governments more likely to try out newer ideas in health 
administration, such as ‘One Health’, and therefore offer richer insights into the process of 
collaboration. The reason for selecting two study states for comparison, was to maximise 
the variations in place-based factors, such as political preferences, administrative cultures, 
as well as disease ecologies, and examine their role in influencing collaborative practices. 
However, policies or practices do not develop in isolation in the state capitals. The central 
government agencies in Delhi enjoy access to greater technical as well as financial 
resources. They have different means of influencing decision-making at state level, 
including by tying use of centrally funded schemes to implementation of centrally 
developed programme guidelines (Sinha, 2004). Similar to changes in practice that takes 
place as policies get translated between national and state levels, policies have a tendency 
to undergo re-interpretation and modification, due to the informality of practices at a 
state-citizen interface as well (Corbridge et al., 2005).  
Therefore, while keeping the focus on decision-making at the state level, I also 
investigated the perceptions and practices at the national and district levels as well. While 
focussing on the state-level activities, I traced the narratives constructed and observed 
practices around the exemplar diseases across the national, state, district and sub-district 
levels, comparing across two study states. The aim was to situate the state-level 
interactions within the multiple framings of collaboration around the selected zoonoses at 
different levels of administration. 
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3.2 CASE DEFINITION 
I defined my cases as ‘instances of decision-making in animal and human health sectors at 
state level for prevention and control of zoonotic diseases’. I wanted all collaborative 
instances to include, animal and human health sectors, even if the wildlife sector was not 
included. This decision is a reflection of the relative size and visibility of the three sectors 
(See chapter 4, Figure 6). By ‘instances’, I mean opportunities presented for collaborating 
around prevention or control of zoonoses at a population level.  
Some of the selected cases resulted in formal partnership mechanisms, such as named 
committees; others were characterized by informal interactions such as personal 
relationships and informal meeting spaces. The selection of cases also includes one where 
there was little or no formal collaboration despite awareness about a disease. Also, the 
instances of collaboration included settings involving discussions of intervention on the 
ground, rather than merely academic discussions. Therefore, all my cases were based in 
official agencies charged with surveillance and response in human and animal health 
sectors, although I did consult other actors, including researchers and farmer cooperatives 
about their contributions to the discussions.  
As discussed in the context of the One Health literature (see Chapters 1 and 2), some 
diseases, like avian influenza, get more attention in research as well as policy debates. In 
this study, I wanted to go beyond disease like avian influenza or rabies that have received 
most attention within research and policy communities in India, so at to explore the 
diversity of collaborative practices, even among less prominent disease cases.  
I wanted to identify diseases that could serve as illustrative, insightful cases that could 
highlight different aspects of responses to zoonoses as a whole. This is because, while 
individual zoonotic diseases might differ in epidemiological, ecological and social 
characteristics, the policy response generally involves some sort of dialogue between a 
relatively small number of institutional actors and therefore, is likely to follow similar 
contours. Within each of the veterinary and public health ministries, there is a designated 
office responsible for conducting surveillance and responding to disease outbreaks. 
Therefore, even when the diseases differ, the policy response generally involves a similar 
set of actors, which is the reason why many aspects their responses can be compared.  
The reason for opting for two states as study sites was to develop an understanding of 
how different administrative and political cultures respond to zoonoses. As mentioned 
before, both animal and human health sectors are classified as state subjects in the Indian 
constitution (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2018). Therefore, even as all Indian states share 
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similar administrative and legal frameworks, they have considerable freedom to design 
their own health programmes, if they have the political interest and resources to do so 
(Deshpande et al., 2017). 
3.3 SELECTION OF STUDY SITES AND DISEASE CASES 
I identified the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu as my two study states.  
 
Figure 2: Map of India with study states shaded 
Both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu are big states with large coastlines. While Gujarat is located 
in western India, Tamil Nadu is a large south Indian state. Both states enjoy a reputation 
for strong economic performance and a history of innovative social and development 
schemes. As described in Table 2 in chapter 2, both are large economies, and demonstrate 
differently styled, but nonetheless, tangible models of social development. Both states 
have had experience of reporting outbreaks of zoonoses and other infectious diseases in 
the past, implying a minimum level of understanding around zoonoses (Refer to Table 1 in 
chapter 1).  
Some health systems researchers have described integrative interventions as innovations 
(Atun et al., 2010). Both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have a history of health innovations7. The 
states have been cited as having a well-trained workforce and encouraging novel policy 
initiatives, so there is a high likelihood of presence of collaborative initiatives.  
On the other hand, the two states have had different political regimes; one being 
dominated by a single nationalist political party, the other by a set of regional parties in 
                                                             
7 e.g. Chiranjeevi yojana in Gujarat (Mavalankar et al., 2009) and TNMSC in Tamil Nadu (Gupta et al., 
2010; Veena et al., 2010) 
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alternate elections. In addition, social composition of the population in both states is quite 
different. Both states have therefore chosen to follow different development trajectories, 
which has a bearing both on the governance systems, as well as social priorities (Joshi and 
McGrath, 2015).  
As I have described in the earlier two chapters, zoonotic diseases are a heterogeneous 
group characterised by differences in epidemiological and ecological characteristics. Not 
all zoonoses enjoy the same level of visibility and public attention (Galaz et al., 2016; Leach 
and Hewlett, 2010). Within the context of both my study states, I aimed to choose two 
zoonotic diseases, each of which can offer me a lens through which to analyse the decision-
making processes.  
 
Figure 3: Analytic framework for study 
My reason for choosing specific diseases to study collaborations was a reflection of the 
practical realities of working in the infectious disease arena. Most infectious disease work, 
be it in research or practice, is still organized around individual pathogens. Choosing 
specific diseases to focus upon, helped me communicate my aims better to policy 
practitioners. In addition, other scholars have demonstrated the importance of framings of 
disease narratives in mobilising attention and policy response (Leach and Scoones, 2013). 
Choosing disease-based case studies,  therefore allowed me to maximise the variability of 
disease framings and examine its role in shaping intersectoral collaborations.  
My analytical framework, introduced in chapter (see Figure 3)  identified disease framings 
as a possibly key factor influencing collaborative outcomes, I chose exemplar diseases that 
could maxmise the variation wihin my cases to increase its explanatory power. I chose two 
diseases in each state: one that would be outbreak prone, potentially causing (or 
increasing risks for) mortality among humans and/or animals; and another that would be 
a more diffused endemic/enzootic disease, which would be widespread but relatively less 
talked about. As described in Table 5 below, I chose Leptospirosis and Anthrax as 
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illustrative examples of diseases that resulted in visible deaths in humans and animals, 
respectively in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Brucellosis was the example of widely prevalent 
but less discussed zoonosis, and was common across both the states.  
Table 5: Characteristics & study sites of disease cases  
Zoonosis & 
Framing 
Study 
site 
Species affected Presentation Route of 
transmission 
Anthrax 
Outbreak-prone 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Livestock, Humans 
& Wildlife 
Sudden death 
among animals; 
variable 
Contaminated 
blood; Dust-
borne spores 
Leptospirosis 
Outbreak-prone 
Gujarat Humans; Livestock; 
Rodents 
Fever with 
respiratory / 
renal distress 
Water 
contaminated 
with rat urine 
Brucellosis 
Enzootic/Endemic 
Gujarat 
& Tamil 
Nadu 
Cattle; Buffalo, 
Sheep; Goat; Pigs, 
and Humans 
Low grade fever; 
Abortion in 
animals 
From infected 
animals 
As I describe in subsequent chapters, all three diseases had unique as well as overlapping 
charactersitics. Anthrax and leptopsirosis typically manifested as outbreaks and both 
carried risks of fatal infections among humans. Therefore, reports of both these diseases 
eliicted strong response from the agencies. The difference among them was that while 
anthrax was usually first noticed because of deaths among animals with characteristic 
bleeding symptoms, leptospirosis was usually noticed among humans, generally in the 
rainy seasons.  
Brucellosis, which was the common disease across both  states, affected similar species as  
anthrax. However, apart from causing self-limiting abortions in livestock, it was difficult to 
spot, either in animals or humans, unless tested.  
Thus, to sumarise, I based my study in two states, which shared certain economic and 
administrative characteristics (resources, bureaucratic capacities) but differed on others 
(social priorities, political culture). Within both states, I selected two diseases that could 
allow me to assess within-case variation (in disease characteristics and response), while at 
the same time allow comparisons between both the study states as well.  
3.4 SCOPE OF STUDY 
Whereas the preceding sections describe what the study is about, given the multiple 
topical and disciplinary areas covered, I feel it is also important to identify areas that were 
not a priority for this study. First, this study was not meant to be an evaluation of existing 
multisector interventions around zoonoses in India. Rather, it aimed to identify the social, 
cultural, political and disease conditions that might influence or restrict the occurrence of 
multisectoral collaborations around zoonoses prevention and control in India.  
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Secondly, as mentioned before and unlike much of infectious disease research, the focus of 
my research was not on the diseases themselves, but on collaborative practices (or their 
absence) that developed around zoonoses.  
Lastly, the study is focussed on the state level practices around collaboration, and included 
perspectives from global and national-level actors only to provide the larger context 
within which state agencies operated in. 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY AND METHODS 
I organized my fieldwork across three different trips to India lasting a total of nine months 
over a fifteen month period between January 2015 and March 2016. During this time I 
conducted 99 interviews, attended numerous meetings and participated in field visits with 
outbreak response teams. My fieldwork took me to Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, 
Gandhinagar, Delhi, Hosur and Vellore (Refer to Appendix D for details).  
There were several reasons why I did not opt for a continuous stretch of fieldwork. First, it 
allowed me to space out my data collection over a larger period, covering multiple disease 
seasons, thus increasing the chances of witnessing an actual disease outbreak and its 
response. Additionally, persistent observation is said to help in developing familiarity and 
trust with the study participants, yielding better data. The idea being, “more will be 
revealed, and therefore, the data will be more valid” (Morse, 2015, p. 1214). Lastly, I held 
repeat interviews with a quarter of my informants in different field visits. Punctuating my 
fieldwork with brief periods of debriefing and reflection in the UK helped me refine my 
data collection strategy. Having focussed on factual questions in early fieldwork, I could 
move on to ask more probing questions investigating the mechanics as well as politics of 
decision-making  in my later interviews.  
Given the fact that my research was aimed at gathering different kinds of information 
about diverse sectors and geographies, I had to cast a wide net for collecting information. 
While my principal modes of inquiry were key informant interviews, participant 
observations and literature reviews, I deployed other information sources and techniques 
for data collection, as described below and in Figure 4. 
48 
 
 
Figure 4: Information sources 
Outbreak alerts and outbreak investigation reports, where available, proved invaluable in 
identifying distribution of specific diseases and the communities affected by them. While 
the official website of the national disease surveillance programme does provide a weekly 
list of reported outbreaks, the informal collaborative platform, ProMED mail proved to be 
a much more informative and exhaustive source of suspect and confirmed disease 
outbreaks8.  
The government documents proved helpful in other ways. During the course of my PhD, I 
learnt from serving bureaucrats how to peruse annual reports, official statistics, meeting 
minutes and project files – not only to find what was written in them, but also to deduce 
from the information not mentioned explicitly. This proved quite helpful in deciphering 
institutional priorities and differing perspectives of authoring agencies.  
I found news media to be another source of information and insight, both for spotting 
specific disease events (such as an anthrax outbreak, not listed in government reports) as 
well as in helping decode priorities of political regimes. Examining organizational charts 
and profile of key officers proved very useful understanding power dynamics in interest 
groups within government departments.  
However, by far the most important source of information for my research proved to come 
from the in-depth interviews as well as informal conversations I had had with 74 
individuals in different parts of India, all of whom had privileged access to some aspects of 
                                                             
8 See http://idsp.nic.in/ and http://www.promedmail.org/soas  
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policy formulation or implementation around zoonotic diseases. Please refer to Appendix 
D for an anonymised list of all interviewees. 
The ‘studying up’ of elites and experts has traditionally posed a challenge for researchers 
adopting an ethnographic stance in office settings “where ethnographic access is by 
permission of people with careers at stake, where loitering strangers with notebooks are 
rarely welcome, and where potential informants are too busy to chat” (Gusterson, 1997, p. 
116). However, some other researchers, on the other hand, have problematized the term 
‘elites’ and pointed towards the “instabilities and uncertainties of power within the research 
interviewee/interviewer relationship” that might exist even in such settings (Neal and 
McLaughlin, 2009, p. 689).  
Recent publications have taken the discussion even further and argued that it might be 
better to rethink power within interview spaces and develop a more collaborative 
approach to the study ‘subjects’(Smith, 2006). This explains the reason I refer to my 
interviewees as informants rather than respondents in the dissertation (Morse, 1991).  
Many researchers have highlighted the importance of and strategies to negotiate access to 
highly placed officers  in policy research (Goldstein, 2002; Harvey, 2011). I must say my 
experience of negotiating access to and participation of many of my key informants was 
less difficult than that described by Gusterson (1997). Some of my informants had known 
me for more than five years through my work as a public health researcher. My previous 
work in zoonoses, coupled with the fact that I was still affiliated to an Indian organization, 
possibly helped open doors more easily than if I were not known to them. I recognised 
that this could introduce a bias in my data and used several strategies to minimise its 
effect on my sampling and analysis, as described later in the chapter.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of interview informants, by sector, level and role 
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However, there were still instances where I was refused interviews9, or was not able to 
schedule interviews because of unavailability of officers. Most of the people I sought to 
interview were gracious enough to be schedule telephone calls when not possible to meet 
in person.  
In summary, I conducted 99 interviews with 74 individuals. As demonstrated in Figure 5 
(also listed in appendix B), there was an almost equal mix of informants from animal and 
human health sectors. Most of my interviews came from programme managers (mostly 
technical officers) working at the state level and served to inform me about decision-
making processes. I visited 1-2 districts in each state following tracing the everyday 
practices associated with specific zoonotic diseases. These comprise around a third of my 
interviews.  
Table 6: Key meetings attended in the field 
Meeting  Organizer, Date, 
Location 
Discussion theme Audience 
South Asia One 
Health 
Workshop 
 Ecohealth Alliance 
 May, 2014, Nepal 
South Asia One 
Health Regional 
Collaboration 
 Epidemiologists 
 Surveillance 
specialists 
Rabies 
epidemiology in 
India 
 Public Health 
Foundation of India 
 January 2015, Delhi 
 Rabies literature   Researchers 
State Epidemic 
Coordination 
Committee 
meeting 
 Government of 
Tamil Nadu 
 August 2015, 
Chennai 
 Development of 
State One Health 
Unit 
 Programme officers 
from Public Health & 
animal Husbandry 
departments 
 Local experts 
Stakeholder 
perspectives on 
rabies in Tamil 
Nadu 
 Public Health 
Foundation of India 
 September 2015, 
Delhi 
 Rabies economic 
evaluation 
 Rabies policy 
gaps 
 Researchers 
 Tamil Nadu program 
managers 
 National experts 
Chatham House 
One Health 
Colloquium  
 Chatham House 
 June 2016, London 
 Developing One 
Health regional 
Centres of 
Excellence 
 International agencies 
 National policy-elites 
I supplemented my interviews with observations of everyday practices. This was through 
attending selected meetings, expert consultations as well as observing practices in the 
field. One of the meetings I attended was when the chief bureaucrats of animal and human 
health departments in Tamil Nadu discussed the establishment of a formal State One 
Health Unit, something I was able to follow up on in my subsequent visit (see chapter 4). I 
attended two technical workshops on rabies policy organized for a parallel research study 
that also involved some officers from Tamil Nadu. In addition, I attended a stakeholder 
                                                             
9 Most dramatically in Surat, Gujarat; see chapter 6 on Leptospirosis.  
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consultation to develop a South Asia regional One Health collaboration that was useful in 
engaging with national and international actors active in the One Health circles (see Table 
6).  
In addition, I shadowed a rapid response team as it went about investigating and 
developing a response to an outbreak of anthrax in Tamil Nadu and village level dairy 
cooperatives in Gujarat to understand the supply chain mechanisms and working 
conditions for the veterinarians.  
3.6 REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
While designing and conducting this research, I was conscious of several potential sources 
of weakness that I had to guard against. These largely stemmed from the fact that my 
research sought to collate insights representing different perspectives from individuals in 
position of power. Some of these potential sources of weakness are common to other 
qualitative research studies and were amenable to standard approaches for improving 
validity, such as prolonged engagement; theory-driven inquiry; attention to emerging 
meanings and categorisations from members/research participants, and, finally, reflection 
on the interactional and textual research practices (Emerson, 1987). Other sources of 
weaknesses were more specific to my research setting and required me to exercise my 
judgment and reflection. These are elaborated below. 
Multiplicity of perspectives 
While devising strategies to promote rigour in qualitative inquiry, Morse (2018, p. 810) 
warns against using a template-based approach. Instead, she emphasizes that a single 
interview might yield both hard, descriptive, data, as well as  ‘softer’ interpretive data. 
Assuring the reliability or trustworthiness of an analysis for both might require a 
difference in approaches (Morse, 2015). Recognizing that similar sets of facts can be 
interpreted in multiple ways (Roe, 1994), I attempted to use triangulation for ascertaining 
factual accuracy of descriptive information, while allowing more space for multiple voices 
to emerge. Indeed, Roth and Mehta (2002) demonstrate the possibility and advantages of 
combining positivist and interpretivist approaches precisely for the analysis of contested 
events.  
According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 266) “triangulation is supposed to support a 
finding by showing that independent measures of it agree with it, or at least, do not 
contradict it”. Factual information, such as the dates of an outbreak, or the agenda for a 
52 
 
meeting, were easily confirmed from news websites or from accounts provided by other 
informants.  
Other points of view and insights, however, can be difficult to confirm, such as when an 
officer ascribed the development of formal collaborations as resulting from an experience 
of working together. In this case, I had to ascertain others’ opinions as well as my own 
understandings of the One Health discussions in the state to be able to deduce the likely 
explanations. While distinguishing qualitative research from journalistic accounts, one of 
the points Morse (2018, p. 806) makes is that in research, not all facts are treated equally 
and need factual verification. It might be more important to take some things at face value, 
make effort to understand the motivations behind a statement, rather than verifying its 
facts. Regardless of the extent of influence the outbreak response played on developing a 
One Health unit in Tamil Nadu, the fact that a key actor cited this experience would have 
made it an important factor while analysing the development of multisector collaborations 
in the state.10 
Lastly, Flick (2014) describes how triangulation can take place at different levels and 
forms. One way to account for the multiplicity of perspectives is by incorporating it in the 
sampling frame. As shown in Figure 5, I tried to ensure a diverse set of views by 
consciously sampling informants from both sectors, working at different administrative 
levels and having different roles.  
Positionality 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, and also described above, several people I interviewed as 
informants knew of me before through my earlier work on promoting multisector 
dialogue around zoonoses prevention and control in India. I had to think about my 
simultaneous identities as an insider – a doctor and public health researcher who had 
participated in policy discussions around One Health and rabies in Tamil Nadu and at 
national level previously - and an outsider, who obviously did not speak Gujarati/Tamil11, 
or work within the public sector. These factors inevitably played out in my interactions in 
the field. 
A potential source for introducing bias – my previous series of engagements with 
zoonoses actors in India – could also simultaneously help me increase the quality of my 
inquiry and interpretation. The virtue of having interacted with many of my respondents 
several times in the six years before my PhD, meant I could claim to have some 
                                                             
10 Refer to chapter 4 for more details  
11 All interviews were conducted in English, which all my participants were comfortable in 
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understanding of the practical contexts of zoonoses decision-making which at times 
helped me understand the reasons for the stands taken by my respondents. However, 
recognizing that relying too much on my own framings could prevent me from seeking 
alternative explanations, I scheduled repeat interviews with about a quarter of my 
respondents. These were typically, the officers charged with surveillance and response to 
zoonotic diseases in the animal and the human health sectors. 
I made it a point to meet these key officers at least twice in each of my three field visits – 
once at the beginning and once at the end. This allowed the officers to satisfy themselves 
about the purpose of my visit and allowed me to gain one level of validation for my 
findings. More importantly, during my last visit, when I realised that I had clearly run out 
of questions to ask these officers, and they had run out things to talk about with me, I 
began to keep my recorder off. This allowed me to engage with my interviewees in 
insightful conversations where they shared some of their insights and frustrations. This is 
where I got several important leads regarding bureaucratic cultures, and politics of 
decision making that informed my final analysis.  
Scheduling repeat meetings in a span of fifteen months and by conducting open-ended 
interviews, I hoped would allow them to explain their positions with more nuance and 
prevent me from assuming simplistic explanations for their decisions. In fact, most of my 
respondents did not appear to hold back from expressing their frustrations, while 
simultaneously acknowledging the impacts of their work.  
Seale (2002, p. 97) promotes a ‘craft skill’ conception of research practice, which suggests 
that researchers can develop ‘methodological awareness’, or “capacity to anticipate the 
consequences of methodological decisions while carrying out a research project” as an 
important dimension of research quality, one, that is independent of prevailing 
‘paradigms’ or ‘schools’.   
Accordingly, in addition to having open-ended interviews, I tried to improve the quality of 
my analysis by recording memos, as described below, triangulating with other 
respondents, whenever possible, and, through the periodic debriefings with my 
supervisors in between my field trips. Some other measures I employed for organising my 
databases, and adopting reflexive analytical processes, are explained below.  
Organising, coding and interpreting data 
Developing a rich database is one of the ways of improving validity of qualitative research 
(Finlay, 2002; Morse, 2015). The dataset from my fieldwork comprised of audio 
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recordings of all my formal interviews. I outsourced transcription of all my recorded 
interviews to an external consultant, which I then cross-checked with the recordings.  
I maintained a field diary during fieldwork that included a mix of meeting notes, 
observations in the field, as well as detailed reflections before and after each interview. 
Because of the way my interviews were organized, each interviewee represented a 
particular viewpoint: sector (animal, human), level of influence (national, state, district) 
and role (policy, program, research). In addition, most of the district level interviews, and 
those from certain technical institutions, related to a specific disease. I therefore 
developed a database of interview details, including the metadata related to each 
interview, and categorised theme along the themes of sector, level, city, organisation and 
disease, among others.  
Having a broad analytical framework proved very useful in structuring my disease-based 
empirical case studies. I extensively referred to interview transcripts, notes and audio 
recordings corresponding to the disease I was examining, while developing initial drafts of 
disease-based empirical chapters. This exercise of repeated perusal of my database helped 
me identify key arguments, as well as relevant quotations, under each broad analytic 
theme. Drafting successive iterations of the chapters helped me spot the linkages between 
different analytical themes and identify core arguments.   
Organising the database, sourcing quotations and developing my arguments was not a 
passive exercise, but required me to exercise a fair amount of judgment. As with most 
interpretative research, analysing elite interviews requires the researcher to ascertain the 
meanings used by the respondents in order for the researcher to construct their own 
definitions of reality (Magnusson and Marecek, 2015).  
Spoken language often involves subtle contexts, and therefore interview transcripts, at 
best, can record segments of conversations, incomplete sentences devoid of allusions and 
non-verbal cues that mark normal conversations. To attach meanings to these snippets of 
conversations, I had to refer frequently to my field diary and call upon my own 
recollections. While this helped give a context to the conversation, this also required 
reflexivity and vigilance on my part to realise the subtle ways my interpretations (of the 
interviewee meanings) could affect the ultimate analysis (Mikecz, 2012; Saville Young, 
2011). 
Anonymization 
Unlike conventional ethnographic research within local communities, researching  elites 
involves a different set of power dynamics (Gusterson, 1997; Nader, 1972). All my 
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interviews with serving officers were conducted with full knowledge of their supervisors. 
Almost all the interviews I conducted, took place in the offices of my informants, excepting 
the few, which I conducted over the phone, or with individuals who had retired. 
Consequently, the authority vested in public office ensured that the power gradients were 
never seriously challenged, even when I asked probing questions and my interviewees 
would have felt comfortable telling me off or opting out, if they wished to do so.  
However, interviewing people publicly, involving very specific areas of expertise and 
access, meant I could not promise absolute confidentiality to my informants. Given their 
levels of insight, even if I remove individual identifiers from their quotations, it might still 
be possible for ‘those in the know’ to identity my interviewees. I therefore committed to 
reconfirm with the informants before using their names with any of the quotes, while 
cautioning them that complete anonymization might not be possible even with the 
identifiers removed.  
Ethics 
My research underwent an ethical review process at University of Sussex, as well as the 
Institutional Ethics Committee at Public Health Foundation of India. The information 
sheets around my research mentioned contacts for ethical oversight of my research both 
in the UK as well as in India. I had undertaken to interview people with a high degree of 
responsibility and maturity with the implicit understanding that they would feel freer to 
opt out if they did not feel comfortable. I audio recorded all my consent agreements, where 
the interview was recorded.  
I aimed to make it clear to my interviewees that, while the transcripts themselves will be 
anonymized and their names will be removed (as requested by the respondent in the 
consent form), other identifiers such as the perspective of the respondent, geographical 
location or his/her office are an important part of the analysis and might not allow 
complete anonymity to the respondent.  
The research study also comprised a smaller component of informal interactions and 
conversations with subordinate staff working in peripheral settings, such as public health 
nurses or livestock extension officers. These visits to the districts were always 
preannounced and made with prior approvals of supervising officers. I did not interview 
any subordinate staff, apart from holding informal conversations. None of their names 
were recorded in the field notes and they have not been cited anywhere in my 
dissertation, thus ensuring their absolute confidentiality. In lieu of formal consent, I aimed 
to declare my identity as a researcher to everyone I came across in the field and shared an 
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information sheet about my study with them (Refer to Appendices C and D for copies of 
ethical approvals, consent and information documents).  
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I described and justified my choice of a comparative case study design with 
an ethnographic stance to answer my research question. I also explained the rationale for 
focussing on state-level policy discussions, focusing on selected zoonotic diseases across 
two different states to develop insights on how intersectoral collaborations occur and 
function around zoonoses in Indian context. I also reviewed the methodological challenges 
I encountered, including those emanating from my own positionality and the strategies I 
adopted to counter them.  
While I explained my focus on state-level and disease-level collaborations, the next 
chapter will situate the subsequent disease-based case studies within the larger discourse 
around One Health and collaborations taking place at the global and national levels.  
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4 TRANSLATING ONE HEALTH RHETORIC IN INDIA 
“In microbial terms, globalization is already a reality” (Whitman, 2000, p. 4) 
While I have described the beginnings of One Health and associated convergence 
movements in the preceding chapters, here I aim to analyse the framings around One 
Health more closely, including the practical translations at the national and state level.   
By looking at examples from Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, I move from the wider international 
and national framings of One Health to how collaborations are enacted in practice, 
highlighting, the importance of factoring in informality and the politics of knowledge 
underlying complex intersectoral collaborations in zoonoses into my analysis.  
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the term One Health is of recent origin, having been 
coined in the wake of global anxiety around emerging zoonotic diseases from the 
‘Manhattan Principles of One World, One Health’ (Cook et al., 2004). Despite the ‘many 
histories’ of animal-human health collaborations (Woods and Bresalier, 2014), there is 
little consensus on the meaning, scope or functions of One Health (Chien, 2013). Its 
meanings are still contested, making it a fluid concept with multiple connotations 
(Bardosh, 2016; Bardosh et al., 2017; Zinsstag et al., 2015). While some place its remit 
solely around zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases and argue about the place of 
other species (MacGregor and Waldman, 2017; Rock, 2017), others want to see the 
concept of One Health being applied to other domains, such as non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) (Turner, 2015) and plant health (Boa et al., 2015), among others. 
Given the fact that the affairs of each sector (animal health, human health, environment) or 
commodity (cattle, poultry, cereals, wildlife) are governed through their own respective 
intellectual disciplines and administrative bureaucracies, there are immense political 
interests at play depending upon how One Health is defined, and consequently how the 
involved stakeholders get selected to deliver on the vision.  
Scholars of discursive policy analysis recognise that “language profoundly shapes one’s 
view of the world and reality, instead of being only a neutral medium mirroring it” (Hajer 
and Versteeg, 2005, pp. 176–7). Citing Foucault’s approach to intertwining of knowledge 
and power, discursive analysis recognises how the manufacture and representation of 
narratives by different actors become an exercise of their political power (Hajer and 
Versteeg, 2005; Wagenaar and Cook, 2003).  
Within the context of emerging infections, Leach, Scoones and Stirling (2010a) describe 
how the problem of EIDs has been framed in the form of different narratives. These 
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narratives compete for attention and appeal to various policy actors, using different 
measures depending on how closely the narratives align with their respective worldviews 
(Chien, 2013). One of the dominant framings of zoonoses has been an understanding of 
disease emergence as a biological phenomenon, and as a potential threat to global health 
security (Elbe, 2011; Leach and Hewlett, 2010).12 
To be sure, there are competing narratives that challenge the purely biological and threat-
based conceptualisation of zoonotic diseases and emphasise studying disease emergence 
from social and ecological lenses as well. While social science scholarship (Dzingirai et al., 
2017b; Hinchliffe, 2015; Wallace et al., 2015; Wilkinson and Leach, 2015) has been at the 
vanguard of challenging these framings, scholars from other disciplines has questioned the 
simplistic construct as well. Those who have questioned the purely-biological framing of 
disease emergence and spread include biologists such as Bogich et al. (2012) and Daszak 
et al. (2013) who argue for the importance of factoring in systems thinking and 
interdisciplinary approaches, respectively. Others  include epidemiologists who have 
highlighted the associations between poverty and zoonoses (Jones et al., 2013) and 
discuss the importance of engaging with communities for constructing disease 
understandings (Wood et al., 2012).  
4.1 GLOBAL DISCUSSIONS AROUND ONE HEALTH: ACTORS 
Despite the presence of alternative framings to a narrow biomedical conceptualisation of 
One Health, many researchers believe that social factors continue to be neglected while 
analysing disease epidemiology,  as well as or in deliberating disease response at global 
and national levels (Bardosh, 2016; Cunningham et al., 2017; Dry, 2008; Galaz et al., 2016; 
Scoones and Forster, 2008). 
One possible reason for the dominant nature of biomedical, threat-based framings of One 
Health, which have been likened by some as an example of “technocratic tyranny” 
(Waltner-Toews, 2017), could be the strong top-down nature of the discourse surrounding 
development of One Health. As most histories of One Health discussions demonstrate, the 
development of the One Health movement was marked by the participation of multilateral 
and international agencies who themselves could not agree on the operational definition 
of One Health (Cassidy, 2016; Chien, 2013; Leboeuf, 2011). In her analysis of the 
development of the One Health movement among international institutions, Leboeuf 
                                                             
12 One example of such threat-based framing of zoonoses could be the article by Karesh and Cook 
(2005) in Foreign Affairs highlighting the ‘worrisome’ diseases crossing species and national 
barriers, or the one by Wolfe et al. (2007)which describes disease emergence as a purely biological 
phenomenon.  
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(2011) categorises the key institutional actors in five concentric circles. In her 
conceptualisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) and World Health Organization (WHO) constituted the primary 
vehicles for the propogation of One Health. Funding agencies, other multilateral agencies 
and research and  activist commuities comprised the peripheries in this conceptualisation. 
But this is not how the global governance of One Health turned out to be (Cassidy, 2018; 
Lee and Brumme, 2012).  
The term One Health originated from the ‘One World, One Health’ concept, which was 
trademarked by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) (Trademarkia, 2018). Possibly, in 
an attempt to remove the movement from ownership of the WCS, the tripartite of FAO, 
WHO and OIE promoted the term, ‘One Health’ in a series of international meetings; 
specifically the international Ministerial Conferences on Avian and Pandemic Influenza 
(IMCAPI). The term One Health was officially adopted in the Delhi Declaration of IMCAPI 
in 2007 (Chawdhry, 2007) and developed into a concept note for multi-agency 
collaboration in 2010 Hanoi IMCAPI (FAO et al., 2010).  
However, despite the idealised intentions to work together, the international agencies, 
which are notorious for their bureaucratic cultures (Weiss, 2016), were still struggling to 
develop a working definition of One Health and discussing how best to operationalise One 
Health several years down the line (Khabbaz, 2010).  
The disconnect between the expectations of the global One Health movement and local 
practices at country level have been documented in multiple country studies, such as those 
by Bardosh (2014), Okello (2014) and Smith (2014) with their colleagues. Given the top-
down nature of the One Health movement, it is not surprising that the difficulties faced by 
key sponsors of One Health found echoes at the country level too.  
Animal, environment and human health are generally housed in different ministries and 
their knowledge grounded in different disciplines. These bureaucratic and disciplinary 
silos, when combined with varying levels of motivation around One Health, offer real 
resistance to the integration envisaged by One Health (Jerolmack, 2013; Schmidt, 2009). 
This is possibly why there have been so few demonstrable examples of country level One 
Health collaborations, a major criticism of One Health approach (Chien, 2013; Gibbs, 2014; 
Lee and Brumme, 2012). 
Recent reviews of literature have highlighted the growing popularity of One Health. Galaz 
et al. (2015) and Valeix (2014) demonstrate, using bibliometric analysis, that many more 
papers and researchers have started referring to One Health over the last decade. 
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However, this increased popularity of the term among researchers hides the dominance of 
researchers and institutions residing in the Global North, and those advocating a top-down 
surveillance-oriented approach (Galaz et al., 2015; Valeix, 2014).  
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, it is clear that One Health still enjoys sufficient 
popularity to be able to sustain a One Health community. A One Health platform has been 
launched that has organised two more iterations of the International One Health Congress 
and brought out a newly launched One Health journal. There has been some alignment in 
the parallel eco-health and One Health movements, with both groups organising a joint 
conference in 2016.13 
The west African Ebola outbreak of 2014 (Wilkinson and Leach, 2015), and the high 
visibility of anti-microbial resistance (Chioro et al., 2015), have resulted in a large number 
of research groups working on the issue of zoonoses and emerging infections, many of 
them citing a One Health approach. 
The multilateral agencies are deepening their collaborations — a recent output being a 
‘bridge tool’ that combines elements from WHO’s IHR14 checklist and OIE’s PVS15 
assessment tools to develop a framework for assessing country capacities for One Health 
collaborations (WHO et al., 2014). However, as explained above, it is not clear how much 
of the current discourse around One Health is reflective of the holistic ‘one world’ thinking 
and how much  is predicated on the ‘research buzz’ around the concept (Galaz et al., 2015; 
Leboeuf, 2011).  
The disconnect between global rhetoric and local realities has been highlighted in other 
country contexts (Okello et al., 2014). The next section describes the interpretations of 
global discussions on One Health in India and its influence upon local policies.  
4.2 ONE HEALTH IN INDIA: INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
Before we can discuss the local interpretations of One Health discussions in India, it will be 
useful to clarify the institutional landscape around zoonoses in the country.  
As described in chapter 2, within the Indian federal administrative system, animal, 
environment and human health sectors are the responsibility of the sub-national state 
governments. However, with a few exceptions, a substantial portion of the technical 
expertise in the disciplines is housed within the central government funded Institutions.  
                                                             
13https://onehealthplatform.com/ 
14 International Health Regulations, at http://www.who.int/ihr/en/  
15 Performance of Veterinary Services, at http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/  
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In keeping with the size and diversity of the country, there are many institutions that work 
on some aspects of zoonotic diseases in the country. However, there are three major 
players as far as networks and policy visibility is concerned. These are the National Centre 
for Disease Control (NCDC), the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). The NCDC and ICMR are both health sector 
institutions, playing a role analogous to the US CDC (CDC) and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), respectively. The third institution, ICAR, belongs to the agriculture ministry 
and has a different role to play, as described below.  
First, the NCDC is officially a technical arm of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. It 
houses the national disease surveillance programme and is supposed to provide technical 
guidance and support to state governments in case of any health emergency. In addition, 
the NCDC also houses the National Standing Committee of Zoonoses that convenes multi-
departmental meetings on zoonotic diseases on a regular basis, as well as runs the 
national referral laboratories for rabies, brucella and leptospirosis, among others. As 
highlighted in the discussions with officers in these agencies, at times NCDC officials blur 
the boundaries between government bureaucrats tasked with implementing government 
mandates and technical experts who are also supposed to provide independent and 
considered advice to the key decision-makers.  
The second health institution is the ICMR, now having the status of an autonomous 
department within the Health ministry. It has a network of 26 centres of excellence 
enjoying expertise in niche areas, such as leprosy, leptospirosis, virology, and statistics. 
The ICMR is among the largest funders of research in neglected tropical diseases globally 
(Moran et al., 2012). It funds original research through research grants to medical colleges 
and universities and also funding the work of its own laboratories. In another indication of 
the differences in their institutional mandates, while officers in NCDC are referred to as 
Directors, all technical professionals in ICMR are designated as scientists.  
Scientific discussions around niche areas such as virology and vector-borne diseases have 
been dominated for more than 50 years by government-mandated centres of excellence, 
the National Institute of Virology (NIV) or the National Institute of Malaria Research 
(NIMR). Having half a century worth of intellectual leadership in an area brings in its wake 
notions of disciplinary ownership for many institutions. Enabled by technical expertise, 
decades of history, as well as an explicit government mandate, many central research 
institutions have developed a powerful influence in deciding how to interpret scientific 
evidence in their areas of disciplinary expertise.  
62 
 
The large number of government-funded institutions in health also means that the 
scientists from these institutions are frequently drawn upon either to provide expertise in 
government activities, such as outbreak investigations, or sometimes in running 
programmes on the behalf of the government itself, as seen in the case of the Integrated 
Disease Surveillance programme and NCDC. This means that scientists from national 
institutions are at times expected to tow the government line (as in the case of outbreaks) 
or are seen as extensions of central government’s authority (such as when visiting states 
for meetings or outbreak investigations).  
Both NCDC and ICMR lost face in the aftermath of the presumptive plague outbreak in 
Gujarat in 1994. As detailed by Garrett (Garrett, 2000) and Deodhar (1998), the outbreak 
resulted in huge economic losses and mass anxiety, but was based on laboratory tests of 
questionable specificity and quality performed by NCDC. The government of the day had 
to commission a special series of studies by then ICMR Director General V. 
Ramalingaswami (Ramalingaswami, 1996, 1995) to prove the presence of disease. I 
recount some additional examples of the functioning of NCDC in outbreak control and 
guideline development in chapters 5 and 6, and discuss the implications on public health 
response for zoonoses in India in the chapter 8.   
In a situation where institutional collaborations are difficult to develop, having cross-
sector institutional collaborations with the veterinary sector is even more complicated, 
given the fact that the Animal Husbandry Department is housed in Ministry of Agriculture, 
with resulting power dynamics between ministries and departments.  
Almost all research and teaching institutions in veterinary sciences are governed by 
ICAR—the third key actor involved in zoonoses discourse in India. ICAR is a huge entity. It 
manages a network of more than a hundred specialised research institutions and manages 
the accreditation of all agriculture and veterinary schools in the country.16 Scientists from 
ICAR can be deputed to work in the Department of Animal Husbandry as technical 
advisers to the minister, and therefore many senior ICAR scientists are quite familiar with 
policy concerns of their sector.  
Institutional capacity is different for the wildlife sector, the third sector commonly 
ascribed to One Health (Coker et al., 2011). Wildlife health comes under the Ministry of 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change in India. However, it has a much smaller 
presence in health discussions as opposed to the health and veterinary sectors. As 
depicted in Figure 6 above, a simple comparison of research output published from India 
                                                             
16Refer to http://www.icar.org.in/node/119 for details. 
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on ‘public health’, veterinary public health’ and ‘wildlife health’ on PubMed shows a vast 
majority of publications mentioning public health. The share of veterinary and wildlife to 
total health publications were so low so as to be almost invisible in the graph below (2.2% 
and 0.2%, respectively).17 
 
Figure 6: Research output from Indian institutions, by sector 
As indexed in PubMed (1985-2017) 
Wildlife agencies can be involved in diseases specifically affecting wildlife, such as anthrax, 
avian influenza, Kyasanur Forest Disease (KFD) and West Nile virus. However, apart from 
a small number of institutions, most laboratory and veterinary expertise generally come 
from a veterinary agency.  
4.3 ONE HEALTH IN INDIA: POLICY REALITIES 
The actual One Health (approach) that the world is following, or we can say, 
intends to follow, we too intend to follow. We can say that. But it will take 
some time - as it’s not that easy. There are so many different departments, 
which were working in different fields for such long time, so to make them 
come together (will be difficult).  (A11, 22 March 2016) 
The earlier sections described the fluid nature of One Health discourse that has resulted in 
multiple framings of the approach. As explained below, in some ways the key elements of 
One Health discourse are reflected at national level in India as well. On the other hand, 
                                                             
17 Keywords used for Pubmed search were as follows: (public health) AND India[Affiliation]; 
(veterinary public health) AND India[Affiliation]; and, (wildlife health) AND India[Affiliation]. 
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there are some aspects to the global discourse around One Health that simply fail to match 
with local needs. The institutions involved in zoonoses-related activities in India chose to 
make their own interpretations of the global discussions and tailored these to meet local 
requirements within the parameters of the local institutions.  
A key point of departure between international discourse and local discussions was on the 
way policy issues concerning diseases were prioritised. The focus of major international 
institutions was almost overwhelmingly on exotic (to the Global North), pandemic-prone 
and emerging infections, as exemplified by avian influenza, one of the three “entry points” 
identified by the FAO/OIE/WHO tripartite (2010).18   
On the other hand, an Indian priority setting exercise, of which I was a part, demonstrated 
how national stakeholders prioritised endemic/enzootic infections such as rabies, 
leptospirosis, brucellosis and anthrax, mentioning pandemic-prone influenza and 
emerging viruses much lower down (Sekar et al., 2011). This finding was echoed in other 
priority setting exercises set in different institutions, such as the NCDC (NICD, 2005), WHO 
(Gongal et al., 2009) and veterinary community (Kurian et al., 2014).  
In addition to the disconnect between international and national policy communities, the 
priority setting exercise for zoonoses in India also helped expose the disconnect that 
existed within the traditional academic community and felt needs from decision-makers. A 
follow-up study from our group in India compared the research priorities with actual 
research outputs and found them to be in contrast to each other. A section of decision-
makers felt the need for research focussing on social, political and economic factors 
around zoonoses. In contrast, when the actual research output of an exemplar zoonosis, 
rabies, was analysed, it was found that most research was conducted around biological 
factors that did not have an immediate bearing on the information needs of decision-
makers (Abbas and Kakkar, 2015; Kakkar et al., 2012). 
This disconnect between policy expectations and research output is not unique to 
zoonoses in India. Indeed, similar arguments were made in an analysis around the politics 
of zoonoses-related knowledge generation at the international level as well (Bardosh et al., 
2017). There could be multiple explanations for such a disconnect, including system 
architecture and individual incentives linked to the lack of intersectoral collaboration. An 
important factor in the Indian subcontinent is likely to do with the pedagogy of One 
Health. A survey among medical students found very low levels of awareness as applied to 
                                                             
18The third ‘entry point’ for establishing One Health collaborations was identified as rabies, which 
did resonate locally.  
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their curriculum. In contrast to medical training, zoonoses occupy an important role in the 
veterinary curriculum. However, for all its strengths around zoonoses, there are strong 
limitations to the way veterinary public health is taught in Indian veterinary schools 
(Kakkar et al., 2013).  
As I discuss later in chapter 7, within the veterinary sector, there is little to distinguish 
microbiology with public health apart from the selection of pathogens. There is very little 
epidemiology that is taught within most veterinary schools, the result being the focus in 
VPH, similar to microbiologists in human health sector, is more on absolute positives, 
rather than analysis of population level  trends (Field notes, B6, 25 Feb 2015). 
There is limited exposure to applied epidemiological competencies in both curricula and 
no time is given to cross-sector learning. No wonder that for most medical and veterinary 
professionals, the disciplinary silos inculcated during their graduate training persist for 
their entire professional lives.  
With regards to formal animal-human health collaboration platforms, there are no formal 
One Health programmes operational at the national level. The closest the government 
came to launching a jointly-funded One Health programme was when a national pilot 
programme on rabies control was proposed jointly by NCDC and the Animal Welfare 
Board of India in the 12th Five Year plan (Planning Commission of India, 2011). However, 
this also failed to secure funding and had to be abandoned. The one area where a One 
Health approach has been internalised across different government agencies relates to 
avian influenza. 
Public health agencies in India had been involved in developing pandemic preparedness 
plans from the first iteration of the document circulated by the CDC in 2004 even before 
the templates were eventually developed by the WHO. As one of my respondents, a former 
epidemiologist with the ministry, recalled:  
I think I first saw a pandemic preparedness plan in late 2004. That was the 
immediate response of US CDC following the China episode (of avian 
influenza). Then it was a lake in northern China - there were a lot of bald 
headed geese, and hundreds were dead. That started the alert. And in 
response to that, US CDC made a plan. That plan came to the minister who 
was Anbumani Ramadoss at that time. I remember there were 30 PDF files 
and all those things. And, incidentally, the person who led this operation from 
US later became the Ambassador to India, Nancy Powell.  
So, this document came and any proceedings over avian flu and their 
preparedness and pandemic...all those words came much later. But this 
process started the thing. And I clearly remember when I first wrote a 
comment on that. Using my common sense, I would not say public health 
sense, probably I was not trained enough till that time. So I said that we can 
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support them in supplies, we can support them with personnel...and also 
whenever this thing happens anywhere in the world, we can have a team 
prepared. 
DDGP (Deputy Director General Programmes) was laughing at me. Do you 
think they need people from my country? Or, supplies from my country? 
Nothing like that. 
So, that was my first episode of these things. After that in 2005, WHO adopted 
it. Remember, this happened before WHO came. So, the direct preference and 
all things were all removed. It was like a more broad and general document. 
And then they started looking into like where to say pandemics, phase I, 
phase II, phase III, all these. So they started basically looking at it and they 
took about a year I would say to come out with something very concrete. Till 
the end of 2005, the WHO documents were also not ready. There were some 
conflicts between documents. That became clear mainly after the Thailand 
outbreak.  
But China had huge outbreaks. So that is the time they started setting things 
in order and I was again roped in, this time by DG, not by DDGP and asked to 
prepare a document for pandemic preparedness for India.  
And I was told that 2 people would be working with me. Both of them very, 
very senior to me – one from programme side and one from lab side.  
So I went to the ministry, met the program person. He told me, “This isn't the 
way to prepare a document. We'll take the Canada pandemic preparedness 
programme and Indianise it.” So I started doing that. 
So that was the first document that was made and for quite some time it was 
known as my document. But that is the first printed document that went into 
the website of MoH. No template had come from WHO for preparing it at that 
time. (A4, 23 Feb 2015) 
The economic implications of the disease, coupled with high-level political mobilisation as 
a result of IMCAPI meetings put avian influenza high up on the policy radar. The template-
based structure of the pandemic preparedness plans and the related guidelines proved to 
be big success with the bureaucracy. The clear allocation of responsibility across health 
and animal husbandry departments provided a framework for communication at different 
levels.  
The formal task force and joint monitoring groups constituted for the purpose of 
responding to suspect avian influenza outbreaks (see Table 7 below) helped establish a 
protocol for communication within the framework of existing bureaucratic hierarchies.  
I found evidence that at least on one occasion, it was due to the communication enabled by 
an avian influenza meeting that the discussions around a broader One Health 
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collaboration were initiated in one state.19 The kernel of this bureaucratically mandated 
formal collaboration also helped develop coordination, as recalled by a veterinary officer 
in the central Department of Animal Husbandry: 
Specifically if you talk about avian flu, we are having very good co-ordination 
with Ministry of Health; Ministry of Environment & Forest. And every month, 
almost every month, they are having meeting under DGHS – the Director 
General of Health Services and we are a member. As far as co-ordination is 
concerned, avian influenza, by default, has been a boon to initiate the co-
ordination between the two sectors. 
And slowly, slowly, because of that co-ordination has been started for other 
diseases also because we know each other now. (A1, 4 Feb 2015). 
Table 7: Institutional mechanisms for coordination at national level  
Adapted from (Kakkar and Abbas, 2011) 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Convenor Membership Function 
Joint Task Force on 
Pandemic 
Preparedness and 
Response  
Secretary 
(Health) 
Policy makers Executive 
responsibility; In-
charge of pandemic 
preparedness and 
response 
Joint Monitoring Group 
on Pandemic 
Preparedness and 
Response 
Director General 
Health Services 
Programme 
managers 
Technical Officers 
Technical supervision 
& monitoring; 
implementing arm of 
Joint Task Force 
National Standing 
Committee on Zoonoses 
Director General 
Health Services 
Researchers 
Policy makers 
Observatory function; 
only formal body that 
meets in the absence 
of disease outbreaks 
ICMR-ICAR  
Research Collaboration 
on Zoonoses 
Indian Council 
of Medical 
Research 
Researchers Joint funding 
mechanism for 
zoonoses research 
Roadmap to Combat 
Zoonoses in India 
Initiative 
Public Health 
Foundation of 
India 
Researchers 
Policy makers 
Practitioners 
Collaborative research 
and advocacy 
 
In addition, one of my respondents informed me that following the declaration of the 
Ebola outbreak, the Joint Task Force on avian influenza would also be meeting to discuss 
other health emergencies (Respondent A3, WHO India, 05-Feb-15). 
In addition to the formal collaborative bodies convened by the government, it is quite 
possible that informal networks would be the venues where qualitatively more ideas 
might be exchanged. A survey of think-tanks demonstrated how the provision of a neutral 
                                                             
19 See discussions on the development of state’s One Health unit in Tamil Nadu, in chapter 7, where 
a series of interactions between the Director Public Health and Veterinary epidemiologists led to 
brainstorming on establishing formal collaborative mechanisms. 
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platform outside formal spaces can open up discussions (Bennett et al., 2011). As 
mentioned in chapter 1, I was personally involved in the activities of Roadmap to Combat 
Zoonoses in India initiative, one of the informal networks mentioned above and feel that 
its activities helped push forward the discussion around One Health and intersectoral 
collaborations. 
The RCZI initiative was established in 2008 in response to calls for increasing 
multisectoral collaborations around zoonoses in India. The RCZI was based at the 
autonomous, Public Health Foundation of India, where I worked at the time, and aimed to 
provide a space outside the formal sector to allow for more open discussions between 
major stakeholders and to raise the quality and content of zoonoses policy discussions in 
India. 
Another informal network, which is likely to have played a major role in influencing One 
Health discussions in India, was a postgraduate course in One Health offered by Massey 
University to 249 professionals working on One Health related areas in South Asia. The 
course involved workshops and conducting joint research projects together. Its influence 
on strengthening One Health related research and capacity building has been described by 
McKenzie et al. (2016) and as testified to by a senior veterinarian in the Department of 
Animal Husbandry: 
And because of that Massey program, we have been together for the master 
course—the medicos and the veterinarians. So, we have been able to develop 
personal relationships also and that is always helping (A1, 4 Feb, 2015). 
4.4 RHETORIC AND REALITY: GLOBAL VS NATIONAL 
While of late there have been many critiques of the One Health approach, ranging from 
those viewing it as the latest iteration in a long history of animal-human collaboration 
initiatives (Woods and Bresalier, 2014) to those critiquing a narrow, high-income country 
focus underlying the One Health discourse (Galaz et al., 2015) to still others advocating for 
a more inclusive and socially-rooted understandings of diseases and interventions 
(Craddock and Hinchliffe, 2015; Cunningham et al., 2017).  
However, in many ways, the earliest framings of One Health continue to inform the 
dominant narrative. These framings were typically structured around wildlife-origin 
infections (Karesh and Cook, 2005) from a global health security perspective (Elbe, 2011) 
and a predilection towards technological solutions for preventing disease emergence 
(Chatham House, 2010). Analysis of the scientific literature around One Health (Valeix et 
al., 2016) and attendances at One Health Congress (Valeix, 2017) demonstrates that the 
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One Health field continues to be overrepresented by small groups of scholars and 
institutions from the global North.  
While One Health did allow a focussing frame for discussion related to disease emergence, 
zoonotic diseases, as well as around the need for a multisectoral approach, it can also be 
argued that the One Health discourse actually distracted attention from felt needs of 
national and sub-national level actors. To illustrate the point, while the FAO/OIE/WHO 
tripartite (2012, p. vi) identified zoonotic influenza, rabies and antimicrobial resistance as 
‘entry points’ through which to initiate discussion around One Health, priority setting 
exercises in India and Africa demonstrated that the national actors prioritised endemic 
zoonoses more than they did exotic and emerging infections (Salyer et al., 2017, p. S60; 
Sekar et al., 2011).  
Continuing in a similar vein, another level of disconnect exists between the global rhetoric 
of One Health and local needs of the countries that are supposed to ‘operationalise’ One 
Health (Khabbaz, 2010). In many of the key texts associated with the One Health 
movement, there seems to be uncritical acceptance of the benefits to the countries of 
adopting a One Health approach.  
By the phrase ‘operationalising One Health’ these texts usually call for establishing formal 
intersectoral coordination mechanisms at country level with little regard to the actual 
requirements and challenges. Examples of such standardized approaches include a WHO 
SEARO-WPRO published guidelines on ‘establishing collaboration between animal and 
human health sectors at the country level’ or the WHO-OIE-FAO (2014) operational 
framework for improving governance.  
Even when One Health ‘operational frameworks’, such as the recent publication by the 
World Bank and Ecohealth Alliance (2018, p. x), claim that “there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach for One Health implementation”, they still end up putting health interests above 
all others, such as in the oxymoronic phrase “The Need for Multi-Sectoral Public Health 
Systems” (2018, p. 2) and offer an uncritical acceptance of the assumption that One Health 
is a public good, beneficial for all sectors, even if their concerns are not directly addressed.  
This tendency to prioritise human health perspectives over others is not unique to One 
Health discourse, and was very clearly demonstrated in the WHO’s strategy advocating the 
inclusion of ‘Health in All Policies’ (2013) following its work on Social Determinants of 
Health. There is an almost naïve expectation that other, possibly less-resourced, 
departments will listen to public health concerns and allocate their personnel without a 
clear sense of benefits that could accrue to them.  
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It is  despite, or possibly precisely because of, such a blinkered approach to One Health, 
that its operationalisation continues to be discussed in international fora (CDC, 2011; 
Prince Mahidol Awards Conference, 2013; Public Health Foundation of India, 2013) by 
white haired men (Valeix, 2017) from the global North (Galaz et al., 2016), while its 
approach faces a variety of barriers at the international and national levels (Abbas and 
Kakkar, 2013; Lee and Brumme, 2012; Okello et al., 2014).   
4.5 CONCEPTUALISING ONE HEALTH COLLABORATIONS AT STATE LEVEL 
Despite the achievements of formal national-level collaborative mechanisms discussed 
earlier, such as those around pandemic response, or the informal alumni network 
developed by Massey, it is clear that these might not echo the ideals of formal, functional 
intersectoral collaborations as envisioned in the One Health literature.  
However, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the autonomy of state governments, 
combined with the relatively simpler institutional politics, make these the ideal venue for 
development of innovative models for intersectoral collaborations around zoonoses 
prevention and control.  
While the following chapters will discuss specific instances of disease-based 
collaborations in my study states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, I will use this section to 
describe the different ways in which both states tried developing animal-human health 
collaborations going beyond individual diseases.  
Officers in both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu told me about having had a history of disease-
based collaborations between the animal and human health sectors. It involved 
leptospirosis in Gujarat and rabies in Tamil Nadu, both going back at least 15-20 years. 
However, for the most part, there was no overarching collaborative platform for 
developing coordinated response to zoonoses and other issues of mutual interest to 
animal and human health agencies, apart from the generic emergency response 
committees that are convened to respond to different kinds of emergencies, such as for 
natural disasters or disease outbreaks. Of late, though, with the increasing prominence of 
zoonoses and increased popularity of One Health, governments in both the states had 
started thinking of developing more permanent collaborative mechanisms, as described 
below.  
Celebrating One Health in Gujarat 
On my first visit to Gujarat in February 2015, in the very first meeting I had, the then 
Director of Animal Husbandry, told me about a seminar on One Health just one month 
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earlier. It was organised by the department along with veterinarians in the state and was 
opened by the state chief minister, a source of obvious pride for him. He shared a 
compendium of ‘articles on One Health’ with me and assured me that they strongly 
believed in the concept of intersectoral collaborations. 
I was quite excited by the idea of veterinary and public health officers conducting technical 
discussion among themselves with the encouragement of the political leadership. 
However, a perusal of the seminar compendium (Figure 7) afterwards proved sobering for 
me. It consisted of a compilation of articles from a recent issue of the OIE journal covering 
One Health. The single page introduction, possibly the only original content in the booklet, 
cited the importance of cross-sector collaboration without mentioning the state public 
health department. As far as I could tell, only one public health officer was invited to 
attend the meeting.  
 
Figure 7: A compendium of articles on One Health, January 2015, Gujarat 
Apart from the seminar hosted by the animal husbandry department, the officers told me 
there were ongoing instances of collaborations with human health agencies, mostly in 
response to suspected zoonoses disease outbreaks. Depending upon the seriousness of the 
crisis, and the level of interest in political leadership, the degree of intersectoral 
collaboration could range from information sharing to physical exchange of personnel or 
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resources. It is important to keep in mind that such high levels of interests cannot be 
sustained. But that does not mean that such intersectoral collaborations are not possible.  
As seen in the case of leptospirosis in Gujarat (see quote below), the threat of upcoming 
outbreaks makes sure that a minimum level of communication and engagement is 
maintained between both the departments more than two decades after the initial 
outbreak.  
Like in Chandipura virus, CCHF virus they have full involvement, and they are 
also taking anti-tick preventive measures...for the concerned disease. So we 
have good collaboration with them. And off and on we are meeting, around 
twice in a year or thrice in a year, and we have a collaboration with the 
agriculture department also, for leptospirosis, for anti-rodent activity.   
This is formal mechanism, whenever we call the meeting for this Chandipura 
virus, or CCHF or...leptospirosis, we have formed one committee, coordination 
committee, at the state-level and district-level. So we are calling them…. And 
this is regular process.   
Mostly health department leads it and others join, and, how to control and 
how to employ their staff and which type of insecticide or this...for the 
prevention purpose, discussions they do, and finally the implementation part, 
we implement, the government, this health department side, human side and 
they act on animal or agriculture side (E4, 12-Aug-15) 
In summary, efforts to develop ‘One Health’ collaborations in Gujarat generally seemed to 
be geared towards episodic events, and in response to specific requirements for 
collaboration. When discussions around collaborations did take place, as was the case of 
the One Health seminar, the efforts of the veterinarians seemed to be to justify their 
presence and scope of contributions towards such a collaboration, rather than any offer to 
lead.  
Institutionalising collaborations in Tamil Nadu 
While the state officers I met with in Tamil Nadu were as voluble and proud of their work 
on zoonoses as in Gujarat, the intersectoral collaborations I noticed in Tamil Nadu were 
qualitatively different from those observed in Gujarat. As mentioned in chapter 3, I have 
tracked intersectoral collaborations longer in Tamil Nadu than in any other state in India. 
The factors that initially drew me to Tamil Nadu are still ones that set it apart from most 
other states in India.  
As also described in chapter 3, most states have intersectoral representative committees 
for overseeing surveillance, pandemic preparedness and response, among other functions. 
However, their activities seldom extended beyond these specified loci and mostly function 
in an ad hoc manner. We discovered in 2010 that Tamil Nadu had developed a formal 
intersectoral collaborations committee for facilitating communication and coordinating 
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response for rabies control in the state. The state government did not look at it as a ‘One 
Health’ innovation at the time, but its leading officers were happy to use our presentations 
hailing it in those terms (Abbas et al., 2011a; Kakkar et al., 2011a).   
A further series of fortuitous circumstances resulted in the development of proposals for a 
more formal One Health unit to work at the state and district levels. The Director of Public 
Health, Dr Kolandiswamy, mentioned how his experience of working closely with 
veterinarians over a month-long period while responding to a suspect avian influenza 
outbreak in 2014 made him aware about the capacities of the veterinary sector and the 
overlapping of their respective mandates (Field notes, 18 July 2015).  
Incidentally, the chief bureaucrats in the health and animal husbandry departments both 
had substantial experience of the other department as well. While the health secretary, Dr 
J Radhakrishana, was initially trained as a veterinarian, Mr Vijay Kumar, then heading the 
Animal Husbandry department, had previously had a stint as a Special Secretary in Health 
department. While veterinarians generally are known to be much more aware of zoonoses 
and the need for collaborations (Frank, 2008), I am sure the initiative must also have been 
helped by the fact that the key public health officers involved in the discussions had been 
trained in a two-year FETP programme at the Chennai-based National Institute of 
Epidemiology, and consequently been more aware about current discussions around EIDs, 
zoonoses and One Health.  
The Health Secretary developed a keen interest in pursuing the idea of institutionalising a 
formal collaboration between both the departments. He accordingly convened a meeting 
on 13 August, 2015 to discuss the possibility of establishing a formal collaboration 
between both the departments. While I do not know its current status, an ‘in-principle’ 
approval of the body had been secured in 2016 and a draft Government Order prepared. 
The health department, ostensibly with access to more resources, was to house a One 
Health unit at the state level using funds earmarked for zoonoses control from existing 
surveillance programmes and led by a senior veterinary officer. A virtual unit to be led by 
a veterinarian deputed from the Department of Animal Husbandry was supposed to 
ensure collaborations at the district level (Field notes, 22 Feb, 2016 and documents from 
the office of Director Public Health) (Figure 8).  
74 
 
 
Figure 8: File for state epidemic coordination committee meeting 
I felt the unit was a clever bureaucratic innovation on several accounts. By using in-service 
veterinarians instead of hiring relatively junior veterinary officers on a contractual basis 
(as was proposed in the national guidelines), the health department was able to secure the 
collaboration of staff with strong networks and practical experience of veterinary 
surveillance (B13, 25 June 2015). The Animal Husbandry department, in turn, got access 
to the resources of the health department and a chance to increase the profile of their 
contributions.  
Even from the brief description above, several key differences in both the states’ 
approaches to intersectoral collaboration start emerging. The instances of collaboration in 
Gujarat, be it the case of the One health seminar or the coordination committees 
mentioned in the quote,  all seem to be geared to meet immediate needs and with no 
attempts at establishing something more ongoing.  
The Tamil Nadu approach, in contrast, seeks to build upon pre-existing experiences of 
collaboration, around rabies, avian influenza and epidemic coordination, in order to build 
a longer-term collaborative platform. Apart from outbreak response, this could function in 
normal times, as well and benefit both departments through pooling of resources and 
more efficient use of existing sources of central government funding.  
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The Tamil Nadu experience differed from the Gujarat collaboration in another significant 
way. While the discussions in Chennai were led by the most senior officers of the 
departments of health and animal husbandry, meetings in Gujarat appear to have been 
convened by relatively junior technocrats.  
The themes of formal versus informal collaborations and the contrasting politics of 
bureaucracies in different settings are relevant to the other case studies as well, as the 
subsequent chapters will show.  
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
To summarise, I discuss in this chapter the overall discourse around One Health at the 
global level and examine the various ways in which Indian actors have responded to it at 
the national, institutional and state levels. Specifically, I also discuss the landscape of 
zoonoses-related institutions operating at the national level and contrast their response to 
the rhetoric of One Health. Lastly, I conclude this chapter with some examples of state-
level intersectoral collaborations in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, highlighting contrasting 
bureaucratic cultures and practices. I also introduce the themes of problem framings, 
bureaucratic systems and institutional memories that I will further develop in the 
following empirical chapters.  
  
76 
 
5 INVESTIGATING ANTHRAX 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed the way One Health is understood and discussed in India 
and how health policy decisions are made within the federal administrative structure 
unique to the country.  This chapter takes the example of anthrax, an outbreak-causing 
zoonosis, to examine how the challenges of disease prevention and control, as well as 
possible solutions, are conceptualised by human and animal health agencies in the state of 
Tamil Nadu and their influence on intersectoral collaborations.  
I start by discussing the unique properties of anthrax that make it an interesting case 
study for policy research—its potential to cause fatal outbreaks and be used as a biological 
weapon—both factors that influence the way it is understood popularly. At the same time, 
as it affects a marginalised section of population most commonly, the everyday nature of 
the disease is often ignored, causing it to be placed lower in the disease priority agenda, at 
least in the human public health sector. I also examine the peculiar epidemiologic and 
social characteristics of the disease that make it a policy challenge.  
I use my experience of shadowing an outbreak investigation team during my fieldwork to 
examine what the process of investigating and responding to an actual zoonotic disease 
outbreak looks like. The experience also allowed me to analyse how frontline managers 
make use of scientific evidence to make practical decisions in a situation of high 
uncertainty.  
I combine the insights gained from the outbreak investigation with my interactions with 
researchers and programme managers to unpack the social construction of anthrax. One of 
the themes I examine includes the different kinds of understanding that seem to exist 
about the disease itself, as well as the risks it represented and how it informed the 
response to the outbreak.  
I discuss the asymmetries of knowledge and how these might invert the power dynamics 
between the animal and human health sectors. Continuing in a similar vein, I unpack the 
politics of knowledge while discussing how different types of ‘scientific proof’ could be 
cited to justify a particular decision, even as the strong undercurrent of political realities 
informed the decision-making process.  
Finally, I conclude with reflections on the nature of collaborations seen in the field around 
anthrax, their characteristics and factors influencing them. 
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5.2 THE ANTHRAX STORY 
Zoonotic diseases are frequently categorised as emerging/re-emerging or endemic20. 
Emerging zoonoses are those that are associated with frequent outbreaks and increased 
risks of human mortality (Daszak et al., 2000). The endemic/enzootic zoonoses, on the 
other hand, are supposed to be highly prevalent among poorer populations, but not visible 
in the policy agenda. These are, therefore, also interchangeably referred to as neglected 
zoonoses (Grace et al., 2017).  
As with most mutually-exclusive categorizations, the dichotomy of neglected-endemic and 
outbreak-prone, emerging zoonoses turned out to be false one, as exemplified by anthrax 
below. Anthrax incorporates the characteristics of both the categories. It is not reported 
upon frequently, even in media, unless there is a large outbreak, or when bio-terror 
weapons are discussed. Apart from stray reports of death among wildlife, most anthrax 
outbreaks in India have been reported among the tribal communities and workers 
handling animal carcasses in slaughterhouses and tanneries. These groups are generally 
considered as among the most marginalized communities in India. However, they are 
usually limited to a few cattle deaths, thus limiting their spread. One exception is when the 
meat from diseased animals is served in community gatherings, resulting in a community 
outbreak (Lalitha and Kumar, 1996; Ray et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 9: News story on anthrax in Jharkhand (Times News Network, 2016a) 
                                                             
20 For instance, see Cutler et al. (2010), Grace et al. (2012a), Halliday et al. (2012) & Maudlin et 
al (2009) 
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Therefore, while anthrax outbreaks are generally ignored (because of the geographic areas 
and populations anthrax tends to affect), this leads to furthering their neglect by way of 
limited epidemiological data. And when larger outbreaks of anthrax are reported in the 
media, it can be argued that they serve to further popular prejudices against scavenging, 
meat-consuming castes or religious groups.  
While the issue of eating beef has assumed greater political visibility in recent years, there 
has always been some prejudices against consumption of meat by  non-Brahmin 
communities among north Indian upper caste groups (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2016; 
Vaidyanathan, 2015). In the case of anthrax, the elitist prejudices against trade in cattle, 
consumption of beef and a tribal identity are all reflected in the news story shown in 
Figure 9 (Times News Network, 2016a).21  
If undetected, anthrax has the potential to kill a large number of animals within a short 
time, and potentially spread to humans as well. The high transmissibility of anthrax, 
combined with its enzootic presence in places it affects, accounts for high prioritisation 
accorded to the disease in districts identified as having enzootic anthrax. As described in 
the following quote from a veterinary epidemiologist from the state: 
In rabies and anthrax if at all any animals are infected, then they have to be 
slaughtered – immediately. Every day that the problem is there (situation 
becomes more serious). My point of view is (that for) anthrax and rabies you 
have to give more importance. (B14, 15 July 2015) 
As I will demonstrate further in this chapter, the dual-visibility of anthrax has, in some 
ways, managed to restrict it twice over from gaining a relevant place in the political 
agenda. Even as it has been classified as a disease of economic importance by the 
Department of Animal Husbandry22, which finances vaccination against the disease, there 
is limited information on its actual burden, contributing to its neglect and limited 
awareness further still among researchers and practitioners alike. Despite several reports 
of human outbreaks being reported annually, there is no national level strategy on anthrax 
as of now. In order to understand the reasons for this neglect, we will need to first 
understand the peculiar biological and social characteristics of the disease, as discussed in 
the following section.  
                                                             
21 For a further discussion on politics of cattle trade and slaughter, see chapter 7 
22 Source: Interview with veterinary officer, C9, 9 March 2016 
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5.3 DISEASE CHARACTERISTICS 
Anthrax has had a long history in public health and in the Indian subcontinent. The 
anthrax bacterium was the first microbe to be conclusively linked to a disease in 1876 
(Sternbach, 2003).23 It was one of the three major diseases recognised as a priority by the 
early colonial government in British India, along with cholera and venereal diseases,  given 
the large numbers of cattle and horses needed for food and transportation (Harrison, 
1994, p. 62).   
Then, as now, outbreaks of anthrax commonly occur among field-grazing animals that can 
be infected by the spores from earlier outbreaks of anthrax lying dormant in the ground. 
The disease results in sudden deaths among animals with characteristic bleeding around 
mouth, nose and hinds. As is the case with many outbreak-prone and fatal infectious 
diseases, the outbreaks are noticed suddenly and, if responded to early, can be contained 
in a few days. Due to the sudden and visible nature of animal deaths, anthrax is easily 
recognizable and allows veterinary epidemiologists to respond early by separating 
infected herds and ensuring vaccination in and around the infected village.  
Anthrax is highly transmissible within animals and to humans from animal fluids. This 
usually happens in the case of animal owners, butchers or animal hide workers who 
transport or deal with animal carcasses. Most cases of anthrax outbreaks in India, 
however, occur in forest fringe areas and among tribal populations who may have 
consumed meat from dead animals (Lalitha and Kumar, 1996; Ray et al., 2009). The 
treatment of anthrax is relatively simple with commonly available antibiotics. The fact that 
anthrax still results in human mortality at all therefore points to its status as a classic 
disease of poverty that is more likely to have an impact on marginalised populations who, 
because of distance or social exclusion, have least access to health services.  
Anthrax bacilli exist in two main forms: as hardy spores outside human body and, while 
within an animal body, they exist in a much more vulnerable vegetative form. As one of my 
interviewees , C1, informed me, anthrax spores enjoy a ‘legendary’ status within the 
infectious disease community for their ability to survive in harsh conditions for decades 
(WHO et al., 2008). This has significant epidemiological implications and it means that 
once anthrax affects a village, all villages within the eight kilometre radius are placed on 
an ‘anthrax endemic’ list requiring intensive surveillance and vaccination for several years 
afterwards.  
                                                             
23 This research led to the development of famous Koch postulates of disease causation, a 
cornerstone of epidemiologic methods even now.  
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The high transmissibility and persistence of anthrax infection is also the reason why 
transport and proper disposal of animal carcasses assumes so much importance for 
anthrax. While bleeding from dead animals is a likely risk for anthrax transmission to 
humans, it is also possible that the anthrax bacilli can use the blood flowing from the dead 
animal to flow into ground and form spores that will persist for decades in the 
environment. This is where one of my respondents, a veterinary epidemiologist, offered 
this crucial bit of insight to me wherein he showed how an epidemiologist could still get 
the best of the ‘legendary’ bacteria: 
Most people talk about spores and threats of bioterrorism. Don’t confuse 
vegetative forms with spores… vegetative bacteria is fragile. It can’t compete 
with other organisms and cannot survive outside the body except as spores. It 
takes somewhere between 18 hours and 3 days to form spores in soil in the 
presence of precise set of environmental conditions.  
Anthrax, in its vegetative form, is among the most fragile of organisms... If 
you don’t cut open the carcass of a dead animal, chances are the organism 
will not be able to survive the time needed to form spores. Since transport 
and burial is so expensive (the WHO recommended strategy of incineration 
practically impossible), the best alternative will be to seal the head of the 
animal in plastic bags to prevent blood from coming out. Cover the animal in 
tarpaulin/plastic sheets, leave it undisturbed for 3 days and only then bury it. 
By that time, there will be very less chance for anthrax bacilli to survive in 
closes carcasses. (C1, 27 July 2015) 
Between 2009 and 2014, 87 different outbreaks of anthrax were recorded in Tamil Nadu, 
with cows and buffaloes being twice as likely to get affected as the smaller sheep and 
goats.24 However, this figure is likely an underestimate. As the veterinary officer described 
to me:  
Most anthrax diagnosis in the field is presumptive; when the vets find sudden 
deaths and bleeding from the natural orifices. The Central Referral 
Laboratory did not culture anthrax because they did not have BSL-3 
(Biosafety benchmark) facilities. (C1, 3 March 2016) 
And perhaps that is why among veterinary epidemiologists reporting on the disease: 
The word outbreak was not used to describe the situation. We always used 
the term ‘suspect outbreak’ of anthrax even if some animal died … since the 
disease was not laboratory confirmed. (C1, 3 March 2016) 
While strictly speaking, the WHO guidelines seem to support this stance (WHO et al., 2008, 
p. 119), this is an old trick used frequently by public health agencies for producing lower 
disease estimates. As I had personally observed before in the case of rabies in the same 
state, the lack of diagnostic capabilities was actually helpful to public health officers in 
                                                             
24 Source: Interview with veterinary epidemiologist B3, 27 February 2015 & 17 July 2015 
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reporting decreased disease incidence and contributed to imprecise epidemiology (Abbas 
et al., 2011b). 
A real-life implication of this failure to enumerate outbreaks was brought home to me in 
another interview. A scientist working on anthrax described to me the situation in the 
neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka where lack of information directly 
resulted in decreased resource allocation, and a reduction in state capacity to respond to 
the disease, as follows:  
Anthrax is now being neglected in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka states. 
They have stopped producing Sterne’s vaccine25 citing lack of cases. But this 
is because the diagnostic capacity is not there… People are not trained in 
simple microscopy (for detecting anthrax). It is all a ‘hushed up conspiracy’ 
where no one wants to look at and talk about anthrax. (B15, 1 Mar 2016) 
On the flip-side, despite the lack of awareness, news about a new disease is not always 
welcome. This is best illustrated by the experiences of Dr Jacob John, a Christian Medical 
College (CMC) microbiologist, who helped establish the presence of anthrax in Vellore 
through his disease surveillance programme in the nineties (George et al., 1994). As he 
recalled to me:  
The Tamil Nadu secretary calls in and he says, “Why are you putting in 
anthrax in NADHI Bulletins? There is nothing in anthrax”. So I explained to 
him saying that “We are looking at all human diseases, and therefore, this 
came out” and then he said, “Please don’t repeat this”. I was smiling inside 
myself. Any other country, people would have patted me on the back that we 
have done good work. But here denialism is there. (Interview with Jacob John, 
27 July 2015) 
In a real-life illustration of the cycle of neglect affecting neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), 
as discussed later in chapter 8, a lack of attention to anthrax resulted in reduced 
information about the disease, which further feeds the neglect of the disease. This 
phenomenon further comes through in my examination of everyday decision-making 
practices around anthrax, as observed in the aftermath of an outbreak of the disease, as 
discussed below.   
5.4 ANTHRAX AT THE COALFACE 
Vellore 
As described in chapter 3, I made multiple visits to the state of Tamil Nadu during the 
course of my fieldwork, and this included two visits to the hospital town of Vellore. One 
                                                             
25 It is the most commonly used anthrax vaccine strain for animals which was developed by 
immunologist Max Sterne back in 1937 (Turnbull, 1991).  
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time capital of former Nawabs of Arcot, it is now best known for its huge leather industry26 
and its two educational institutions, the venerable Christian Medical College (CMC) and 
the recently built Vellore Institute of Technology.  
Academics at CMC Vellore have been reporting anthrax at least since 1977, when it was 
still considered to be a ‘rare’ disease among humans (Koshi et al., 1981). However, once 
they started following cases more closely, they managed to diagnose around 50 people 
with anthrax over the next 20 years (Lalitha and Kumar, 1996). The increased reporting of 
human anthrax cases was, no doubt, also helped by a pioneering mail-based multi-disease 
surveillance system put in place by public health physicians at CMC in the 80s (Jacob John 
et al., 1998). The surveillance project was responsible for uncovering an outbreak of 
anthrax in neighbouring Chittoor district in Andhra Pradesh in 1990 and establishing its 
continued presence in the district (George et al., 1994).  
According to local veterinarians:  
Approximately twenty outbreaks of anthrax have taken place among animals 
in last two decades in Vellore, though now it is less in frequency. Because of 
the frequent reporting of anthrax from various (administrative) blocks in the 
district, the entire district has been considered as endemic since 2011. This 
means that anthrax vaccination campaigns are conducted regularly for all 
domesticated animals. We estimate almost 80% coverage (C1, 27 July 2015). 
While many of the people affected by anthrax were found to have handled animal hides 
and carcasses, no outbreaks have been reported among the tanneries in and around 
Vellore. Almost all the ‘zoonoses experts’ I met with outside Vellore, cited consumption of 
and working with dead meat within tribal communities as a major source of anthrax 
spread. In the context of Vellore, with its numerous tanneries, the implication was that it 
must be more common among the people working in the unclean professions associated 
with dead animals. This mirrors Marsland (2014) and other anthropologists’ depiction of 
senior health officers’ understanding of local traditions being a source of disease.  
However, when I interviewed veterinary epidemiologists based in the district, they had a 
different understanding of the disease: 
I have never come across tannery workers with anthrax. There are so many 
chemicals being used in the tanneries that I doubt that any bacteria will 
survive. Also, most tanneries now provide much better protection for their 
workers, like gloves, shoes, etc. Most people who get anthrax handle 
carcasses or have consumed meat. These are obviously people who are poor, 
illiterate and who don’t have access to health services. (C1, 3 Mar, 2016) 
                                                             
26 Vellore has a sizeable leather production and processing units, including tanneries, contributing 
more than a third of India’s leather exports. (District Administration-Vellore, 2016). 
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I had a unique opportunity to observe how some of these concepts played out in real life 
settings when I chanced upon an outbreak of anthrax in my second visit to the district. I 
learnt about a potential outbreak of anthrax on 4th March 2016, my first day in Vellore, 
when I went to meet the district public health officer, whom I will refer to as Dr Sunil27. 
Apparently, he had just received information of sudden deaths of tens of sheep which took 
place in Keelvenkatapuram village in Nemili block a few days before.28 He was in the 
process of putting together a Rapid Response Team (RRT) mandated by the national 
disease surveillance programme that could conduct the initial outbreak investigation.  
I had the right references and permissions, and so could accompany the RRT to the 
affected village. The RRT consisted of a young medical graduate, who was also the district 
epidemiologist and whom I will refer to as Dr Rajiv, as well as two health workers, along 
with another officer we met in the village (see Figure 10). What follows are edited 
excerpts from my field notes that establish the basic facts of the outbreak and my 
observations.  
Outbreak Investigation 
  
Figure 10: Rapid response team surveying households in affected village 
(faces blurred to protect anonymity) 
After waiting for a short while for the driver, our 9-seater car started for the 
affected village, about two hours’ drive from the district headquarters. I 
learnt from Dr Rajiv, the district epidemiologist, about the reporting of the 
outbreak. Apparently, the initial information (of sudden deaths in sheep) 
came not from animal husbandry department, but from a municipal officer 
who happened to be visiting the area the day after several animals died in 
the village. He promptly informed the public and animal health officers at the 
same moment I was visiting the DDHS office. (Field notes, 5 March, 2016) 
Luckily, no human cases had been reported so far and the brief for the outbreak 
investigation team was to assess the extent of the outbreak and identify potential risks for 
                                                             
27 Referred to as the Deputy Director of Health Services, or DDHS, in Tamil Nadu. 
28 Some information about the outbreak can be found on ProMED-mail (2016). 
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the human population in the area. When we entered the village for the first time, it was at 
least three days since the sudden and large number of animal deaths had started. There 
was no sign of the veterinarians. However, I was informed that they were conducting their 
own parallel investigations, but were a bit stretched as they were also conducting a state-
wide vaccination campaign against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) the same week as the 
outbreak. 
The public health team was told by some of the villagers that the deaths 
(among sheep and goats) had been taking place since January and were not a 
recent phenomenon. The village had lost around 450 sheep/goat out of a 
total small animal population of around 1,450 in the village.  
They did not inform the authorities (about the deaths) and went on disposing 
off the animals in the ‘usual ‘way’. We were told by a young farmer that while 
they might not be aware of anthrax, most people know that the meat of dead 
animals is not to be eaten, except for some ‘illiterate and poor’. Some elder 
people also say, ‘why do you want to let it go to waste?’ (Field notes, 5 March, 
2016) 
One of the health workers in the investigation team apparently belonged to the same 
village. We came to know from him that most goat/sheep owning families stayed in 2-3 
small pockets in the village. All animal deaths had taken place only within these 
households. Upon further enquiries by Dr Rajiv, the young and enthusiastic 
epidemiologist, we also learnt that the deaths had only taken place among animals which 
used to go for grazing in a dried riverbed, around 7-8 kilometres from the village. One of 
the explanations for the outbreak I later heard was that torrential rains some time ago 
might have loosened the dormant spores already present in the river bed and brought 
them to the surface. 
I received an interesting lesson in the linguistic culture of different disciplines when Dr 
Rajiv was planning his village-wide survey and started referring to dead animals as 
‘deceased’, later corrected himself, but was still unsure whether to use the epidemiological 
terms ‘casualty’ or ‘mortality’ instead! The public health investigation team also proved to 
be more accepting of the community’s version of animal death toll. Some farmers claimed 
that the deaths had been taking place in smaller numbers for two months and a total of 
450 animals were dead because of the disease. This was the number noted down by Dr 
Rajiv in the beginning, even though this fell in the face of anthrax being the cause (as it 
usually occurs in short episodes and subsides immediately following 
treatment/vaccination).  
I met some veterinarians in the area a few days later as they were completing their 
vaccination of livestock against anthrax (see Figure 11). I found them to be much more 
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pragmatic. They confirmed the outbreak as being of anthrax, citing laboratory reports and 
mentioned potential claims for government benefits as one of the possible reasons for 
higher numbers being reported. Usually anthrax does not result in more than a handful of 
animal deaths, possibly because most outbreaks take place in the more expensive cattle 
that are reported earlier and also because at least in Tamil Nadu, a good proportion of 
livestock are insured and consequently, most of them are fully vaccinated against major 
diseases, including anthrax. The sheep/goats in the affected village are often taken to large 
distances for grazing and, according to the veterinary officers, might have been missed 
during the vaccination rounds in the village.   
 
Figure 11: Goats being vaccinated against anthrax in Vellore. 
Controlling an outbreak 
Dr Rajiv being the junior-most doctor, and the only one on an ad hoc contract in the 
district public health office had conducted the bulk of the outbreak investigation so far. 
The public health department’s RRT made two more field visits in the course of three days. 
No human cases were detected and the department could afford to deploy its manpower 
in other places.  
Serendipitously, on the last day of my stay in Vellore, the public health office learnt that a 
few residents of the affected village were thought to have reported to a hospital with 
cutaneous anthrax. This is a milder form of anthrax infection. It is restricted to the skin 
and typically develops in exposed areas following the handling of infected animals. It is 
supposed to be treatable with antibiotics. 
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Now that the outbreak had spread to human populations, there was an increased level of 
urgency. Accordingly, I was asked to come to a primary health centre near the village 
where another RRT, with more senior members consisting of state-level experts, was 
supposed to assemble. A specialist team from the Institute of Vector Control and Zoonoses 
Research (IVCZR), a specialist zoonoses research institute from nearby district of Hosur, 
was expected to come and assist Dr Sunil, the DDHS. 
The IVCZR is administered by the Tamil Nadu department of health and is primarily 
concerned with training medical officers and conducting outbreak investigations of 
common vector borne diseases. It is important to highlight here that while a veterinary 
officer can be asked to contribute to an outbreak investigation, this is not the norm and I 
was not expecting one to come. I arrived at the meeting point around the same time as Dr 
Sunil and Dr Rajiv. We had to wait for around an hour before the team from Hosur arrived 
after a five-hour journey. Their team consisted of a senior public health officer, an 
Additional Director (who was senior in the bureaucratic hierarchy to Dr Sunil), a 
veterinary epidemiologist as well as two field workers. Apart from the veterinarian who 
had been deputed to the IVCZR from Animal Husbandry department, rest of the ‘experts’ 
turned out to be either medical entomologists or vector borne disease specialists.  
The meeting started in earnest upon the arrival of the team from Hosur. The officers chose 
to have most discussions in Tamil, a language they and the staff were clearly more 
comfortable in, practically insulating me from the conversations. From what I did manage 
to capture, based upon passing snippets of English terms and the periodic updates from Dr 
Rajiv, I realised several things: 
First, the committee did not seem to be in favour of releasing information 
bulletins. This could be because they felt that it had the potential to spread 
news about the outbreak beyond the affected village and generate panic, 
which was not advisable given the impending elections and politically 
polished atmosphere in the state.  
Secondly, and more worryingly, the consensus among the officers seemed to 
be heading towards providing chemoprophylaxis to all the residents in the 
village. The reason for this, again, was their need to show proactive approach 
of the health department (this being the election season). This was done to 
pre-empt any criticism of the health department, in case the outbreak had a 
political fallout. Since no one seemed to know what the protocol was, Dr Rajiv 
then used his smartphone to dig out the guidelines from the internet. He read 
out the CDC guidelines, which mentioned 60 days of Ciprofloxacin as 
preventive for persons exposed to inhalational anthrax spores. (Field notes, 
11 March, 2016) 
This puzzled me as I was not sure if long-duration prophylaxis with antibiotics was 
suitable, or safe to be given in the context of a limited outbreak such as this one. As I was 
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not aware about the CDC guidelines on anthrax on the day, so I had to look them up 
afterwards. I found that the CDC had started developing guidelines for prevention of 
anthrax in response to the international panic surrounding the US anthrax terror attacks 
in 2001 (Inglesby et al., 2002) and are primarily directed towards a high-risk bioterror 
scenario. 
For instance, in its latest set of guidelines, the authors acknowledge that the disease is “not 
uncommon among persons who interact with animals” in LMICs, followed immediately by 
a counterpoint: 
Biodefence experts often place Bacillus anthracis at or near the top of the list 
for potential threat agents. Inhalation anthrax is particularly deadly… 
(Hendricks et al., 2014) 
The WHO guidelines (2008) make it clear that chemoprophylaxis should not be used in 
natural outbreaks, and definitely not on a massive scale, nor for a long duration. The CDC 
guidelines, on the other hand, suggest a 60-day course of antibiotics along with three-
doses of anthrax vaccines for people suspected to have been exposed to anthrax spore 
attacks.29 
With the exception of NTDs, chemoprophylaxis is not a common population-level public 
health strategy (Hotez et al., 2007). And even there, the practice is being questioned 
(Parker and Allen, 2014). The veterinary sector, especially in India, had a more relaxed 
approach to the use of antimicrobials (Van Boeckel et al., 2015). Is it possible that the 
discussion on using antibiotics as chemoprophylaxis may have been initiated by the only 
veterinarian in the team? As I observed in my notes: 
The veterinary officer in the RRT seemed to be the most authoritative with 
even the senior officers deferring to his expertise and he supported the 
intervention (chemoprophylaxis) enthusiastically, even citing the national 
guidelines as well as personal experience of a community trial conducted in 
Hosur to support the strategy. (Field notes, 11 March, 2016) 
I have not been able to find the trial on chemoprophylaxis cited by the veterinarian, and 
think it might have been conducted in animals and not human populations. This is because 
short duration treatment with antibiotics is actually recommended only among animal 
populations in certain situations.30 However, I did find the guidelines suggesting 
chemoprophylaxis for anthrax prevention among humans. This was in a manual co-
published by WHO India and the NCDC (NCDC, 2006), although no references were cited 
                                                             
29 For CDC guidelines, refer to Stern et al. (2008), Wright et al(2010) and Hendricks et al(2014) 
30 WHO (2008) suggests administration of between 1 and 3 doses of antibiotics is preferred to 
administering live vaccines to animals in non-endemic areas where the disease has been identified 
early.  
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for the recommendation. In fact, I am not sure if two months of antibiotics have been 
successfully administered and tested at a population level in any part of India. 
Interestingly, studies following up the response to the US bio-terror attacks in 2001 found 
that even at the height of anthrax attacks and panic in 2001, the overall adherence for a 
60-day antibiotic regimen was among less than half the population (Shepard et al., 2002).  
I had my reservations about the inappropriateness as well as potential for harm from 
distributing large doses of antibiotics. It looked like Dr Sunil was also not completely 
convinced, or at the very least, wanted to secure his superior’s approval before making the 
decision. Accordingly: 
they decided to call up the chief public health officer of the state (the Director 
of Public Health) for a final opinion. After a few minutes’ briefing over the 
phone in Tamil, Dr Sunil said that that he has secured the DPH’s approval. 
The DPH, apparently, supported the decision of the team to go ahead with 
chemoprophylaxis, as the political risks of having human cases outweighed 
other concerns (Field notes, 11 March, 2016). 
All this while, we had been having discussions in the health centre. Afterwards, when it 
was late afternoon and all the major decisions had been taken, the RRT members decided 
to make a quick visit to the village and inspect the location of animal holdings and burial 
(Figure 12) before the Hosur team headed back on their five-hour return journey.  
 
Figure 12: Burial pit for dead animals (incinerated and covered with bleach) 
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It was as we were preparing to get into the vehicles that the apprehensions of the RRT 
members regarding the outbreak became clearer to me: 
First, it was decided that only two cars would visit the village so as to prevent 
drawing too much attention to the team. The presence of anthrax in the 
village also proved to be a disquieting aspect of the travel. Now that the 
disease had proven serious enough to warrant month-long antibiotics for the 
village, it was felt that all the members of the RRT should also be adequately 
protected, and hence popped a pill each before heading off for the visit.  
Even though several people including Dr Sunil, Dr Rajiv, another Medical 
Officer and several other workers had already made multiple visits to the 
village, they all submitted to our collective fear about the germ and took a 
strip each from the health centre pharmacy, sharing their antibiotic blister 
packs with others who didn’t want to queue for one. I couldn’t help but feel 
that in some ways it was a moment where the team was bonding against the 
common threats to their individual and professional safety. (Field notes, 11 
March, 2016) 
I must confess there were moments in the field and immediately afterwards when I felt 
like giving into these emotions and considered taking the antibiotic strip offered to me. 
However, I reasoned at the time, there was only a minimal risk to me of contracting 
inhalational anthrax in the short time I would spend in the village. I could not catch the 
other forms of anthrax without physically coming in contact with either sick animals or 
contaminated objects.  
I knew I would not be putting myself at too much of a risk by refusing the antibiotic, except 
possibly, exposing myself to jokes at my expense by my fellow passengers in the car as we 
headed into the village. However, the feeling that I might be putting myself and people 
around me at risk persisted for a while. This was especially pronounced when I took the 
train to Bangalore immediately afterwards and visited friends in their homes.  
Even though I spent only a few days there, visiting an outbreak-affected village made me 
experience the disease at a much more personal level than might have been the case 
otherwise. In addition to experiencing the anxieties of being exposed to a fatal disease 
outbreak, albeit in a very limited way, it also gave me an opportunity to reflect about how 
we process information and make decisions in an uncertain, risk-prone environment, as I 
describe in the next section.  
5.5 EMERGENT THEMES 
Even as we are changing into a much more connected knowledge society with very 
different ways of producing and using knowledge (Castells, 2011), we are faced with re-
imagining our understandings of expertise. It is not always be possible to rely on a single 
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definitive source of expertise, or to interpret data in a specific way for making decisions, 
given the fractured and distributed nature of expertise itself in the modern world (Collins 
and Evans, 2002).  
When faced with a rapidly unfolding situation with high degree of unpredictability about 
its impacts, as in the case of the anthrax outbreak in Vellore, it becomes difficult to select 
one response as being the most appropriate one. Another factor that complicates any post 
hoc analysis of decision-making is that the professionals tasked with interpreting evidence 
and making decisions on behalf of a population, such as the epidemiologist in the field or 
the scientists making guidelines have their own social, political or institutional 
commitments that can influence their roles as translators (Jasanoff, 2003; Wynne, 1992). 
I unpack some of these themes in the discussion below.  
The paradox in public health practice: Publics vs health 
The RRT team’s visit to the village was uneventful on that day. This included short stops at 
a burial ground and some households. We also wanted to visit the grazing lands in the 
nearby village, but turned back when they proved difficult to locate and we got late. 
However, I could not help but notice the paradoxical relationship between the public 
health servants and the public they are supposed to serve. The generally accepted picture 
of Tamil Nadu as a state, as represented by its political regime, is that of an omnipresent, 
benevolent and paternal state, especially for the less well off (Deshpande et al., 2017; A. 
Wyatt, 2013a). On the other hand, communicable diseases control policies are frequently 
associated with police powers in India and some of the most passionate debates about 
limits of state power in India and elsewhere have always challenged this notion 
(Patralekha Chatterjee, 2006; Kakkar et al., 2010).  
The fact that the outbreak took place two months before the elections only served to 
heighten the tension between the paternalist, populist face of the government and the 
regulatory police powers it might need to manage the health emergency. 
The positions of the state and citizens were not really in conflict in this case, and it should 
have been in the common interest of the public health officers as well as the affected 
village residents to ensure a prompt response that limited animal diseases, while 
preventing serious human cases from occurring. However, the public health officers chose 
to exercise what might appear to be a more pro-active option by resorting to a long-
duration antibiotic course, instead of strengthening surveillance and maybe educating 
people on personal protection, which might have been a more conservative, but standard 
response..  
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Despite the many possible drawbacks of chemoprophylaxis31, the public health officers 
still decided to go ahead with the intervention. Could this be because the supposed 
outbreak did not affect the entire village but was, in fact, confined to a small community of 
shepherds in the village? And even among the shepherds, those at increased risks were the 
poorer ones who could not afford to feed their herd and therefore had to send them off for 
grazing. While the alacrity of the public health department in responding to the outbreak 
was indeed commendable, this small section of affected population in all likelihood would 
have been satisfied with receiving the pills, even if they did not end up taking them.  
 
Figure 13: Backyard goat-keeping. 
Marsland (2014) cites her experience in Tanzania where the public health officials thought 
of the public as faceless crowds rather than as a discerning group that needed to be a part 
of the health policy debates. This had several parallels to the situation in Tamil Nadu, 
where the state officers preferred to deal with the ‘crowds’ with a hands-off intervention 
instead of engaging with them in promoting awareness and encouraging social response of 
detection and quarantining. In addition, it is likely that, given the caste taboos against 
consumption of meat and raising animals for slaughter, by the obviously poor shepherding 
families (see Figure 13 & Figure 15) among the more privileged bureaucracy might further 
contribute to the othering of the poor and the diseased (Fuller and Narasimhan, 2015; 
Sarkar and Sarkar, 2016). 
                                                             
31 Apart from the risks of developing anti-microbial resistance and causing individual harm, there 
were also the practical concerns of feasibility of ensuring coverage and adherence to a long 
duration anti-microbials regimen.  
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Shaping knowledge and expertise 
Developing an insight into a complex biological and social problem like anthrax requires 
both strong health disciplinary training as well as a well-honed understanding of social 
contexts. In the course of my investigations into anthrax, I repeatedly came across 
situations where these two streams of understanding were in tension.  
The first example is that of the disposal of animal carcasses. The preferred method 
recommended in all guidelines is incineration. This seemed fine to me when I was doing 
my literature review and before I was actually confronted with the logistics and costs 
involving transportation and burning of large animal carcasses in aseptic conditions. A 
veterinary epidemiologist who had worked on anthrax prevention for several decades 
pointed out to me the limitations of the incineration approach and the presence of 
alternatives. The WHO/FAO/OIE guidelines (2008) proposed a more practical alternative 
for carcass disposal in resource-constrained settings. This was to seal the animal head in 
plastic bags, cover the unopened carcass in tarpaulin sheets and keep it above ground for 
three days before burying it in a deep pit. The logic went that once the carcass is allowed 
to putrefy for three days, the anthrax bacteria in the bloodstream would die away as they 
would not be able to compete with other, more aggressive bacteria involved in the 
putrefaction process. Therefore, there was much less chance of any anthrax spores 
surviving.  
On the other hand, instead of highlighting the carcass disposal strategy, the national 
guidelines developed by the NCDC labelled it as ‘The Last Resort’ (sic). After discussing 
different variants of the incineration as well as the untested rendering process covered in 
almost three pages, the guidelines describe the practical option of burial in half a page 
(NCDC, 2006, p. 14). Unlike the WHO guidelines that offer all options, there is a clear 
judgement on the part of the NCDC in promoting certain disposal methods over others. 
However, there is no explanation or citation of another authority to justify their stance.  
A similar example of misplaced power could be seen in the authorities’ decision to 
distribute antibiotics to the entire village population. As discussed in the previous section, 
this was done after a quick search on the CDC website for anthrax prevention on the 
district epidemiologist’s mobile phone.  
As discussed before, the CDC guidelines on chemoprophylaxis were obviously developed 
under a different set of circumstances targeting a different population. While the easy 
availability of information on a smartphone is definitely an empowering technology, in 
this situation, it possibly resulted in an ill-advised decision when combined with a set of 
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contributory factors. The guidelines are not directly published by CDC; instead, they link to 
other publications and websites from the CDC page on anthrax prevention. Even to me, 
when I tried accessing the same documents on a desktop, it took some time to figure out 
the authorship and context for these publications.  
The CDC guidelines do not address the situation of endemic anthrax directly and the WHO 
mentions it not on the anthrax webpage, but deep into a PDF document. It is possible that 
a lack of easily accessible explanations on the CDC combined with relative inaccessibility 
(on a smartphone browser) of the PDF-based guidelines of WHO might have resulted in 
that link coming up on the smartphone of the epidemiologist.  
Even as the CDC and WHO guidelines were hard to access on the small screen of a 
smartphone deep in rural Vellore, the factor that is most likely to have tilted the RRT’s 
hand in favour of chemoprophylaxis is a single-sentence, unreferenced recommendation 
to provide chemoprophylaxis to exposed persons by NCDC, mentioned below: 
Chemoprophylaxis – asymptomatic exposed individuals are put on a four 
week course of doxycycline 100 mg twice daily or ciprofloxacine 500 mg 
twice daily. (NCDC, 2006, p. 11)(Figure 14) 
 
Figure 14: Anthrax guidelines (NCDC, 2006) 
A third related illustration of the dichotomy of ‘high vs low science’ could be made in 
relation to the diagnosis of anthrax as an outbreak. Anthrax is an easily demonstrable 
bacterium using basic microscope and staining techniques, provided the sample is taken in 
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a timely manner. Blood cultures are definitive proof of an infection, but a positive blood 
smear examination in an outbreak environment should be enough to make a decision.  
 
Figure 15: Traditional sheds for cattle rearing. 
Again, the theory looks simple. But the vet confirming a sample as positive could 
potentially be exposed to two kinds of risks. One is infection by the bacteria if blood is not 
drawn properly. Also, the risk of exposing themselves to potential reprimands for 
declaring a false positive in case it turns out negative later. We have already seen how it 
might be in the interest of public/veterinary health officers not to arrive at a conclusive 
decision to prevent them from reporting actual numbers. Having a provisional clinical 
diagnosis is enough for them to start a response while the responsibility to declare an 
outbreak is passed on to a laboratory.  
The field veterinarian I interviewed described the best way to confirm an anthrax 
infection without waiting for a blood culture report:  
If the animal is still alive, chances are there will be low levels of bacteria in its 
blood as it will be filtered by the spleen and will not be easily diagnosed in 
blood smear. Bacteria levels typically peak just around the death of the 
animal—there are lots of bacilli so easier to identify in blood smear with 
some experience. Most districts have microscopes, but whether they have 
capacity to detect or not…. Sometimes in outbreaks, we ask local dispensaries 
for diagnosis…. It’s a simple procedure. Conduct blood smear analysis with 
simple microscopes & confirm increased clotting time of collected blood. Take 
blood from jugular vein as it is easy to sample with minimal risks. If you find 
the blood clotting normally, it is not likely to be anthrax (C1, 3 March 2016). 
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Policy researchers are well aware of the distance between policy formulation and its 
translation (Walt et al., 2008; Zahariadis, 2007). In relation to service delivery, some even 
say that a policy is only as good or bad as the way it is envisaged and shaped by the 
bureaucrats on the street (Lipsky, 2010) or control rooms (Schulman et al., 2004), 
reinterpreting polices to manage daily policy crises.  
However, there are additional issues related to the growth of expertise. As demonstrated 
in the above three examples, there are circumstances where even actors with the capacity 
to question such expertise ceded authority to more distant, possibly out-of-touch 
institutions because of perceived competence. This was true in the case of CDC, which 
framed chemoprophylaxis guidelines for a different context and did not bother to include 
a disclaimer for their applications in non-US settings. This was also true for the NCDC that 
exercised its supposed technical authority by providing vague and unjustified 
recommendations regarding chemoprophylaxis and carcass disposal.  
A case can be made for highlighting the practical aspects of field epidemiology and 
empowering professionals on the ground to be able to make the decisions through 
capacity building and provision of resources. If, as described in the third example above, 
simple microscopy might help make an informed decision in the field, or if the guidelines 
gave primacy to practical experiences, it is likely to affect the speed and quality of 
decision-making on the ground.  
Political contexts of outbreak responses 
This experience served to reinforce my understanding that it is not possible to separate 
the policy from the politics of decision-making. I was initially not able to reconcile the 
image I had had of the DPH with his decisions. I had met the DPH on several occasions and 
I always found him to be a well-informed person, clearly an epidemiologist at heart. A 
graduate of the prestigious two-year graduate programme in field epidemiology, offered 
by the National Institute of Epidemiology, I found him to be quite aware of the challenges 
posed by zoonoses and having well-thought-out position on limitations of current 
intervention strategies. 
However, his reasons for taking a conservative decision might have been as old as 
bureaucracy itself — passing the buck. When confronted by conflicting choices, both citing 
science and reason (as in the case of chemoprophylaxis vs surveillance alone), the officer 
in the field chose to pass the buck to his senior in the capital. In such a situation, the 
Director could be justified in choosing a less risky option that seemed to have the 
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endorsement of key people in his team rather than listen to arguments about a relatively 
distant threat of antimicrobial resistance.  
Scholars in science and technology studies have highlighted similar themes in other 
contexts. Stirling & Gee (2002) questioned the workings of expert committees and 
demonstrated the plurality of views that existed within the scientific community about a 
specific policy issue. This is in contrast to the political pressures to “push attention from 
‘plural conditional’ to the ‘single definitive’” (Stirling, 2010, p. 1030). This, he argues is 
because of an overwhelming reference among decision-makers to minimise ambiguity and 
promote the notion of ‘risk’ as a quantifiable, and by extension – creating a controllable 
entity. Wynne (1998), in his famous study of  Cumbrian sheep, questions the divide 
between the ‘experts’ and  lay publics, again centred around  notions of risk and 
uncertainty.  
Scholars have argued for rethinking the notion of expertise given the fact that there is 
increased awareness about contested nature of meanings as well as a more human 
understanding of expertise (Collins and Evans, 2007; Jasanoff, 1992). When bureaucrats 
and scientists can reflect the same biases as the societies or institutions they come from 
(Corbridge et al., 2003; Jasanoff, 2003), there is hardly room for surprise when the 
government technocrats turn out to be similarly motivated by the social mileu or 
institutional politics.  
It is quite likely that the NCDC, in an attempt to increase the credibility (and compliance) 
of its guideline document, adopted a prescriptive tone without any nuance, or references 
to external publications as reflected in the quoted sentence earlier. Including nuance in its 
guidelines, is likely to have led the NCDC to acknowledge the presence of external sources 
of expertise as well as a scope for reinterpretation of its guidelines by implementing 
officers – both decreasing its perceived credibility.  
The decision of the DPH, too, is likely to be reflective of the political pressures on ‘closing 
down’ on complexity in the form of a visible intervention that will be acceptable to local 
community and saleable to the political leadership on the cusp of an important election.  
5.6 PARTNERSHIPS AROUND ANTHRAX 
So far in this chapter, I have examined how ecological and epidemiological characteristics 
of anthrax inform its social framing, viz. having simultaneous identities as a disease of 
international priority due to its bio-terror potential, as well as being a disease of poverty 
(Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats et al., 2006; WHO, 2006). I also 
examined decision-making around anthrax using the example of an outbreak 
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investigation. This involved reflection on the politics of knowledge and expertise. Building 
upon this discussion, I will now return to the principal concern of this inquiry, which is to 
examine collaborations around zoonoses and analyse their dynamics.  
One major way in which the veterinary sector differs from the human health sector is in 
their operational incentives.32 The animal health sector views livestock as a productive 
asset and therefore it can choose interventions using strictly monetary principles. For 
human health, on the other hand, moral and methodological difficulties abound in valuing 
human lives in monetary terms (Dorman, 1996, p. 51), and therefore the mandate of 
health sector is to promote something more esoteric, such as general well-being. 
Therefore, the central notion of economics in animal husbandry could be a reason why, 
when it came to setting priorities, the economic grounds influenced the veterinarians’ 
decision to spend fewer person-hours on anthrax and more on the concurrent state-wide 
FMD vaccination campaign. This was also the reason cited by them to explain their limited 
presence in the village and why I was able to schedule interviews with them only in the 
latter half of the outbreak. FMD is a disease of significant economic importance, resulting 
in annual losses of $US3 billion to India (Pattnaik et al., 2012) and hence is a high priority. 
In the absence of a robust animal insurance system or compensation for loss of property 
and costs involved in transport and burial of dead animals, finances often assume 
importance in government – farmer interactions.33 While animal disposal seems to have 
been an organised effort, it did not appear to me as if the farmers in Vellore were getting 
compensated for their losses. In such a context, any talk of formal collaboration among 
animal and human health practitioners will need to spell financial responsibilities clearly. 
As the public health department is believed to have access to more funds than animal 
husbandry, the district veterinary officer, who must have been grappling with 
compensation requests at the time, had this to say about working together with the health 
sector when I met him in his office (Figure 16): 
You might have coordination…but the main problem with anthrax is who 
foots the bill, such as, for burial of carcasses—there are no guidelines. (C9, 9 
March 2016) 
However, the close association of the animal husbandry sector with finances was looked at 
in a different light in the health sector. Jacob John, the retired microbiologist and infectious 
                                                             
32 See chapter 2 
33 While subsidised insurance schemes have been launched in different parts of the country, 
including Vellore (Department of Animal Husbandry Dairying & Fisheries, 2009; Tamil Nadu 
Agricultural University, 2009), vaccine preventable diseases such as anthrax are commonly 
excluded (Agoat, 2017). Unfortunately, since majority of the animal farming sector is unorganised, 
these animals are seldom immunised. 
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diseases researcher from CMC, had this to say about his assessment of the motivation of 
veterinarians, and the differences in their outlook with physicians:  
I admire the fact that the veterinarians are present in rural areas where 
animal diseases are. So you get veterinary services where even the health 
services are not available. But then animal lives cost money, human lives are 
cheap… (Jacob John’s interview, 27 July 2015) 
Yes, they (the veterinarians) are much more receptive (to discussions around 
zoonoses) as they don’t have this airs as medical people have—few  medical 
people think as if they are Gods walking around—you cannot dialogue with 
people like that as they know everything. There is no humility with medical 
people, but veterinarians don’t have all these airs. They are easy and they ask 
genuine questions. But the doctors usually even when they  are called for 
meetings, they don’t ask any questions, so my suspicion is that they want to 
hide their ignorance ,so they don’t ask questions. So, yes the veterinarians 
may be more scientifically oriented as compared to medical people who 
might be less scientifically oriented, but they practice medicines more, like 
practitioners—you know something and then you apply it and make money. 
(Jacob John interview, 27 July 2015) 
Of course, this portrayal of veterinarians as scientist-practitioners who are well grounded 
in rural realities sketches a stereotype that most veterinarians would not mind for their 
profession. Moreover, I suspect the image speaks as much of Jacob John’s perception of his 
profession as it does of the veterinarians.  
 
Figure 16: District veterinary hospital & Animal Husbandry Office, Vellore 
When I spoke to a senior veterinary researcher who is a leading zoonoses researcher in 
south India, about his perception of the veterinarians’ standing with the public health 
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community, I got a different response. He recalled  how, despite being neglected by public 
health community in India, his work on anthrax and other zoonoses helped him acquire 
visibility internationally, albeit selectively.  
One of the main problems is that, at least in this state, the medical profession 
doesn’t consider us (veterinarians) at par…. While zoonotic diseases might 
generally be neglected, the researchers working on them gain lot of 
recognition. I got more recognition for my five years of work on zoonoses 
than 20 years’ work on other non-zoonotic pathogens. There is a lot of 
international interest in anthrax, including its potential as a bio-weapon. I 
have been interviewed by different international experts who want to find 
out more about anthrax work in India. (B15, 1 March 2016) 
However, just like Jacob John’s perception of the veterinarians, the researcher’s perception 
of his profession is also likely to represent one aspect of the veterinarian’s professional 
standing. The deliberations of the RRT demonstrated to me how easy it might be to 
disrupt the professional power dynamics at times. Tamil Nadu is a state where the 
government and its bureaucracy are quite empowered.34 Hence, the decision-making is 
often hierarchical. During my interactions with the public health and veterinary officers in 
the course of the outbreak, the pecking order was clearly established with the ranking 
officer given the chance to speak first and last. But it was interesting to notice the 
disruption of these hierarchies when the bureaucratic seniority contrasted with 
disciplinary expertise in the case of the outbreak response team meeting. Clearly, those 
leading the discussions were all relatively senior officers (with one Additional Director 
being more senior than the others) and the DDHS being the responsible officer in the 
district. However, as this was the first anthrax outbreak in the district in 3-4 years, they 
were all dealing with a disease they were less familiar with. Consequently, they routinely 
deferred to the suggestions from the veterinary officer accompanying the expert team as 
he clearly had more professional experience with the disease. As discussed earlier around 
the outbreak response, it is likely that the veterinary officers’ familiarity with some of the 
interventions might have helped push the discussion the way it ended up.  
A last note on informality underpinning intersectoral collaborations. While I was not able 
to witness veterinarians conducting joint investigations with the public health team in the 
field, I did meet them separately afterwards in the village, as well as at their district 
headquarters (Figure 16). I learnt that the DDHS and district veterinary officer talked at 
least two times on the phone and met once in the veterinarian’s office. So there was some 
                                                             
34 See (Fuller and Narasimhan, 2015; Gupta et al., 2010; Springer, 2000). 
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level of communication at all stages of the outbreak. This made the quote from the 
veterinary officer (below) all the more surprising for me.  
Infectious disease literature frequently cites the importance of using animal diseases as 
early warning signals for potential human health event (Eidson et al., 2001; Wolfe et al., 
1998). Citing similar arguments, when I asked the district veterinary officer what he felt 
about the ongoing communication between animal and human health agencies in Vellore, I 
was expecting to hear a response affirming the importance of communication, but did not 
expect the conditionalities he included in his response:  
If we have information that people might have consumed (potentially 
infected) animal meat, we inform the local health centre, but don’t usually go 
to the district level itself. On the other hand, if any anthrax patients are 
admitted to the bigger hospitals in the district, they let us know as well (C9, 9 
March 2016). 
In effect, in the above quote, the district veterinary officer confirms his support for the 
idea of having regular communications with health department. What I found remarkable, 
especially in a state with strong bureaucratic traditions such as Tamil Nadu, is that the 
officer preferred the sharing of information done informally at the peripheral level 
without involving his office. This was in contrast to the usual approach in Tamil Nadu 
where, at least in my experience, the usual approach of public servants is to insist on 
‘following proper channels’ for accessing information.  
However, I had noticed a similar predilection for delegating communications through 
informal channels at subordinate offices in my interviews with state officers. For instance, 
the state veterinary epidemiologist in Gujarat described the importance of district 
veterinary office in coordinating among different departments as follows:  
And one more thing I would like to tell is that…the activities which are being 
done at district level—he (district veterinary officer) is doing and 
coordinating all those activities—be it health department or other 
department. So coordination is there with other departments (E6, 12 Feb 
2015). 
As I will demonstrate in the next chapter on Leptospirosis, and discuss in more detail in 
chapter 8, Gujarat is different from Tamil Nadu in many ways. However, both share a 
similar administrative structure and traditions.  
Communication channels are explicitly identified in the case of avian influenza outbreaks. 
The established guidelines, as well as the direct interest of the department leadership in a 
major disease outbreak, ensure that communication lines are maintained at all levels. 
However, the same level of urgency is absent in the case of localised, self-limiting 
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outbreaks like anthrax. In the absence of administrative cover from either established 
protocols or bureaucratic leadership, it is quite possible that the officer felt more 
comfortable sharing information through informal channels. This would ensure the word 
gets out without anyone overstepping departmental boundaries.  
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, within this chapter I examined the different ways in which a zoonotic disease 
like anthrax is understood, how responses are conceptualised and the effect of these 
understandings in influencing the collaborations around the disease.  
I draw upon insights from scholars of policy analysis and science studies to analyse the 
role of politics in conceptualising scientific authority, in interpreting scientific knowledge, 
and finally, in shaping practices.  
While anthrax is seen as a potential biological weapon in some contexts, others refer to it 
as a disease of poverty. And, given its association with communities handling carcasses in 
India, it is also associated with ‘unhygienic’ practices. These differences in understandings 
of the disease, and the diseased, in turn, shaped how disease control was practised.  
There was a reluctance among some of the uncompensated, uninsured farmers not to let 
the meat go waste, on one hand, while on the other, among the team of visiting public 
health experts, the risks associated with the disease outbreak, and even more so with the 
potential for political fallout from the outbreak, merited distributing antibiotics to 
everyone exposed in the village for a two-month period. The public health team claimed to 
cite multiple sources of scientific authority to select an intervention, but ultimately, cited 
political exigencies as the over-riding rationale for their decision.  
Lastly, I described the diffused and delegated nature of inter-sectoral collaborations that 
exists at the district level and which is characterised more by informal communications 
than a top-down institutional mechanism, demonstrating how the everyday practices 
within bureaucracies can provide the conditions for collaboration, even if formal policies 
do not.   
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6 LEPTOSPIROSIS 
I had not originally planned to focus upon leptospirosis as a zoonosis. Like many other 
public health professionals, I did not know much about the disease apart from hearing 
about its periodic mentions following an urban flooding (ProMED-Mail, 2006, 1997; 
Rediff.com, 2005). 
However, as a result of a set of fortuitous circumstances that I will explain shortly, I came 
to select the disease as one of my case studies. I was encouraged by state officers in 
Gujarat to study the disease as a ‘success story’ because of the way its initial outbreaks had 
brought together a range of stakeholders from different institutions who together 
developed a response strategy that is still in place. While I found this to be largely true, 
after spending more time in the field, a more nuanced, and a far more interesting, picture 
of the disease started to emerge.  
Even as the disease has assumed an endemic status in Gujarat, and has been normalised, 
and even as state officers claim leptospirosis control to be a ‘best practice’, uncertainty 
and anxiety persist regarding the nature of the disease as well as the impact of its control 
strategy. In some ways, leptospirosis typifies neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) which, 
despite their very real presence, remain removed from popular imagination. 
Leptosporosis also provided me with a unique lens with which to view how popular 
perceptions and policy discourses are built and change over time. The officially promoted 
and overarching storyline about the disease revolved around how it was ‘successfully 
controlled’ and, indeed, was a ‘best practice’ of zoonoses collaboration. But on closer 
examination, and through deeper conversations with the respondents, it was clear that 
controlling the disease was a challenge.  
As described in chapter 3, I interviewed the decision-makers and programme managers 
from different sectors who had different roles in disease control programmes. Not 
surprisingly, they expressed a range of opinions about leptospirosis control, depending 
upon their involvement in the disease control programme. Echoing insights from other 
zoonoses from my research, I will use the example of leptospirosis to illustrate the 
importance placed by decision-makers on generating narratives of success, and appearing 
to be in control, even in conditions of uncertainty and complex policy challenges, often 
using access to information for privileging certain narratives over others. These concerns, 
in turn, informed the extent to which intersectoral collaborations were allowed to develop 
and function around leptospirosis prevention and control.  
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6.1 BACKGROUND 
As already noted, my own previous exposure to leptospirosis was limited to reading 
reports of the disease following flash floods in different parts of India (Jena et al., 2004; 
Zaki and Shanbag, 2010). In fact, as mentioned earlier, leptospirosis was not the disease I 
had planned to focus upon initially. Instead, I wanted my inquiry to focus upon the much 
more visible threat of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF), a widely-reported and 
newly-emerged fatal viral infection that first appeared in Gujarat just a few years ago in 
2011 (Mishra et al., 2011). 
CCHF is understood to have high mortality, especially among the health professionals 
coming into contact with patients. The picture presented by CCHF was strongly 
reminiscent of the alarmist depictions of other viral haemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola 
and Lassa (Leach and Hewlett, 2010), and, within the local context, of the pneumonic 
plague outbreak in 1994 in the state of Gujarat (Sivaramakrishnan, 2010).  
The presence of CCHF in India was identified by scientists from the National Institute of 
Virology who advised anti-tick measures for cattle, among other measures, to contain the 
spread of the disease. Feeling the existing solutions were not practical in the state, the 
veterinarians, working with entomologists, developed a way to apply a locally available 
insecticide in a simple but effective manner to the cattle, thus preventing further spread of 
the disease.  
As the excited animal husbandry officers recounted to me, the public health department 
recognised the expertise available among the veterinarians and involved them in the 
discussion from the start. The state veterinary epidemiologist described to me the extent 
of the collaboration that included developing anti-tick and CCHF containment strategy 
together in the high-level working group chaired by the Principal Secretary, as well as 
utilising their existing partnership with farmers in affected communities to deliver anti-
CCHF measures along with the public health department. However, despite the enticing 
subject material offered by CCHF, my principal contacts within the public health and 
animal husbandry departments in Gujarat did not seem too keen for me to pursue this line 
of enquiry. Instead, they nudged me to explore leptospirosis which, they justified, would 
make a better case study for me as it had been brought under control as a result of well-
established preventive and intervention measures in place.   
In separate discussions (incidentally held on the same morning, and therefore implying a 
level of collaboration from both departments), officers from both the departments of 
Animal Husbandry (DAH) and Health Services (DHS) referred to several decades’ worth of 
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work conducted on leptospirosis control in Gujarat and tried to convince me of its 
potential as a ‘One Health case study’.  
The sudden nature of CCHF resulted in reactive “responses which might not have been as 
systematic and comprehensive” as they could have been, one of the officers suggested, 
possibly implying that this is not the disease they wanted to showcase to the rest of the 
world. Leptospirosis, on the other hand, had been around for several decades and, 
consequently, had “more mileage”—Indian-speak for potential for publicity. The long-
standing collaborations around the disease, officials suggested, pointed towards a ‘best-
practice’ of collaborations and therefore might make for a ‘more informative’ case study for 
me (Field notes, 10 Aug 2016).  
In the same set of conversations, I was also promised full support from the state 
government in gaining access for conducting my interviews around leptospirosis (no one 
seemed similarly bothered about brucellosis, my other disease case in the state). While I 
had been interested in CCHF because of its topicality, I did not protest too much about 
changing my disease selection. Leptospirosis met my criteria of an outbreak-prone disease 
quite well and, as had been pointed out to me, was likely to yield richer history of 
intersectoral collaborations dating from before the current discussions around emerging 
infections and before One Health gained currency. Securing access to key informants is 
relevant to conducting elite research (Goldstein, 2002), So, the assurance of access to state 
officers was as important for me as was the unsaid implication of limiting my access had I 
pursued CCHF.  
6.2 DISEASE CHARACTERISTICS 
As I started exploring the literature around leptospirosis more intensively, I realised the 
many ways in which leptospirosis is representative of a typical zoonotic disease. It has a 
huge but unaddressed disease burden, mostly in tropical and resource poor countries and 
in underserved populations (Hotez, 2008a; Hotez et al., 2008; Lobo et al., 2011). It is 
believed that the disease results in at least 60,000 deaths annually from more than a 
million cases, but the burden of leptospirosis continues to be underestimated and, 
according to epidemiologists, is marked by an “interaction of poverty, geography, and 
climate” (Picardeau, 2015, p. 1). 
The disease is primarily transmitted through infected rodents; it also affects, and is 
possibly transmitted, by livestock. However, the focus of epidemiologists and government 
remains on studying and controlling the disease among human populations (Tilahun et al., 
2013; WHO and International Leptospirosis Society, 2003). 
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Leptospirosis in India 
Indian epidemiologists had known about the disease through small, isolated outbreaks 
around the Indian coastline and the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean from the early 
20th century; even before Leptospira, the causative bacteria, was discovered (Rao et al., 
2003; Vijayachari et al., 2015). A defining feature of leptospirosis the world over has been 
that, even in places identified as being disease-endemic, its burden is largely 
underestimated (Halliday et al., 2015). It is usually when a population-based surveillance 
system is put in place as in the case of Kerala (John et al., 2004) or Orissa (Jena et al., 2004) 
in India, or when the disease is systematically studied (Crump et al., 2013) that 
leptospirosis starts becoming more visible.  
Not surprisingly, while the disease is frequently identified in public health emergencies, it 
is not recognised (or reported) as commonly by clinicians in routine practice. A series of 
papers published in the 1980s provide a fascinating illustration of the way tropical 
diseases like leptospirosis are sometimes discussed within scientific communities.  
 
Figure 17: Case report on leptospirosis published in the BMJ 
(Agrawal and Srivastava, 1986, pp. 1646–7) 
Agrawal and Srivastava (1986) describe a ‘case’ of outbreak of leptospirosis in a ‘food-fad 
commune’, an oblique reference to a marginalised community called ‘Musahar’ (literally 
meaning rat-eaters in Hindi) in the eastern Indian state of Bihar, who are known to eat 
rats in times of food scarcity. The patronising generalisation and sloppy epidemiology of 
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the report attracted comment from another doctor, originally from the same state in India. 
He punched holes in the epidemiological and social analysis of the case report by 
identifying several alternative explanations for the disease apart from consuming rat meat 
(Singh, 1987). 
The well-regarded British Medical Journal published the case report, tellingly sandwiched 
between eye-catching reports of an eyeball injury from snooker and another report on 
bulimia featuring a portrait of Samuel Johnson (Figure 17). It can be argued that labelling 
the Musahar camp as a ‘food-fad commune’ would be one way to make leptospirosis sound 
exotic enough to merit featuring in the journal. 
Leptospirosis in Gujarat 
As is the case with most states lining the Indian coastline, leptospirosis is now known to be 
endemic in coastal regions of south Gujarat (Figure 18). However, it had not been formally 
reported in Gujarat before an outbreak associated with high mortality occurred in Valsad 
in 1994, which subsequently spread to neighbouring districts and caused a major 
outbreak in 1997 in the commercially important district of Surat (Patel et al., 2006; 
Prasad, 2000). Since then, leptospirosis outbreaks have become an annual occurrence.  
 
Figure 18: Map of Gujarat with Surat identified. (Source: Wikipedia) 
Significantly, 1994 was also the year when an outbreak of bubonic plague took place in 
Surat. This was a watershed year for public health planning in Gujarat as also across India. 
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The outbreak and its aftermath exposed poor urban sanitation, weak public health 
response and limited surveillance and response capacities of the Indian state. It occurred 
at a time when India was opening up its economy. Surat  prided itself for its place in the 
international economy.35 The plague outbreak resulted in losses of billions of dollars in 
trade nationally as airplanes were fumigated or even returned from international airports 
and led to a major loss of face (Garrett, 2000; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011).  
The episode eventually led to a comprehensive review of national public health 
surveillance systems chaired by David Heymann of WHO and the development of a 
national disease surveillance system that still serves as the backbone of public health 
preparedness and response in the country (Abbas, 2012). The levels of anxiety and 
migration witnessed during the plague outbreak still form a part of the institutional 
memory of the public health machinery in Gujarat.  
The fact that the first outbreaks of leptospirosis followed soon after plague and floods of 
1994 in Surat district, and incidentally both involving rats as a major reservoir (Patel et al., 
2006), possibly served to galvanise the response from an already sensitised public health 
machinery. In fact, as is implied in the quote below, it is quite possible that leptospirosis 
was discovered in the region only because of the heightened surveillance instituted in the 
region in 1994. In his ethnographic study of leptospirosis outbreaks in the region, Prasad 
(2000, p. 3689) quotes a doctor from the district who claimed that:  
There were lepto cases in Surat district even prior to 1994 but got bypassed. 
It was only during the plague in Surat, that Leptospira were detected 
through cultures in the laboratory tests. 
While in 1994, the focus of public health authorities was on controlling the plague 
outbreak, given the international spotlight placed on the city, subsequent outbreaks of 
leptospirosis in 1997 and 1998 provided them with an urgency to understand the disease 
spread and develop a response strategy. Studies conducted by local clinical researchers 
point to the unique manifestation of leptospirosis in Surat. From around 2006 onwards, 
patients with leptospirosis in Surat presented with higher and severe form of respiratory 
symptoms, many of them requiring access to ventilators (Shah et al., 2012). An 
ethnographic survey conducted by Prasad (2000) pointed out the high proportion of tribal 
populations in leptospirosis-affected areas in Surat. A paper from the state public health 
department demonstrated the spread of leptospirosis from rural to urban areas and to 
                                                             
35 According to Surat Municipal website 
(https://www.suratmunicipal.gov.in/TheCity/Contribution, accessed 3 Oct, 2017), the city 
accounts for 42% of the world’s total rough diamond cutting and polishing, and 12% of Indian 
fabric production.  
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neighbouring districts over a number of years (Patel et al., 2006). Epidemiological studies 
by the public health department, such as those by Bhardwaj et al.(2008), identified contact 
with flood water, walking barefoot and presence of rats in the area as key risk factors 
associated with the disease.  
Investigating the role of animals in disease transmission does not appear to have been the 
focus in the initial years of the outbreak. However, possibly following the establishment of 
several veterinary schools in the region afterwards, I found recent studies that have 
documented the exposure levels of different animal species to leptospirosis. Sero-
prevalence studies by Panwala et al. (2015, p. 11) demonstrated a 40% carrier rate in 
cattle in the region, a finding echoed in other studies by Patel et al. (2014; 2015) and 
Balakrishnan (2011). 
As the medical community in Surat subsequently realised, leptospirosis was now 
widespread in south Gujarat region and most people were at risk of exposure to the 
disease following the monsoon. Therefore, the response strategy for the disease now had 
to focus on promoting availability and early access to adequate health care services. 
The next section examines how different agencies came together in Surat to develop their 
collective understanding of the disease situation and used that to develop a response 
strategy, as referred to in Figure 19 and explained below. 
 
Figure 19: A timeline of leptospirosis in Surat. 
6.3 RESPONDING TO DISEASE 
Arriving in the immediate aftermath of the disastrous 1994 plague outbreak in Surat, the 
disease took everyone by surprise. Under political pressure, the local administration as 
well as the faculty from Surat medical school were determined not to let the disease go out 
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of hand as had happened in the case of plague, and which had resulted in the loss of image 
for the commercially important city.  
At the time of the outbreak in the mid 90s, district health offices did not have the 
personnel and material resources they enjoy now. There was no disease surveillance 
programme with formal disease reporting and response mechanisms. Moreover, the 
disease was as yet little understood by researchers and programme officers alike in 
Gujarat. Therefore, faculty from the departments of Medicine, Microbiology and 
Community Medicine of the local medical school were engaged from the very initial 
outbreaks for their expertise, as described by a programme manager in local public health 
department:  
And since around 1998 or '99 —exact(ly) I don't know. But from '97-‘98, or 
from ‘99, in Surat, surveillance for leptospirosis was started. And at that time, 
it was in infant stage—meaning surveillance was being developed. So slowly, 
slowly…in terms of experience we started surveillance. And as time went by 
we felt that this thing needs to be done. So in around 2005, our full-fledged 
programme, as you say, (started). So there was no aspect left in it. It became 
like this.  
Every year, one activity more used to be there in surveillance. If there was 
anything left to be done then ok, one more year it was extended, so during 
that second year, something else was added, in the third year something else 
was added. In 2005, GMC, the Government Medical College which is there 
over here...a module was made (D10, 9 Feb 2016). 
While most medical schools in India have traditionally not engaged directly with public 
health programmes, the case of the public health department of Surat medical college was 
a little different. A relatively newly established medical school, Government Medical 
College (GMC), Surat had been active in government health programmes even before 
leptospirosis, as explained by a former member of Community Medicine department in the 
GMC:  
We had learned a lot—a number of diseases which other communities and 
departments had not even heard of. But we could also have done that without 
entering into (health programmes) and it’s not a mandate for us. We are a 
teaching institution. 
But how can you teach when you don't know what is happening around you. 
That is one and second is you are sitting there as a public health expert and if 
you don't contribute to the crisis then what sort of public health expert you 
are? That was my understanding…. And that's why we used to work for any 
health crisis which used to come to us in Surat and south Gujarat. And 
probably that's why my department was considered top-most in India (D16, 9 
Feb 2-16). 
At the time of leptospirosis outbreak in 2006, a senior public health professor from the 
college was deputed to the ministry to manage public health programmes. Building on the 
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previous experience and institutional links, different departments of the medical college 
were involved in responding and controlling the outbreak from the beginning. While the 
epidemiologists and microbiologists helped collect data and tried to assess the extent of 
the problem, physicians from the department of medicine were deputed to smaller 
hospitals in the district during the outbreak season every year for managing patients.  
But then investigation facilities were built up. In early phases even 
government institutions had a shortage of dialysis machines and other 
things. So we had even done public-private partnership—a contract to 
manage the cases which were in need of dialysis in Surat city in private 
hospitals (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
The presentation of the disease in Surat was much more severe than those reported from 
the southern states in India that had a longer history of the disease. Many of the patients in 
Surat required services of a ventilator, as well as access to intensive care specialists, which 
were unavailable in most public hospitals at the time. Therefore, even as microbiologists 
developed diagnostic kits that were effective against the local strains, the faculty from 
internal medicine were deputed on short postings to cover management of suspect cases 
in peripheral hospitals and train the doctors there.  
As a result of intense scrutiny of the local public health response during the 1994 plague 
outbreak in Surat, a basic surveillance system had started being discussed following an 
outbreak of leptospirosis in rural Surat in 1997. However, it was still seen as a distant 
problem and very much an unknown disease: 
(In) 2006, we were ignorant that there can be leptospirosis in the city (D16, 9 
Feb 2016). 
Surat city faced a major flood in 2006, which brought in its wake the first outbreak of 
leptospirosis in the city. Not surprisingly, this made people immediately recall the last 
major outbreak in the city, in the words of a local public health physician: 
First case was in a private hospital. Midnight I got a phone call – “I’ve got a 
case and should I transfer to city hospital or I can continue to manage?” I 
said keep a sample for us and you can manage the case. Next day morning, 
we all sat together and decided the protocol for private institutions. What 
are the diagnostic criteria and what they are supposed to do, how they are 
supposed to report…. Then along with IMA (Indian Medical Association) we 
prepared community education message.  
So it was Saturday-Sunday, so I was here. And I was also held up (in Surat) 
because of traffic. And maybe I took 18 hours to clean my own house...and 
travel up to Civil Hospital after those 18 hours and...for one week, I was 
facing even international media, just replying whether there's likely to be 
plague outbreak in the city or not. 
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And nobody thought of leptospirosis. And because post-plague Surat has 
continued the...rat surveillance...and flea surveillance...we had some confident 
clues whether there will be plague or not. And I used to say as, as per today's 
surveillance data, it's not likely (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
Lack of institutional expertise in the disease, coupled with an escalating number of villages 
and people affected in the annual disease outbreaks, was likely to have increased pressure 
on the government for developing an effective response strategy, especially when the 
memories of the chaos exposed by the plague outbreak must have been fresh in public 
mind.  
Local academia-practice collaborations 
This prompted the local public health agencies to approach the faculty at Surat-based GMC 
for technical assistance. As recounted by a public health officer:  
In medical education, the PSM department and our...medicine department 
and paediatric department, they used to support us. So mostly from the 
PSM36 department we used to take an expert with us and from here we used 
to have our experts and our field officers used to be there. All of us together, 
we used to have a meeting (D10, 9Feb, 2016). 
According to a public health academic:  
Any crisis which comes in south Gujarat, we work voluntarily for that. That 
was the mandate for us. Because that is an opportunity for entire hierarchy 
of the department to learn about epidemics and how to manage and how to 
contribute and that may be...it's our business to handle the data and 
everything and leave and even connect the departments or build up a 
network... (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
The public health officers and epidemiologists involved in the initial years of leptospirosis 
outbreaks were quite candid in explaining how they were taken by surprise because of the 
relative novelty (and severity) of the disease, and how they had to develop their own 
understandings very quickly.  
So some literature, when someone is in the PSM department, someone is in 
medicine, so all new, because all these were new things no, so all used to take 
an interest... (D10, 9 Feb 2016). 
The collaborative team of academics and programme managers, primarily from within the 
health sector, produced a set of guidelines for responding to leptospirosis that they refined 
several times. The operational guidelines included information useful for district public 
health workforce in carrying out different tasks of outbreak response. This included case 
definitions to be used in the field, clinic and laboratory, methods for sample collection and 
                                                             
36 PSM stands for the Department of Preventive & Social Medicine, the closest academic discipline 
to public health taught in medical schools in India. More recently, it is also referred to sometimes as 
Community Medicine. 
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transport, description of basic epidemiology and clinical manifestations of leptospirosis as 
well as protocols for clinical management.  
  
Figure 20: 2006 Leptospirosis manuals by GMC Surat (left) & NCDC (right). 
According to some individuals involved in the process, the visiting team of ‘experts’ from 
the NCDC37 was so impressed with the manual that they promptly repackaged the content 
and published it with their own institution’s logo (Zoonosis Division - NICD, 2006). I heard 
this story many times, recollected by different people who had participated in the 
discussions with NCDC in 2006. I interpreted this recollection both as a form of validation 
of the rigour of their efforts, and possibly out of frustration at the denial of intellectual 
credit for their efforts (Figure 20).  
In 2005, GMC prepared a manual, meaning written guidelines were made. 
Like that, little bit of guidelines were made but some used to be made on the 
treatment aspect, or how the surveillance will work. But complete, 
comprehensive guidelines were made in 2005. Then later, the state 
government approved it.  
Then in 2006 or in '07, NC...at that time NCDC people also used to come 
here...to give expert opinion during this episode. Sometimes we used to call 
their team also to do research - NCDC Delhi. So those who used to come from 
Delhi, they took these guidelines. They modified it a bit, put in their own 
inputs, and presented these guidelines at the national level (D10, 9 Feb 
2016). 
As discussed  in the document, this feeling is likely to have been further accentuated by the 
fact that, despite several post-graduate theses and different sets of research studies 
                                                             
37 then referred to by its old name, National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD) 
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conducted over the years, the Surat academics have been prevented from publishing their 
findings emanating from the data which is ‘owned’ by the state government. 
The public health faculty from the medical school worked with local public health agencies 
to develop a better understanding of the disease epidemiology and assist in investigating 
disease outbreaks. It is a testament to the enthusiasm and capabilities of the faculty at 
Surat medical school that until a few years ago, all leptospirosis investigation cases were 
conducted at the medical school and their epidemiologists managed the local disease 
database. Now a lot of diagnosis takes place in peripheral hospitals, as does the clinical 
management of suspect patients. 
To summarise, it seems that the district administration was taken by surprise by the 2006 
outbreak hitting Surat city. Not wanting a repeat of the anxiety levels seen in 1994, and 
because of the limitations of knowledge around the disease in the area, as well as the 
availability of a willing and capable partner, helped in the development of an informal 
cooperation between the local administration, health department and the medical college 
aimed at controlling the disease. However, the visibility of the disease among the human 
population and the expertise of the local actors ensured that the collaboration would be 
human-centric in its focus and would not emphasise the zoonotic component of the 
disease.  
Case definitions  
Case definitions for leptospirosis surveillance were revised frequently making year-on-
year comparisons of disease incidence quite difficult. I found the disease trends, depicted 
in Figure 21, using surveillance data collated from the public health office in Surat. It 
shows the annual incidence of leptospirosis cases ranging from 2-390, having come down 
markedly in recent years. The disease severity (or case fatality rate) showed similar 
fluctuations, but generally hovered between 15% and 20%. Curiously, the disease 
incidence data does not correlate with 1994, 2005 and 2013—the three years when major 
floods occurred in Surat—nor with reported figures in other publications38, which does 
lead one to question its accuracy.  
                                                             
38 For instance, the famous 2005-06 outbreak is supposed to have resulted in 379 suspected cases 
and 43 fatalities, as cited in (Parmar et al., 2013, p. 507) 
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Figure 21: Incidence of human leptospirosis in Surat district (1997 - 2012)39 
Leptospirosis was a new disease for the local public health community and it took some 
time for them to put in place a surveillance and response strategy after the initial outbreak 
in 1994. As the public health officers struggled to come to terms with the disease, they 
invited participation from the faculty of GMC, Surat to help them mount a response.  
The surveillance system started working in 1997, and gradually increased its coverage to 
cover all the reporting units in Surat in 2004, possibly accounting for the peak in the above 
graph, as explained by a senior public health researcher to me:  
First official data comes out…roughly around 94...94-98 actually started. But 
the peak was somewhere around 2004. But that was mainly because of the 
increase in the surveillance net (E3, 21 Aug 2015).  
However, the disease trends in later years became even harder to interpret, most likely 
because of the differences in defining leptospirosis cases in successive years. As a few 
public health academics associated with designing the response strategy in the early years 
recounted:  
Our case definition was made so broad – we had made it such that any case, if 
it looks like… any such symptoms come up, then we used to any way take it as 
a suspected leptospirosis case. We used to talk about confirmed (case) later… 
Like that gradually, it was understood what leptospirosis is. At that time, 
people were scared because of this plague… (as it had also) happened post-
flood (D10, 9 Feb 2016). 
The main difficulty…was because of the changes in (case) definition. Who can 
be a suspected or confirmed case of leptospirosis? Sometimes, they felt MAT 
test positive is lepto, or sometimes they said it's only ELISA that was positive, 
sometimes they said, it's the two ELISA, and second four-fold rise was a 
                                                             
39 Another district, Tapi, was carved out from the larger Surat in 2009. The data above exclude 
cases from areas currently included in the new district. Source: (Epidemic Branch (Surat)- 
Commissionerate of Health Family Welfare & Medical Services, 2016) 
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positive lepto, and sometimes they said only RTPCR cases can be termed as a 
confirmed case of leptospirosis.    
And within a year also I have seen instances where the kits were changed. So 
if I say now four-fold rise – in kit A, the four fold rise or the cut off for lepto 
was 4, so it became four-fold rise of 16. In the second kit that was (some 
word) by the government had cut off of 10, so it became 40, so there were 
issues regarding that also (E3, 21 Aug 2015). 
Untested remedies 
As recounted by a public health researcher who was involved in the initial activities, the 
team tried different methods to understand disease epidemiology, and associated risk 
factors that could help them identify individuals at risk and develop interventions. While it 
is difficult to find any scholarly examination of these strategies in the published literature, 
the quote below gives a fascinating insight into the thinking that informed these initial 
activities: 
 
Figure 22: Laboratory protocols for leptospirosis. 
Most of them are poor, tribal, farm labourers. And farm labourers means they 
were not all employed by some family. Many of them had their own small 
land where they were working. And it was even very difficult to identify these 
farms...that the patient was exposed in which farm.  
Because the practice is, ‘Today you help me in my small farm, tomorrow I 
come to your farm and help you’. And even their residence was just in the 
midst of the farm. So they have to cross that mud and everything daily when 
they come out.  
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So, in that early phase we say it is predominantly amongst those who work in 
farm... but then argument started coming up – ‘Oh, he was teacher. Oh, he 
was trainer. Oh, he was student’. But then you (realise), in such villages even 
a teacher has to do some farming... of his own or at least has to cross the mud 
and slush and pass through it. The rats are not going to discriminate.   
So, it is only exposure which matters but then... occupation exposure rate is 
higher. Then when we looked, we also followed up cases in the field and that 
gave us lot of insight of their living condition and exposure risk and other 
things (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
It was in these circumstances that the NCDC, during one of its meetings with the 
leptospirosis team in Surat, suggested the introduction of chemoprophylaxis, which 
involves the mass distribution of doxycycline, to the entire population in selected villages. 
Doxycycline, similar to ciprofloxacin discussed in the previous chapter on anthrax, is a 
broad-spectrum antibiotic. It is the treatment of choice for a wide range of pathogens, 
despite increasing resistance. Doxycycline can also be harmful to children, babies and 
those with other existing illnesses (British National Formulary, 2018; Bryant et al., 1987).   
There is limited evidence that supports mass distribution of such a powerful antibiotic as 
doxycycline for leptospirosis. At the time, the suggestion must have been made by NCDC 
when there would have been only one study available in the public domain. Sehgal et al.’s 
(2000) study was the only clinical trial at the time from India which failed to detect any 
impact on infection levels, though it did demonstrate potential for reducing disease 
severity.  
When I probed the public health experts associated with the decision in Surat, I got a 
response along the following lines from all of them:  
When such critical cases appear, you can't say that this is not recommended, 
this is not done…. See there are, see then it is public health challenge and that 
too crisis like that, there needs to be visibility of programme.... People should 
feel that something is happening and there should be some effectiveness of it 
and science of intervention (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
This justification seems to have a lot in common with the decision on anthrax discussed in 
the previous chapter. As demonstrated in the case of anthrax, this justification by the state 
seems to prioritise political expediency, or being seen to be doing something, over 
acknowledging the uncertainty and loss of control when it comes to the natural world.  
Such reasoning presupposes that the ‘public’ lacks capacity for rational reasoning 
(Marsland, 2014). However, what I find ironical here is that, while on the one hand the 
government refused to engage with public in decision-making process citing lack of 
capacity, at the same time its officers appear to be using their technical expertise to justify 
a decision which was ultimately arrived at out of political expediency! 
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At least, among my interviewees who were familiar with the academic literature, there 
was widespread agreement about lack of scientific evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
chemoprophylaxis. And, I did not have to look too far to find scientific literature 
questioning the strategy.  
In their joint review of the existing evidence base regarding leptospirosis, WHO and the 
International Leptospirosis Society (2003) suggest chemoprophylaxis in specific 
circumstances to exposed individuals only and not as a population level general 
intervention, as was practiced in Surat. Moreover, two systematic reviews published in 
Cochrane by Brett-Major and colleagues have cited unclear evidence on the use of 
antibiotics in prevention (2009) as well as treatment (2012) for leptospirosis. This means 
that both of the key strategies employed by the government could offer doubtful 
protection against leptospirosis.  
This led me to wonder how a policy like this could sustain itself for more than a decade on 
such weak grounds with endorsement by locally-based actors, whose authority and 
credibility was invested in the programme. Even though 12 years had passed since the 
launch of the chemoprophylaxis strategy in Surat, perhaps it was telling that I was not able 
to find anyone in Gujarat willing to offer a strong defence. Could it be possible that the 
inputs for the policy have come from an institution outside the state, such as the NCDC or 
the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), with different levels of ownership by local 
actors?  
In fact, despite the restrictions on publishing, I could detect hints of quiet resistance to the 
policy by Surat-based academics and health officers. For instance, none of the state 
manuals on leptospirosis control that I came across40advocates chemoprophylaxis, even 
though it was listed in their calendar of annual activities. 
The resistance from the academic side was much more explicit. I came across multiple 
papers from public health as well as microbiology researchers from GMC, Surat that 
questioned the chemoprophylaxis strategy. Some of them do so in very unambiguous 
terms, such as those entitled, “Chemoprophylaxis with doxycycline in suspected epidemic of 
leptospirosis during floods: does this really work?” (Bhardwaj et al., 2010) and “Prophylaxis 
and treatment for leptospirosis: Where are the evidences?” (Charan et al., 2012). 
I must confess it took me a while to locate these papers. This was because very few of my 
interviewees cited these critical papers, possibly indicating that an aversion to 
                                                             
40 I was able to access 2005, 2009, 2012 and 2013 versions of the operational manual on 
leptospirosis control, published by the Government of Gujarat. 
118 
 
commenting on public policy still persists. Another likely explanation for the continued 
silence on policy issues is that the Surat academics might have felt spoken over and 
outcompeted for credibility in comparison with national agencies. As the public health 
researcher responded to me when I probed the lack of publications from GMC: 
They published series of books. And that's why we could not publish (D16, 9 
Feb 2016). 
From evidence to policy 
However, when I tried to examine the process and rationale for implementing 
chemoprophylaxis through the perspective of a middle-level programme manager, a 
slightly different and more messy explanation emerged, complicating the standard publics 
vs public health argument. I interviewed the public health officer responsible for 
implementing the daily activities of leptospirosis and other outbreak-prone diseases in 
Surat. This is what he said: 
(Chemoprophylaxis has been going on) since 2005. Only one or two years we 
had dropped in the middle...in 2007 or '08. 
In 2005, we only started it in high risk talukas. Meaning they were selected 
talukas. After that, we increased it and... Barring only one or two talukas, 
where no cases used to happen during the whole season, in all the talukas 
this was implemented. 
After that, political problems started coming up. Meaning… in this 
(chemoprophylaxis program) there was a lot of political commitment. These 
cases used to happen in the tribal areas. And the tribal population is given a 
lot of importance now by the political people. 
So in the tribal area that, like if there was even one death... due to any reason 
whatsoever. For instance...a scattered case happened somewhere.... which is a 
non-endemic area... 
And what happens is that… over there (non-endemic area where the death 
occurred) we do (have) surveillance but there is no (distribution of) 
doxycycline… Then what happens is that over there the level of awareness 
meaning sensitivity which should be there...to detect the disease… is not 
there. 
So the case is also reported late and the doctor also doesn't take it too 
seriously. So what happens is that if that case goes on, there are more 
chances of deaths taking place. If death takes place over there...then there is a 
problem. Over there, each and every death was counted. 
If there is a death, then immediately questions will start. 20-25-30 (deaths) – 
why (did) this happen? Who had gone for chemoprophylaxis? Why wasn't it 
started? What, then to give answer brother (to the question) why isn't it (the 
chemoprophylaxis intervention being implemented) over there?  
Now the scientific reason, we can make the doctor understand. It is a little 
difficult to make a political person understand it.... 
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So they said, “No, it should be started”. Then they said that “It is ok (to start 
distributing antibiotics). If there is even one death that can be avoided over 
there, so what's the problem? Start it over there.”  
Then we didn't leave any area. 
So we had started chemoprophylaxis in all the areas. But we ensured that we 
gave it (the antibiotics) to the high-risk population. Meaning the other 
population we don't (distribute the drugs to). Those who are field 
labourers...meaning those who are related to animal husbandry (are 
covered)... 
(So now we're covering all the areas, but) only high-risk population. Those 
who have chances of getting it. Those who have exposure. Those who don't 
have any exposure only there is no meaning to give them. (D10, 9 Feb 2016) 
The above quote highlights quite nicely the gap between motivations, incentives and the 
expectations of problem solving between academic and policy contexts. While the officer 
quoted above did not say so explicitly, I assume he was aware of the scientifically 
questionable premise of antibiotic prophylaxis. However, once the decision was taken to 
implement the policy (before his time, and likely above his paygrade) by technical experts 
and administrative leadership, they started doing so within endemic areas only, likely to 
maximise the benefits and reduce the risks and costs of the intervention.  
How the strategy unfolded subsequently was quite illuminating. The officer acknowledged 
the limitations of surveillance and response systems, while explaining their inability to 
identify potential cases of leptospirosis and institute prompt treatment, especially in the 
relatively inaccessible, but politically significant, tribal communities.  
He explained the political fallout of even non-disease-related deaths in the outbreak 
season. He found it difficult to respond to the intense scrutiny all of his department’s 
actions would come under from the political leadership. Questions would be raised not 
only about the absence of chemoprophylaxis, but also about all other aspects of his 
department’s strategy.  
Rather than engaging with the political representatives in a reasoned debate (since “it is 
difficult to make a political person understand”), the path of least resistance for the public 
health officer was to cover the entire district, but focus on the most exposed (likely 
poorer) people.  
As the discussion above highlights, government officers appear to have mixed feelings 
about the public and their representatives. Recalling Marsland’s (2014) notion of publics 
as  lacking capacity for rational thought, the public health officer clearly does not have 
confidence in the merits of his arguments and in his ability to convince the politician about 
the benefits of following the ‘rational’ strategy. Instead, the officer is clearly aware of the 
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hierarchy of influence and making sure that the interests of those with the most influence 
are accommodated in the official policy.  
 
Figure 23: Control room mangers? Health dept, Govt of Gujarat. 
Officers like these typically work at the interface of field personnel, policy-elites and 
political leadership. Therefore, it is up to the individuals like the quoted public health 
officer to identify policy options and negotiate a consensus among the political and 
bureaucratic stakeholders in order to seek endorsement. It will also be his/her job to 
ensure that this commitment to political goals is translated into a scientifically justifiable 
and practically acceptable intervention that could then be sold to the peripheral workforce 
as doable.  
Simplistic linear frameworks of evidence-based decision making (Armstrong et al., 2006; 
Mansnerus, 2013) often do not do justice to the complex, messy realities of second best 
compromises that Roe (2016a) calls for in managing policy messes. There are definitely 
shades of Roe’s (2013) high reliability professionals and control room managers (Figure 
23) in the way officers like the one quoted above make decisions, as explained later in the 
chapter.  
Multisector planning 
First time in history…for leptospirosis, animal husbandry, agriculture 
department, public health department used to sit together in the year and 
plan for intervention and re-think what had happened in this case. That 
happened for the first time.  
And they used to exchange information, high-risk area, so that happened in 
early...in order to test problem. And one of the advantages of the plague was 
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that it was a sensitive issue. So every department...used to feel that they have 
to be part of this. Because it's everybody's responsibility (D16, 9 Feb 2016). 
While the primary agencies involved in assessing and devising strategies for leptospirosis 
control were the public health department and the local medical college, other 
government departments such as animal husbandry, agriculture and the municipality 
were also involved in different ways. As discussed in the quotations from a public health 
researcher from Surat above and from a state veterinary epidemiologist below, 
veterinarians from animal husbandry are consulted while developing the annual calendar 
of activities for leptospirosis: 
See, especially for leptospirosis control, the health department is tracking the 
needs. They are inviting every say...monsoon is coming in every year, so we 
have to prepare an action plan... and according to the prepared action plan, 
they will make a calendar. 
So the training will be held at district level, taluka level or at the medical 
college by inviting… stakeholders, veterinarians, farmers and all these people. 
So that time for leptospirosis, health department became the lead and called 
all the meetings with a certain agenda to be acted upon (E6, 10 Feb 2015). 
For a zoonotic disease that has been studied for more than two decades, there is 
surprisingly little understanding (or interest) in mapping the reservoir species, 
understanding their ecological dynamics and devising suitably tailored strategies. The 
only study conducted among animals at the time appears to have been by the 
microbiologists at the medical school (Panwala and Mulla, 2015) and two more 
descriptive studies by Patel (2014; 2015), which are limited to cattle and provide no 
solution to the problem. Taken together, they point to a constant presence of leptospirosis 
among livestock.  
To date, I have not managed to come across any assessment of leptospirosis among rodent 
populations in Gujarat, despite the NCDC claim that “it is established beyond doubt that 
rodents are the major reservoirs of bacterium Leptospira” (Venkatesh et al., 2016, p. 78). 
This statement can be made only if the authors of the report had exclusive access to 
unpublished data, or if they were extrapolating evidence from another context to Surat. 
The lack of rodent surveillance data is especially confusing in Surat because Surat is one of 
the few places in India having a regular rodent surveillance programme in place. Thanks to 
the plague outbreak, Surat is one of the few sites to have dedicated rodent surveillance 
teams in rural and urban areas funded through their municipality. The samples, however, 
have to be sent outside Gujarat for testing by the only national referral laboratory on 
plague run by NCDC in Bengaluru. The Gujarat officers, despite multiple requests, cannot 
get additional leptospirosis testing on rodents because the lab does not have the capacity 
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to do so. As recounted by the public health officer below, the frustration with the NCDC 
clearly shows through:  
And...another thing is that a plague surveillance unit is available at our place, 
two of them... after 1994. So in the plague surveillance the problem used to be 
that, we have suggested 2-3 times to them, we suggested to NCDC also, either 
it was a political problem or they had a financial problem, I don't know. So 
we told them for plague, you are anyway taking the rodent organs.... You are 
taking the blood also for sampling. So in that only why don't you people do 
the leptospirosis sampling? 
So the NCDC team used to come here every year to look at leptospirosis. So 
we told them that you develop an additional facility for leptospirosis and in 
that you do something. Now, it is my personal thinking, I don't know 
whatever it is...but maybe they didn't have much interest in developing that 
centre, whatever it may be (D10, 09 Feb 2016). 
I was told that an annual plan of work is developed in advance every year to identify 
activities needed for leptospirosis control. Apparently, the plan is prepared by the public 
health department, which prepares an annual calendar of activities in consultation with 
animal husbandry and agriculture departments.  
We have prepared Gantt charts of different sorts of activities, that (describes) 
how to go. State's task was getting (supplies), which month we are getting, 
identification of high risk areas, and identification of inter-department 
meeting. That inter-departmental meeting happens here (Health 
Commissioner’s office) at the state-level as well, and regional level also (E7, 
12 Aug 2015). 
 
Figure 24: Letter discussing the role of veterinarians in leptospirosis control 
(Director Animal Husbandry, 2012) 
Regarding the involvement of veterinarians in Gujarat, I had been told that the state had a 
two-decade-old programme on leptospirosis dating back to 1995, following the first 
outbreak from Valsad in south Gujarat in 1994. I found the following references to the 
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project, indicating a programme was in place but, sadly could not locate any other 
documents that might shed light on its programmatic history.  
Under budget 2403-101-02-plan, Scheme Name: Ten Animal Disease 
Diagnosis Scheme and Control of Leptospirosis disease is being implemented 
by the State Government since 1995-96 (Director Animal Husbandry, 2012) 
More interestingly, perhaps, the letter shown in Figure 24 furnished the clearest depiction 
of the role of animal husbandry in leptospirosis control activities in the state (Source: 
Office of Health Commissioner). The letter was from the Director of Animal Husbandry 
(2012) to the chief veterinary officers and veterinary epidemiologists41 working in the 
southern districts of Bharuch, Navsari, Valsad, Surat and Tapi in Gujarat. It was dated 23rd 
January 2012, and possibly was sent to kick-start planning for the annual calendar of 
activities developed by the public health department.  
The letter directed the district officers to undertake the following activities for the 
purpose of leptospirosis control: 
 Conduct surveillance of livestock in high risk villages, including blood samples  
 Conduct epidemiological analysis  of surveillance data (essentially annual 
comparisons) 
 Regularly attend intersectoral collaborations at district and sub-district levels 
for zoonotic diseases 
 Develop plans for establishing an Animal Disease Diagnosis centre (a laboratory 
for veterinary microbiological investigations) 
 Conduct public awareness campaigns for preventing the disease by distributing 
pamphlets at key events, such as  
o Animal Husbandry Camp 
o Animal health mela (fair) 
o Krishi Mahotsav (Agriculture festival) 
Also interestingly, the letter directed that half the blood samples collected from livestock 
be tested at GMC, Surat.42 This is likely because the veterinary sector still lacked 
laboratory capacity for leptospirosis testing as late as 2012. I was informed that the 
nearby veterinary universities have since started conducting serological analyses in newly 
opened veterinary colleges near Surat.  
All my interviewees mentioned ongoing efforts to operationalise intersectoral 
collaborations. The letters from both the departments’ headquarters instructing district 
officers to maintain regular contacts further support the claim. However, it is worth asking 
                                                             
41 Official designation: Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry and Assistant Director, respectively. 
42 The other half of blood samples were to be tested outside the state, a lab in Chennai. Parallel 
testing is a commonly used external quality assurance mechanism, but maybe also signals attempts 
by the veterinary sector to keep tabs on the human health sector lab, or end its reliance on the 
medical college.  
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at the point, how was the partnership envisaged? Did any sector take a lead role and was 
the effort owned jointly by all involved departments? 
The picture becomes clearer when we look at a graphical depiction of distribution of work 
in the annual activity plan for leptospirosis control (see Figure 25). I used the 2012 
activity plan published in that year’s state manual for leptospirosis control (Epidemic 
Branch - Commissionerate of Health Family Welfare & Medical Services, 2012) to identify 
and understand the allocation of activities to different sectors. While the activity plan does 
look well-planned and quite decentralised, as shown in the figure, it appears that there is 
far less collaboration among the sectors than what I was led to believe initially.  
From Figure 25 it appears that apart from initial consultation, non-health sectors (i.e. 
agriculture and veterinary) are involved only peripherally for conducting very specific 
tasks one month in a year. The programme focus on human health interventions appears 
clearly in the figure, with little mention of non-human-health components, such as animal 
health protection.  
While an annual calendar of activities was planned for the disease, it appears that the 
emphasis in the calendar, as in many bureaucratic plans, is to focus on the immediate 
goals (in this case, preventing a spike in disease incidence) than on developing 
institutionalised vision of collaborations. Planning meetings are held in the beginning of 
the year (Activity #2), but no provisions seemed in place for the ongoing exchange of 
disease information between the departments or even an end-of-year stock-taking.  
 
Figure 25: Annual plan of activities for leptospirosis control in Surat 
Developed by public health office at the state level (Epidemic Branch - Commissionerate of Health Family Welfare 
& Medical Services, 2012, p. 26) 
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The ‘intersectoral collaborations’ put in place for leptospirosis seem typical of many other 
One Health ‘best practices’ that involve regular interactions and joint planning by different 
agencies; they are convened by the human health sector and cater only to human health 
concerns with little discussion on the concerns of other agencies.  
6.4 EMERGENT THEMES 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I have described how the programme managers 
in the state believed (or tried to make me believe) in the story of ‘successful’ control of 
leptospirosis in Gujarat. While highlighting the limited nature of epidemiological analyses 
in the public domain, I have demonstrated how the state government’s claims of having 
‘controlled the disease’ do not hold water, even with the little that we know about the 
disease.  
This does not take away from the substantial commitment of resources, personnel and 
creative thinking that appears to have gone into the last 12 years of leptospirosis control 
in Surat and neighbouring districts in southern Gujarat. In addition to equipping 
peripheral health centres with the capacity and personnel to provide specialised medical 
care, the leptospirosis control programme has also been characterised by remarkably 
close collaborations between Surat-based medical faculty and the public health 
department. In addition, while leptospirosis continues to be seen as primarily a human 
health issue, and there is limited ownership by the veterinary sector, they have a specific, 
allocated role in the programme and regular conversations do take place between both the 
departments.  
In the following section, I want to analyse four closely related themes that appear from the 
discussion so far.  
The first theme is a further examination of the success story narrative built around 
leptospirosis in Surat. I want to examine the reasons for pushing a narrative like this—
how it came together and, more importantly, how they managed to sustain a story of 
successful control for such a long time.  
The second theme centres on the role played by politics around knowledge in building and 
sustaining a success story narrative. Specifically, I will examine multiple instances I came 
across where the access to disease information was limited.  I argue this was to preserve 
the authority of the state and its promoted narrative.  
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The third theme, emanating from the previous two, focuses on the bureaucracy, including 
the process through which it monopolised discussion space by co-opting key actors in 
Surat.  
The last theme is an attempt to analyse the decision-making process through the 
perspective of policy-makers on the ground, mostly middle-level managers.  
Manufacturing a success story 
One thing is evident: whether disciplining or empowering in intent, the 
operational control which bureaucracies or NGOs have over events and 
practices in development is always constrained and often quite limited.11 
What is usually more urgent and more practical is control over the 
interpretation of events. (Mosse, 2004, p. 646) 
As I have described at the beginning of the chapter, my principal contacts within public 
health and animal husbandry departments nudged me towards studying leptospirosis 
control in Gujarat instead of CCHF as I had originally planned. Citing the decreased 
incidence of the disease and long-standing animal-human health collaborations around 
leptospirosis in the state, the officers assured me that leptospirosis ought to be studied as 
a “best practice” compared to the developing story of CCHF, a disease that was still 
understood incompletely.  
I later discovered, of course, that there is no such thing as ‘best practice’ when it comes to 
emergency response and upon closer examination, the Gujarat experience of leptospirosis 
control did not seem quite as it was portrayed to be. Unlike the case of CCHF (Kakkar and 
Abbas, 2013), there was limited engagement of public health officers with veterinarians in 
either understanding the epidemiology or devising response strategies for leptospirosis. 
There were many unknowns about the epidemiology of leptospirosis. Changing case 
definitions of the disease meant that the numbers were not comparable across the years. 
Limited research on animal reservoirs meant that the disease transmission cycle was not 
understood completely, therefore making it difficult to explain whether reducing disease 
incidence (even if accurate) had to do with changing epidemiological cycles or an actual 
decrease.  
When it came to developing a disease response, as discussed earlier in the chapter, apart 
from strengthening surveillance and ensuring access to specialised health services, the 
major preventive strategies either did not have proven effectiveness, such as mass 
chemoprophylaxis among unaffected or antibiotic treatment among suspect cases, or 
implemented half-heartedly, such as around establishing collaborative surveillance and 
control strategies among rodent and livestock species. 
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As discussed below, this positive spin on leptospirosis was also paradoxically countered 
by an increased sensitivity around sharing disease data I encountered in the field. While 
some senior researchers refused to discuss leptospirosis with me altogether, citing lack of 
written permission from the state government which, apparently, ‘owned the data’, many 
recounted their own frustrations with the state government for denying them permission 
to publish papers based upon their findings. This all made me wonder why  officers in the 
public health and animal husbandry departments at the state capital felt so confident 
about the disease and, indeed, make an effort to showcase leptospirosis control as a ‘best 
practice’. A part of the answer is likely to lie in the 1994 plague outbreak and its aftermath. 
It is estimated that the plague outbreak of 1994 resulted in losses of $600 million to the 
national economy and resulted in mass anxiety as reflected in the news reports of the time 
(Pallipparambil, 2006). The plague outbreak exposed the vulnerabilities of the public 
health systems, both at the state and national levels and resulted in huge investments in 
public health surveillance, including the launch of the first-ever national disease 
surveillance programme in 1997 (NICD, 2002). 
The motivation to avoid a plague-like situation could be one reason why the state 
government was especially keen to appear being in control of leptospirosis, a disease that 
first became visible around the same time as the plague outbreak (Prasad, 2000), but 
finally erupted in public consciousness when it caused outbreaks in urban areas in Surat in 
2005.  
The political leadership in Gujarat has been provided by the same political party since 
1998 (Wikipedia contributors, 2018). The regime at the time of the outbreak has been 
claimed by many to be focussed more on ‘event management’ (Indian Express, 2014) and 
political showmanship in favour of substantial administrative interventions.43 For a 
government that is so protective of its image, its officers would have been under pressure 
to craft as favourable a story as possible.  
In a context where the meaning of success is itself contested (as in the manipulation of 
case definition, and resultant disease incidence), what matters more than the outcomes of 
                                                             
43 The extent to which political image of the government trumped public health interests in Gujarat 
can be best illustrated by its response to the recent Zika virus outbreak in 2016. Around one year 
after WHO declared Zika to be a public health emergency of international concern, and amidst 
popular anxiety about the possibility of outbreaks in India, the first human cases of Zika infection in 
India were discovered in Ahmedabad, the state capital of Gujarat. The government of the day, 
defying its national and international obligations on disease reporting, and also obligations to its 
citizens, chose to hide the fact. It is speculated that even public health officers from the state were 
not kept in loop as the timing of the infection clashed with a major investment summit planned in 
the same city, and any disruption would have been seen as a major loss of face (Biswas, 2017). 
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a policy process, is the nature of interpretation of the problem and the policy outcome 
(Roe, 1994, 1991). It is so much easier to get potential critics on board by framing a 
narrative of success that can conceal differences and prevent ridicule or criticism to 
emerge (Mosse, 2004; Sumberg et al., 2012).  
Evidence-based decision-making: Politics of knowledge translation 
The government crafted a story of successful disease control using several interlinked 
strategies. These included controlling access to disease information by restricting its 
access to a closed group of people, including by co-opting those voices that could 
potentially challenge this story. This helped the government to promote the construction 
of a disease narrative that it favoured and discouraged critical perspectives from 
emerging. This was, in turn, facilitated by the political and administrative culture unique 
to Surat and Gujarat, as demonstrated below. 
In the absence of critical epidemiological analyses, it is difficult to make sense of the bigger 
disease picture in Surat. Some insightful studies did come out questioning the current 
understanding of leptospirosis and its interventions,44 but these remain few in number. 
These include studies describing clinical manifestations (Clerke et al., 2002), descriptive 
epidemiology (Patel et al., 2006), and diagnostic microbiology (Panwala et al., 2015). Most 
research on the disease appeared to be describing the disease, without analysing the 
transmission pathways or risk factors that could either improve the understanding of the 
local behaviour of the disease or inform intervention policies.  
The extent of disease transmission occurring within and between different animal species 
has also not been investigated adequately, thus preventing a complete understanding of 
disease epidemiology from developing. The only research I have come across has been 
done quite recently and those are sero-prevalence studies45 among different animal 
species, such as those by Balamurugan (2013), Patel (2014; 2015) or Panwala (2015). 
Incidentally, one of the first publications to describe the leptospirosis response in Gujarat 
was actually a social science critique of the limitations of the overtly clinical approach 
adopted by the state of Gujarat (Prasad, 2000). Sadly, there does not appear to have been 
further examination of the social aspects of the disease epidemiology or interventions.  
                                                             
44 For instance, see papers by Bhardwaj et al. (2008) and Parmar et al. (2013)on leptospirosis risk 
factors, Shah et al. (2012) reporting isolates and several papers questioning chemoprophylaxis 
(Bhardwaj et al., 2010; Charan et al., 2013, 2012). 
45 These studies typically identify prior exposure of animal immune system to leptospirosis without 
identifying the type of exposure.  
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From the few studies medical faculty have been allowed to publish, it seems that there is a 
need to question government narratives around leptospirosis. But as was made clear to 
me multiple times in Surat, the data from leptospirosis surveillance was ‘owned’ by the 
government and therefore, analyses could only be published after taking their consent. As 
a result, the faculty have several graduate dissertations and other research manuscripts 
that have still not been published for lack of consent from the state government.  
I had an opportunity to experience the heightened sensitivity with which leptospirosis 
data were treated when I went to interview the faculty in GMC, Surat. In my personal 
interactions with different stakeholders in Gujarat, I was surprised at how informal and 
personal the interactions were on one hand and the evasiveness that existed with regards 
to sharing data on the other. Despite being known to state programme managers and 
following repeated requests for a formal letter of introduction from them, I was assured 
that it was not needed to schedule interviews around leptospirosis in Surat. However, 
when I went, a different picture presented itself. 
Like most policy researchers, I have had my requests for interview or information politely 
fobbed off before. However, it was the first time in my PhD fieldwork, that I was turned 
back without any information, interview or explanation. As I recorded in my field diary 
below, I encountered an inexplicable, but very real resistance in discussing leptospirosis in 
the office of the Community Medicine department pictured below (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26: Community Medicine department in GMC, Surat. 
The professor invited me to morning tea in the college canteen with the 
whole team of faculty and residents from the community medicine 
department, apparently a daily ritual. While the informality of the team 
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during tea impressed me, I was struck by how uneasy the professor seemed 
sitting across from me. He asked me some disjointed questions about PHFI, 
my residence and field sites, but did not respond to my reference to my 
research questions.  
After tea, we went to his office, accompanied with two other faculty 
members. When I started to move beyond small talk and introduced my 
research questions, he immediately responded with “But what is exactly the 
purpose of your study”, and “How will you cite the source of this information”.  
I thought I had already explained this in our previous meeting, but did it 
again anyway and passed the information sheet and consent form to him. I 
was sent out and asked to wait for ten minutes while the GMC faculty tried to 
make sense of my documents and possibly deliberated upon a strategy to 
handle me.  
I was told that the other two faculty members would be answering my 
questions. He did not give any reasons for this.  
Things got even stranger. I followed the two academics, an Associate 
Professor and a young Assistant Professor, to another (smaller) faculty room 
deep inside the corridors. When we got settled again, I circulated the forms to 
both of them again. This time I took care to highlight the key clauses from my 
consent form, “You will not be identified as an informant, if you don’t want to. 
I will ask you specifically before ascribing a quote to you. The recorder is only 
to assist me in note-taking, but it’s OK not to use it, if you don’t like”. 
It took the senior academic fifteen more minutes to go through the form, 
before apologising and saying to me, “I didn’t realise, but I will have to speak 
to the Dean about this before talking to you”. 
I also mentioned that all the senior public health officers knew about my 
study and was happy to have them confirm this on the phone, if he liked. 
However, that didn’t work and off we went to the Dean’s office, where the 
Assistant Professor and I waited outside for another half an hour. He later 
came out, and finally informed me, “I have spoken to the Dean/Principal and 
he says that you can’t interview or collect data without a formal letter from 
the Regional Director”. (Field notes, 9 Feb 2016) 
The above interaction at the GMC was when I realised about the fragile nature of the 
disease control narrative and the uncertainty accompanying it. Even as everyone claimed 
the disease to be under control, many remained apprehensive about it, to the extent that 
even a discussion among health professionals was seen as potentially challenging the 
disease control narrative. As told to me by a senior public health researcher,  
But most unfortunate part will be, it will be very difficult for you also to 
understand that, in spite of leptospirosis being there in south Gujarat for so 
long, there are no great publications out of it. For some reason, the 
government was very sceptical about using the data. They have never 
allowed data to be utilised.    
So there are very few publications, I am not aware about very recently if 
anyone has published but I remember 4 or 5 publications, not beyond that by 
Rajesh Chudasama and Pankaj, one or two, there are numerous dissertations 
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which have been done on leptospirosis lying vacant, lying unutilised in 
medical college of Surat. Huge amount of work has been done (E3- 21 Aug 
15). 
The defensive stance of many of the stakeholders involved was further emphasised by 
complete refusal to share information around the disease data with me, even as the public 
health officers themselves were much more forthcoming.  
The sensitivity about sharing surveillance data is not peculiar to Gujarat alone. There are 
heightened public anxieties accompanying communicable disease outbreaks where state 
intervention usually follows reported deaths, or serious illnesses. This has led many 
countries to enact laws that provide overarching authority to the governments to suppress 
individual liberties and use police powers to maintain law and order, including India 
(Kakkar et al., 2010) as also elsewhere (Gostin, 2005).  
However, as demonstrated in the case of leptospirosis, if the disease data are not opened 
up for analysis, it will prevent an informed public debate, and will almost surely result in 
weakened public health performance. The need to protect patient confidentiality is 
obviously paramount in such situations, and it is difficult to find a justification for not 
sharing anonymised disease data for the public good (Fairchild and Bayer, 2016; Mello 
and Gostin, 2009).  
In line with the discussions in this chapter, it can be argued that restricting access and 
analysis of public surveillance data through preferred agencies even a decade afterwards 
is an attempt to influence discourse and extend the authority of state. The way information 
regarding the counting of the dead and diseased in a population is politicised brings to 
mind Foucauldian notion of biopolitics as well as the technologies of rule exercised by the 
state (Corbridge et al., 2005; Rose, 2001). One of the ways in which the government seeks 
to shore up the credibility and legitimacy of its decisions is through the instrumentalised 
use of scientific advice and constructing a hegemonic narrative that seeks to paper over 
the conflicts (Jasanoff, 1992; Mosse, 2004). The problem with such emergent narratives is 
that by nature they are fragile and require constant vigilance to prevent alternative 
framings to emerge. Just how can a consensus emerge among a disparate group of actors, 
is discussed in the next section.  
A coalition of the unwilling 
Another factor that appears to have facilitated the promotion of a success story narrative 
around leptospirosis has been the co-opting of most of the public health and medical 
community in the decision-making process by the district health administration. This is 
likely to have occurred spontaneously, possibly after the 1997 leptospirosis outbreak 
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following close on the heels of the 1994 plague outbreak. A pre-existing history of medical 
college’s participation in public health programmes is likely to have facilitated the 
partnership, as posited by other reviews on collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006; Thomson 
and Perry, 2006). In addition, at the time of the initial outbreak, a senior public health 
professor from GMC, Dr Vikas Desai, had been deputed to the Health department in the 
state capital as a programme manager. Consequently, she was well placed to have 
mobilised the GMC faculty for acting as a champion for and in assisting the government’s 
leptospirosis response efforts, and possibly another reason why the academia-practice 
collaboration developed and sustained over the years.  
The academics mostly agree that they themselves benefitted from the association. When 
leptospirosis was first identified in Surat, apart from an academic understanding, there 
was very little personal experience of identifying or managing the disease among the 
clinicians and public health practitioners alike. As recounted by a former clinician from 
GMC:  
That was the first time that we had seen the disease and before that certain 
sporadic cases were occurring, but probably they were going unnoticed and 
undiagnosed…. That was the first time I saw cases of leptospirosis and read in 
textbooks as under graduates (D13, 9 Feb 2016). 
In a situation where even the local experts were taken aback with the novelty of the 
disease, as well as severity of the presentations, it would have been extremely difficult for 
the government to mount an effective response. This made the crisis-like situation at the 
time perfectly ripe for innovative ideas, such as an academic-policy collaboration (Atun et 
al., 2010; Tennyson, 2004).  
The curious aspect is that as we also felt that why only Gujarat has got 
pulmonary symptoms. Karnataka…has got hundreds of cases of lepto, but 
very few of pulmonary haemorrhage and Tamil Nadu… We had gone once to 
Tamil Nadu for our conference for lepto and there they said that we don’t see 
many (pulmonary cases), as the patients come and given dialysis they go 
away and so you can’t compare the mortalities at all.  
We used to be always (asked) by our officers, “Why your mortality is very 
high as Tamil Nadu has low mortality?” But they (Tamil Nadu) don’t have 
pulmonary involvement at all. They have typical Weil’s syndrome. In kidney 
involvement you do dialysis. But here the pulmonary haemorrhage is so 
severe that nothing works (D13, 9 Feb 2016). 
Once you have the right of state, as well as a consistent and scientifically compelling 
framing that fits into the dominant narrative, it became difficult to be challenged (Mosse, 
2004). All local actors were co-opted into the story. Having the local medical college’s 
cooperation in outbreak investigation and response helped legitimise the government’s 
strategy.  
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The government, for its part, convened high-level meetings regularly in the initial years, 
paying close attention and providing resources for treating affected individuals. As an 
example, one of the doctors mentioned how ventilators were procured for even smaller 
government hospitals and, in the initial years, when there was limited capacity to be able 
to provide intensive care, medical personnel from GMC used to be deputed in monsoon 
months to run these centres and provide secondary care closer to affected areas. 
The technical competence of the work at the time could be judged by the fact that the 
NCDC, which was supposed to be the premier national centre for advising on disease 
outbreaks such as this, actually found the operational manual developed by GMC in 2005-
06 good enough to serve as inspiration for its own manual (see Figure 20). 
On the other hand, apparently microbes are not similarly impressed with the endorsement 
of technical institutions. And the actual burden and transmission of Leptospira still retains 
a lot of uncertainty. As discussed earlier, regularly changing case definitions, limited 
research among other reservoir and carrier species, and reliance upon interventions of 
dubious effectiveness and safety means that there is still a lot we do not know about 
Leptospira in Gujarat and it cannot be claimed with any certainty that the disease numbers 
will not increase back again.  
Regardless of the current state of Leptospira, at the time of the initial outbreaks, and in an 
environment of rising anxiety about the disease, the government at the time did well to 
bring together professionals from different disciplines to lend their expertise to its efforts 
to control the disease. By forging such a network of professionals, the government was not 
only able to increase the scientific validity of its response,  but, as is the norm with other 
state actors, it was also able to inspire confidence about the credibility and effectiveness of 
its efforts to control the disease (Jasanoff, 2006). Importantly, after the initial outbreak 
season, by having the leading professionals of the district by its side, the government was 
able to capitalise upon this association to lend credence to the ensuing narrative about 
successful control of the diseases.  
Governing public health: Exercising leadership in uncertain times  
The capital of Gujarat, including the headquarters of all departments and the state 
legislature, is located in the city of Gandhinagar. Having replaced the much-older capital of 
Ahmedabad, this city was built with the explicit purpose of housing the chief organs of the 
state and, by extension, projecting the authority of the state. It has wide boulevards 
allowing for smooth flow of vehicular traffic and is lined by big open spaces or huge 
ministerial office complexes on either sides (for instance, see Figure 27).  
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Figure 27: New secretariat complex in Gandhinagar. 
One of the peculiarities of the city housing the state’s political and bureaucratic leadership 
is that most traffic lights do not seem to be working at any time. Instead, most of them are 
flashing red even during peak hours. The rationale for this oddity, as explained to me by 
the locals, is that people do not like to wait for traffic signals unnecessarily when they are 
working and prefer making their own way instead. Apparently, the people running all the 
main organs of the Gujarat have more trust in their individual abilities to negotiate their 
right of way with fellow commuters in an efficient manner than they have in the state’s 
ability to keep traffic moving. I cannot help but wonder whether this is a metaphor for my 
observations around leptospirosis, where short-term political expediency of projecting 
success sometimes took precedence over long-term, more substantive public health 
concerns. 
This ability of state officers from Gujarat to project a narrative of success came from their 
ability to make use of an institutional set-up unique to the state. First, the structure of the 
department of health itself. Following the structure of the central ministry, state ministries 
of health are headed by a political leader, i.e., a minister who is advised by a bureaucrat, 
the Principal Secretary. The Secretary leads the secretariat staff, responsible for 
budgeting, procurement and managing the administrative work of the departments. In the 
department involving specialised expertise, such as Health or Animal Husbandry, there is 
an independent cadre of technocrats. In the case of health ministry, they are headed by a 
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Director/Commissioner of Health Services who provides technical advice to the minister 
and secretary.  
While the post of director/commissioner in most states is generally held by a health 
professional, in Gujarat, the Commissioner of Health Services post has been earmarked for 
a generalist bureaucrat belonging to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) cadre—just 
like the health secretary, but more junior in the hierarchy. According to public health 
personnel, this not so subtle appropriation of a technical role by the generalist IAS and the 
clear demarcation of hierarchy vis-à-vis the health secretary has led to the undermining of 
the public health workforce in the state health department.  
The argument goes that, unlike the generalist IAS officers, who are often rotated among 
different ministries with three-year terms, technical officers serving in the public health 
directorate seldom enjoy a similar level of mobility or visibility, and are therefore 
mandated to provide a longer term vision to the health department that is informed by 
their technical training and expertise. The takeover of the role of health commissioner by 
IAS officers in Gujarat would, therefore, imply that the value of technical advice becomes 
subservient to short-term politically opportunistic concerns while deciding public health 
strategy.  
This explanation does not mean to imply that public health officers cannot make a 
contribution in Gujarat or that all policies are short-term and politically opportunistic. 
Rather, the above explanation seeks to point out the tensions and conflicting interests of 
technocrats and bureaucrats. It also seeks to demonstrate how heavily the cards are 
stacked against incremental public health strategies in favour of more visible and maybe 
less effective strategies such as drug administration or supplying ventilators in peripheral 
hospitals.  
When discussing past managers, most bureaucrats say good leadership is defined by their 
ability to ‘extract work from the system’. This is a phrase I have heard multiple times 
during my interactions with government officers all over India. This way of thinking about 
work, which involves a leader getting a recalcitrant bureaucratic workforce to deliver, 
contrasts with the self-motivating ethos of medical and teaching professions.  
When academics start working closely with bureaucrats, is it likely for a clash of working 
styles and motivations to emerge? One manifestation of the clash in working styles was 
possibly expressed in the refusal of the public health department of the medical college to 
discuss leptospirosis with me. While I was waiting with the young public health lecturer 
outside the Dean’s office in Surat, he cited the restrictions placed upon government 
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servants in interacting with the media and others from outside the system possibly to 
justify the wary attitudes of his superiors. However, the notion of epidemiologists not 
discussing analysis of historic surveillance data seemed anachronistic to me, especially 
since the bureaucrats seemed much more open to talking to researchers like me than did 
some of the academics themselves.  
Jasanoff (1987) cites the blurring of boundaries between scientists giving advice and the 
decision-makers acting upon it, with the difference often constituted through the very act 
of advice giving. Is it possible that the academics also started identifying more with the 
policy-makers during the course of their interaction? And might this explain why 
interventions with questionable efficacy and safety like mass antibiotic administration 
were endorsed by the academicians? 
Maybe this is the reason why, for all their confidence in leptospirosis strategy, the 
ownership of surveillance data still remains restricted to official use only. Despite the 
surveillance database being initially maintained by the public health faculty in the local 
medical college, there are limited number of studies that have examined the epidemiology 
of leptospirosis in the region, or interrogated the effectiveness of the intervention 
strategies being deployed in the state.  
And perhaps, this is also the reason why the veterinary component did not seem to be fully 
integrated with programme functioning in Surat. A simplistic success story narrative could 
only develop within the group with established hierarchies and dynamics. This narrative 
was uncomplicated with considerations of non-human carriers or reservoirs and, more 
importantly, was able to explain why the disease numbers seem to be coming down.  
Giving additional importance to veterinarians and to animal reservoirs would mean 
developing a more complicated framing for the disease situation and opening up to the 
fact that leptospirosis could not be controlled as easily by the health department, and 
which promised less chances of success.  
The traditional view of bureaucracy as Weberian apolitical implementers is now 
frequently problematized (Keeley and Scoones, 1999). There is much more awareness 
about the messy, non-linear, incremental ways in which bureaucrats interact with 
different actors and exercise varying amount of influence in the policy making processes 
(Gupta, 2013; Oliver, 2006; Zahariadis, 2007). Bureaucrats’ engagements with science 
often serve to depoliticise the decision-making by portraying it as a rational method 
(Fischer and Forester, 1993). This is especially true for zoonoses, which some have said 
suffer from “technocratic tyranny” (Waltner-Toews, 2017), and is also true for 
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leptospirosis where the political implications of defining cases, debating interventions, or 
selecting areas for chemoprophylaxis never came to light in  public.  
Politics of the middle 
While the previous arguments explain the different decisions behind leptospirosis control 
in Surat, I believe they do not offer a full story. It was only at the end of my fieldwork when 
I stopped interviewing and started having more relaxed conversations with my key 
informants that I started to get a more personal feel for the everyday realities of decision-
making.  
I believe it is important to take a more sophisticated look at the machinery of the state and 
not view the policy elites as a monolithic community. If we distinguish field level 
implementers from the big-picture policy formulators, there is still a gap in the middle—
people whose job it is to bring everything together. These are the individuals, like the 
public health officer in Surat (D10, quoted earlier in the chapter), who while realising the 
limitations of chemoprophylaxis, have to develop it in a way that appeals to all 
stakeholders involved, from the political leadership, his superior officers, other engaged 
actors as well as the implementing workforce and the affected communities themselves.  
 
Figure 28: Roe's Control Rooms: A veterinary epidemiologist’s office in Surat. 
And the biggest descriptor of their job function—technical programme managers such as 
these must operate under conditions of high uncertainty, with limited information at their 
disposal. This brings to mind the description of policy messes by Roe, which are 
characterised by:  
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high degrees of uncertainty, and coping, muddling through, groping along, 
sub-optimization, bounded rationality, garbage can processes, second-best 
solutions, policy churn and policy fiascos, rotten compromises, managing the 
unexpected, crisis management, and that deep wellspring of miserablism, 
implementation and policy failure. (Roe, 2016a, p. 372) 
Drawing on scholars of policy analysis (Sabatier et al., 2007) and uncertainty (Stirling, 
2010), Roe translates his observations on control room operators (Roe and Schulman, 
2012) to managing policy messes. He makes the point that to function with reliability, i.e., 
maintain service provision even in turbulent conditions, ‘high reliability professionals’ 
work on managing the messes and not cleaning them up altogether. There will be room for 
learning on the job and constant translation of ‘macro-design’ policy frameworks by these 
mid-level professionals to meet anticipated needs locally.  
There are certain obvious parallels of Roe’s framework of high reliability management 
with leptospirosis response in Surat (Figure 28). There was limited information, 
accompanying uncertainty about the nature and distribution of the disease or the efficacy 
of the small number of interventions presented to the decision-makers. There appeared to 
be little understanding of how to prevent the disease, reasons for its serious presentation 
in Surat (i.e. more cases of pulmonary involvement), and limited evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of antibiotics, the mainstay of the treatment strategy. However, they had to 
make do with what information was available—a case of bounded rationality as it were—
and develop an intervention strategy that worked but, also importantly, was seen to be 
doing work. There were investments in increasing surveillance, but also provision of 
specialist treatment services in peripheral hospitals, a concept unheard of until then.  
One of the major challenge was that you will get hardly one case per village 
with this type of involvement. And most of the villages reported case once in 
all years or twice in all years. Very few – two or three villages, I remember, 
had consistently reported cases. And (by cases, I mean) multi-organ 
involvement or critical cases. (D16, 9 Feb 2016) 
As mentioned above, the leptospirosis cases presented sporadically, the public health 
department decided to provide antibiotics to prevent the emergence of more cases, 
initially to all the residents of the village but subsequently restricted to everyone at a 
higher risk of contracting the disease.  
Stretching the analogy a little more, what does this mean for intersectoral collaborations? 
Can we also view them through the lens of ‘muddling through’ and as a way to cope with 
uncertainties of infectious diseases (Lindblom, 1979, 1959)? Researchers in other 
disciplines seem to think on these lines. Quick & Feldman (2014, p. 673) make the case for 
working on boundaries for “creating junctures: translating across, aligning among, and 
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decentering differences” across different spheres of public management and promoting 
resilience overall in the system.  
The adaptive governance framing proposes policy actors at multiple levels and cutting 
across sectors working autonomously to interact with each other that will create 
synergies, increase capacities to respond to and bounce back from newer shocks (Dietz et 
al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2015). Looked at from this perspective, the innovations emerging 
from leptospirosis response in Surat can be seen as an organically emerging response to 
crisis events shepherded by semi-autonomous public health officers seeking most gain 
within resources (and networks) available to them. 
This framing does not answer all the questions around how the leptospirosis control 
strategy has developed over the years since the initial crisis, or about the intersectoral 
collaborations between different sectors, however, it does point towards the importance 
of the everyday practices of middle-level bureaucrats responding to uncertainties through 
improvisation and innovation within constrained circumstances, framed by overarching 
discourses and politics.. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
To summarise, leptospirosis control strategies in Gujarat have a history of around two 
decades. The leptospirosis narrative has changed with time – starting with its status as a 
relatively unknown, but, potentially dangerous disease, to the current popular perception 
of a disease that is now supposed to be in decline as a result of apparently successful 
control policies put in place by a responsive government with the help of committed 
experts.  
Like most policy narratives (Roe, 1994), however, the above description of leptospirosis 
control in Gujarat is also a reductionist, partial and slightly misleading account. In my 
analysis of leptospirosis policy debates in Gujarat, I found alternative, and more 
interesting, aspects that also deserve highlighting. I found the evolving nature of 
leptospirosis control strategies in Gujarat from the 1990s to the present day to be a 
fascinating illustration of the non-linear, incremental and messy nature of decision-
making that often takes place in climates of high uncertainty and bounded rationality 
(Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Zahariadis, 2007).  
One fallout of the crisis situation characterising early leptospirosis outbreaks is that it 
provided the public health agencies opportunities to experiment with new ways of doing 
things (Atun et al., 2010; Kingdon, 2010). Realising the limitations of going it alone early 
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on, the public health department found willing allies in the local medical faculty who were 
as concerned about the disease as them and provided their expertise for characterising 
and responding to the outbreaks.  
The crisis situation also prompted collaboration with the animal health agencies given the 
zoonotic nature of the disease. In successive outbreak seasons, as the disease appeared to 
be in decline, the importance given to the role of animals in disease transmission declined 
and the role of veterinarians became much more circumscribed. After those initial 
meetings, the collaboration is still kept alive through regular meetings, however, and can 
be reactivated when required, as seen in the case of CCHF.  
The case of leptospirosis also demonstrates the amount of time and effort invested in the 
crafting and maintenance of a success story narrative (Mosse, 2004). As narratives of 
success stories go (Sumberg et al., 2012), it is in the political interests of the dominant 
actors (in this case, the public health department) to continue with the simplistic narrative 
of ‘leptospirosis being under control’ without making it unduly complicated with the 
nuances of changing case definitions and role of animal reservoirs, .  
Just as in the case of anthrax discussed in the previous chapter, and also with brucellosis, 
as we will see in the subsequent chapter, the engagement of experts with policy making is 
quite political in nature, precisely because, the association of scientists with policy making 
often ends up depoliticising and legitimising the policies (Fischer, 2009; Jasanoff, 2003), as 
demonstrated in the discussions leading to the adoption and internalisation of 
chemoprophylaxis as a key intervention strategy.  
Some of the policy decisions came about quite early on, others were developed with or 
refined over the course of a number of years. If the performance of leaders is to be 
measured in terms of limiting the number of shocks and limiting the intensity of crisis 
events on the system, the public health leadership in Gujarat must be credited with 
ensuring the apple cart of public affairs did not upset.  
Despite the limitations of its strategy and execution, is this a model for public health 
response that we can study for developing future response strategies? More relevant for 
this thesis, can the Gujarati approach to intersectoral collaborations, based on everyday, 
pragmatic interactions, be taken as a template for establishing limited, but practical and 
sustainable intersectoral collaborations for One Health? I will return to these questions in 
chapter 8, after exploring the case of brucellosis across two states.  
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7 BRUCELLOSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Brucellosis is, in many ways, the odd one out of the three disease-based case studies I 
discuss in this thesis. Unlike anthrax and leptospirosis, it does not result in localised 
outbreaks. Instead, brucellosis causes low intensity infections that can persist for years 
among affected animals as well as humans. In addition, unlike the localised presence of 
other two diseases, brucellosis is fairly well spread all over India.  
A third point of difference relates to the disease characteristics and the resulting attention 
to the disease. In the case of leptospirosis, it was the high number of deaths among 
humans that resulted in leptospirosis assuming a highly visible place on the policy radar. 
Whereas in the case of anthrax, it was the sudden and visible nature of deaths among 
livestock (and risks to humans) that helped mobilise a quick response from officers. In 
contrast, brucellosis has a much more subtle presentation, where deaths are rarely 
ascribed to the disease in animals and humans.  
As I will demonstrate later in the chapter, instead of health impacts of brucellosis, it was 
the economic impact on the dairy sector that compelled the government to develop a 
comprehensive control strategy for the disease. A final point of difference is that unlike the 
reactive collaborations found in the case of other two outbreak-prone diseases, it appears 
brucellosis has not been able to elicit collaborations between animal and human health 
agencies, despite its entrenched nature.  
While the above description explains the unique nature of brucellosis, in many other ways, 
brucellosis inspires discussion on similar themes as my other two disease case studies. 
Like other zoonotic diseases, there are huge information asymmetries in the case of 
brucellosis as well. As in the case of other zoonoses, this reduces the decision-making 
space for brucellosis, but in different ways. Whereas the chapter on leptospirosis showed 
how state agencies could seek to influence the public discussions by restricting access to 
disease data, discussions around both anthrax and leptospirosis demonstrate how experts 
use asymmetries of information to interpret evidence in a way that advances their political 
interests. Building upon the same theme, the case of brucellosis demonstrates how a 
disease can be hiding in plain sight, even when its presence has been established many 
times over. The disease also helps make the point that having an high disease burden does 
not lead to prioritisation on its own; instead, the political interests of key stakeholders 
might be dictating eventual policy preferences.  
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In this chapter, I identify possible explanations for the apparent mismatch between 
disease burden of brucellosis and the policy attention it gets and analyse its impact on 
policy response from animal and human health sectors. For one, the veterinarians 
themselves appear to have mixed feelings about publicly acknowledging the magnitude of 
the disease. An explicit recognition of the disease status could potentially lead to reduced 
consumer confidence in the largest dairy cooperatives in the country and affect 
livelihoods. This is also likely to lead to further questions around the availability, 
feasibility and acceptability of different intervention measures for controlling the 
disease—which is another difficult conversation that many would prefer not to have.  
Cattle are economically important livestock species that contribute in a big way to the 
dairy sector; also, they are most affected by brucellosis in India, making brucellosis control 
among cows the principal component of any brucellosis control strategy. However, unlike 
other countries that have controlled brucellosis through a mix of vaccination and culling 
strategies (Smits, 2013) the sacred status of cows in north Indian political discourse and 
poor animal tracking systems make the strategy difficult to replicate in India.  
An added challenge associated with brucellosis is the stigma associated with the disease 
among veterinarians, which, in turn, explains the resistance to handling live vaccines of 
brucellosis. Talking to veterinarians and observing the high-risk environment they work 
in informed my reflections around the different ways in which risk is conceptualised by 
veterinarians as well as other actors. 
Lastly, I discuss the near-absence of intersectoral collaborations in the light of these 
distinct, but interrelated, aspects of brucellosis. This offers a useful vantage point to 
examine the conditions needed for developing intersectoral collaborations, which 
apparently are absent in the case of brucellosis. This discussion also sets a context for 
identifying alternative forms of intersectoral collaborations and discussing their viability, 
as proposed in Tamil Nadu, and discussed in the next chapter.  
7.2 DISEASE CHARACTERISTICS 
Brucellosis causes long-term infection across multiple livestock, wildlife species, all of 
which can transmit the infection to humans. It is possibly the oldest animal-origin disease 
identified, its transmission having been recorded in a 2.4 million year old hominid found 
in South Africa by British army physicians in the mid-nineteenth century in Malta46 (H. V 
Wyatt, 2013). Its presence and distribution in India has been well established—the initial 
                                                             
46 Which is the reason why brucellosis is sometimes also referred to as ‘Malta fever’. 
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work on the disease being done by the veterinarian Polding in the 1940s (1948) by which 
time the animal-human link was widely known.  
As described in Table 8 below, there are three major strains of Brucella spp., the bacterium 
responsible for the disease, affecting human and livestock populations. Each strain prefers 
different host species. While Brucella abortus affects dairy livestock, and consequently has 
the largest economic impacts, the small-animal-affecting B. melitensis is the species most 
commonly associated with human brucellosis and causes particularly severe illness. It is 
worth noting that both B. melitensis and B. suis have been developed into biological 
weapons, a fact the WHO (WHO)’s official guidelines state the “health and veterinary 
authorities should be aware of” (Corbel, 2006, p. 18).  
Table 8: Principal zoonotic strains of Brucella 
Brucella 
species 
Main species affected In humans 
B. abortus Cattle (Cows), Buffalo Mild infections 
B. suis Swine Uncommon, Severe 
B. melitensis Sheep, Goat Most common, Severe 
However, unlike anthrax, whose potential for weaponisation is much discussed, Brucella 
species do not seem to attract a similar attention. Public discussions about brucellosis, like 
the disease itself, is low intensity and difficult to spot. Brucellosis is a chronic47 infection in 
animals among whom the key sign of frequent infection is decreased productivity. It 
causes repeated abortions in mature females, after a succession of which they generally 
become reproductive again, but with decreased productivity. It causes inflammation in 
and around the testes of male animals. Humans get infected through close contact with 
animals, such as during delivery, or through consuming products such as unpasteurised 
milk. Some cases of inhalational brucellosis have also been reported in high-risk 
environment such as abattoirs and wool sorters (Corbel, 2006; Kumar and Singh, 2013).  
The non-specific presentation of brucellosis in animals is also present in human patients. 
The most common feature of infection in humans is intermittent fever accompanied with 
weakness persisting over a long duration, sometimes accompanied with body ache. Given 
low awareness about the disease, it rarely gets a quick diagnosis or appropriate treatment. 
Some estimate that public health systems might miss diagnoses of up to 85% of brucellosis 
patients in the absence of high degree of suspicion and availability of serological 
diagnostic tools (Mantur and Amarnath, 2008, pp. 544–5).  
                                                             
47 Chronic refers to illnesses that persist for a long time (several months to years).  
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India has among the world’s highest numbers as well as among the most dense cattle 
populations in the world (Thornton et al., 2002). More worryingly, perhaps, India also 
hosts the highest number of livestock owners living in absolute poverty, which can be used 
as a proxy for livestock farming in suboptimal conditions (Grace et al., 2012b).  
The close interactions between large number of livestock and humans in potentially high-
risk settings are likely to amplify the transmission of zoonotic diseases. Since we know 
there is a high level of brucellosis circulating among the livestock populations in India, 
there is no reason to suppose that similarly high levels of brucellosis might not be present 
among humans as well.   
However, such is the lack of data on human brucellosis in India that two systematic 
reviews conducted in the last 10 years did not find even a single study from India meeting 
their criteria for good epidemiology for estimating incidence (Dean et al., 2012; Pappas et 
al., 2006). As a result, these global estimates completely discount the burden of human 
brucellosis in India. This is in many ways painting an inaccurate picture of global 
brucellosis.  
Veterinary researchers have conducted dozens of serological surveys for brucellosis over 
the past few decades in India.48 However, in the absence of epidemiologic design, they 
cannot provide a big-picture understanding of disease burden and can only offer 
fragmented picture of the disease across different states, species and animal holdings. 
Reviews of literature conducted by the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) 
reported a prevalence of 22.2% at the national level, with relatively higher values in 
poorer states in the northern and eastern regions in India (NDDB, 2015, p. 11, 2007, p. 1).  
While different studies cannot really be compared because of different populations, 
sampling methods, etc., as depicted in Table 9, a review of all brucellosis sero-surveys 
showed remarkably high levels of prevalence of the disease among all major livestock 
species (NDDB, 2015, p. 10). Given the importance of cattle and buffalo productivity in the 
dairy sector, such high levels of brucellosis are likely to result in huge economic losses, 
estimated by some veterinarians to be around US$ 3.4 billion annually in India (Singh et 
al., 2015, p. 211).  
                                                             
48 For example, (Agasthya et al., 2007; Appannanavar et al., 2012; Dhand et al., 2005; Handa et al., 
1998; Hundal et al., 2016; Isloor et al., 1998; Kumar et al., 1997; Oshi and Myers, 1969; M. D. Patel 
et al., 2014; Pathak et al., 2014; Renukaradhya et al., 2002; Singh and Parikh, 2014; Yohannes and 
Gill, 2011). 
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Table 9: Prevalence of brucellosis in livestock (Source: NDDB, (2015, p. 10) 
Animal species Reported incidence 
range in different 
studies (%) 
Cattle 0.4 – 56 
Buffalo 0.3 – 30 
Sheep 2 – 50 
Goat 1 – 39 
Pig 1 – 17 
Camel 1 – 7 
Mithun49 15 – 34 
Equines 38 – 42 
A follow-up paper by the same group of researchers estimates around 0.17% of Indians 
get affected by brucellosis every year (Singh et al., 2018, p. 148). If this were an accurate 
estimate, it would translate into an annual incidence of 2 million cases among humans 
which would far surpass the current estimates for global incidence of human brucellosis of 
500,000 reported by Pappas et al (2006, p. 91). Regardless of the exact numbers, even 
from the limited nature of analyses conducted in India, it is clear that brucellosis has been 
established for a long time and is spread across India. Brucellosis is likely to result in 
substantial disease burden and economic losses, even if we do not know the exact figures.  
Given the entrenched nature of brucellosis in India, its presence across multiple 
domesticated and wild species as well as humans, geographic spread, non-specific clinical 
presentations as well as risks to consumers, controlling the disease would require a multi-
pronged strategy that prevents and controls the disease in community, farm, clinical as 
well as consumer settings. Smits (2013) advocates for a vaccine-led approach for 
controlling brucellosis in high risk areas, supported by other interventions: 
Effective vaccines for the control of brucellosis in cattle and small ruminants 
are available and cheap, and in high-risk areas there is an urgent need to 
start large-scale vaccination programmes... Essential to the success of mass 
vaccination in controlling brucellosis is achieving a high degree of protection 
of adult livestock in a very short period and vaccinating young stock before 
natural infection can occur. To reduce the risk of transmission of infection 
from neighbouring areas where animals are not vaccinated, a region-wide 
approach is important.  
An up-to-date livestock census and an effective surveillance system are 
crucial for the control of brucellosis, as the disease may quickly re-emerge 
from remaining foci of infection. Although test and slaughter may be an 
option for the management of remaining or re-emerging foci of infection, 
such a strategy is frequently not an option because of the cost (Smits, 2013, p. 
219). 
                                                             
49 Mithun is a bovid, indigenous to North-eastern India (Shisode et al., 2009) 
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Singh and Kumar (2013) further add to the reasoning by Smits to favour a vaccination-led 
approach in the context of India, citing a range of factors. The limited reach of veterinary 
services, coupled with a rapidly expanding dairy sector, means that diagnostic as well as 
response capacities are limited, animal identification systems almost non-existent and 
compensation for culling is frequently not possible. While brucellosis is known to be a 
‘herd disease’, culling large number of animals is not possible because of logistics, 
acceptability as well as economic reasons.  
This leaves vaccination accompanied with repeat testing and farm hygiene as the only 
viable intervention strategy. However, there are many challenges even with executing 
such a reduced strategy, as mentioned below and elaborated upon later in the chapter. 
First, while vaccines exist against all major strains of Brucella spp. that occur in different 
livestock species, current disease control efforts exclusively use S-19 vaccine which is 
effective against brucellosis in cattle and buffalo. This means that the more serious forms 
of brucellosis occurring in sheep, goat and pigs get ignored. Another challenge of 
organising large scale vaccination drives for brucellosis might lie in the attitude of the 
veterinarians themselves. The S-19 vaccine is a well-established one but carries with it 
slight risks of accidental infection to the veterinarians administering the vaccine, which 
has resulted in veterinarians being hesitant about adopting the vaccine. This is explained 
in more detail in the next section.  
7.3 PRACTICES 
7.3.1 Risks & Apprehensions 
A fact about brucellosis that I became convinced about gradually in the course of my 
fieldwork was that the veterinary community was not only aware of the disease, but quite 
concerned about the impact on their profession as well. Almost all the veterinarians I met 
personally knew of someone who had contracted brucellosis and commented on the “high 
levels” of the disease.  
Veterinarians’ perceptions of being at much higher risk of catching the disease is borne out 
by their personal experiences, as well as multiple sero-prevalence studies, as shown in 
Table 10. A review of different studies examining brucellosis in high-risk humans showed 
a positive immune response among 12-40% in veterinarians and 6-51% in para-
veterinarians. Similarly high levels of exposure were also reported among other 
occupational groups working with animals as well (NDDB, 2015, p. 17).  
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Table 10: Prevalence of brucellosis among occupational groups  
Source: NDDB, (2015, p. 17) 
Exposed group Prevalence 
(%) 
Vets 12-40 
Paravets 6-51 
Abattoir workers 1-69 
Patients with FUO50 1-12 
Patients with other symptoms 7-92 
Other occupational exposure  1-45 
General population 0.5-4 
The increased awareness of the risks from brucellosis and its enzootic spread could be 
why veterinarians have ranked brucellosis as a priority disease, as recorded by multiple 
authors and institutions in the last 10 years. This includes identification of brucellosis as a 
“zoonotic disease of public health importance” by the NCDC (Venkatesh et al., 2016) and 
specifically labelling it as a priority zoonosis for India by zoonoses researchers at the 
Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI) (Sekar et al., 2011). Similarly, a WHO report on 
‘control of neglected zoonotic diseases’ identified brucellosis as a focus disease because of 
its endemicity and association with poverty (2006, pp. 4–5).  
But coming back to the veterinarians and their apprehensions about the disease, it is likely 
to have been fuelled by the symptomatology of the disease. It is understood that among 
humans,  
The main symptom is recurrent bouts of high temperature, hence its other 
name ‘undulant fever’.... A chronic debilitating disease, it can cause a variety 
of other symptoms, including joint pain, fatigue and depression (WHO, 2006, 
p. 12). 
While brucellosis mostly presents as a painful, incapacitating illness, it has also been 
known to cause infection of the male reproductive system in a small number of cases, and 
might possibly be sexually transmitted among humans as well (Corbel, 2006; Vigeant et al., 
1995). Though recent studies show this is less trues now, the veterinary workforce in 
India was traditionally dominated by men (Veena and Rajeshwari, 2008; Vijayakumari and 
Prathaban, 2003). It can be argued that the masculine professional culture of the field 
veterinarians, combined with small chances of sexual transmission and debilitating nature 
of the disease, could explain the stigma that so marks a diagnosis of brucellosis.  
The following excerpt from an interview that I conducted with a veterinarian brings home 
what it might feel like to experience the illness, concerns accompanying the disease and 
the impacts it might have on the professional and personal lives of a veterinarian. I came 
                                                             
50 FUO is Fever of Unknown Origin, categorised when the diagnosing physician is not able to 
identify the cause of fever in a patient and has ruled out most likely explanations (Brown, 2015). 
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across a young veterinary officer (whom I refer to as B2) who got brucellosis. Troubled by 
multiple relapses, he had decided to quit his job to begin his recovery from the disease. 
Here he narrates his experience of how he found about his disease and was trying to get it 
cured: 
It started in August 2014 – I got mild fever. I took one paracetamol. Then 
after one week, again one hour fever. Then again next month.... As I got fever 
for three days continuously, I went to a doctor. He gave me amoxicillin for 
five days and paracetamol. The fever subsided. Then I was happy for another 
two months when it started again. It will come for two or three days (and 
then) it will just go away. Rest of the time I was normal.  
In December, I went to three doctors. When I went, they took... malaria, 
dengue, all blood counts. The blood was normal. They gave me five days’ 
antibiotic again. Any antibiotic, any bacteria will respond to something, 
right? In January, in March, it happened again – I got fever. Finally, in May, I 
diagnosed (myself, that) I had brucellosis. 
I had an episode – I couldn’t walk properly (due to) severe pain in my back. It 
was, you know, very chronic and severe pain. (I had) fever, sweating and I 
couldn't get sleep. I (had to) crawl to the bathroom and that was the worst 
thing (that happened to me). Then I thought it is Brucella. And surprisingly, I 
got (positive for both) in my body: Brucella abortus and melitensis. 
After taking rifampicin and doxycycline, my walk became normal (again). I 
got the prescription myself (as) most of the (doctors), they don't know. They 
just give (antibiotics blindly). I had a very good book (for reference): the 
WHO recommendation for zoonosis. 
Then I was normal for a few months before it started again. After 5-6 months, 
I was with pain everyday which made my life worse. And after that, it 
regressed. When I walked too much, I got pain again. This time again one 
hour (of) fever, sweating, insomnia and very severe pain which radiates 
through the leg. Then I thought again I got brucellosis and I checked, so they 
gave me RBT (Rose Bengal Test and found the titre levels were up) 75%. 
I took gentamycin this time. I told the doctor that I didn't take streptomycin 
when I had brucellosis first time; just rifampicin and doxycycline. I asked him, 
“Can we inject streptomycin?”. And, he's a doctor. He should know better than 
me. I said OK. So he gave me gentamycin. Again, I was normal. For two days, 
they gave me injections. Following three days, my (veterinarian) friends gave 
(the antibiotics through) IV (intravenous infusion). And then, I was normal 
(as the) pain was not there. (But) after 15 days, I got pain (again), but not 
too much now.  
I always wanted to be a vet. See we used to do artificial insemination, 
delivering calves and treatment of animals; all extension work…. Once I was 
using bare hands and my friend said, “You will get brucellosis one day”, and I 
got it. See the problem is if you want to deliver large animals and there is any 
distortia, you cannot use gloves. It is very slippery.  
For the time being, I need rest. Once I take rest, my body will be all right. 
Once I am all right, I will go and work with animals, you know, I love animals. 
I am a veterinarian. I like to work with animals. I cannot give up my job. I will 
start wearing gloves. That I will do it when I am (back at work), so I should 
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not get it again. Anyways, I will have some antibodies, (so) that is different. 
But I will start wearing (gloves, and) I will be (a) bit cautious (B2, Veterinary 
Officer, 22 Feb 2016). 
Even though a bit extended, the above quote from my interview with the veterinary officer 
highlights many of the challenges around zoonoses generally and brucellosis specifically. 
First, regarding the disease itself, the account sketches a vivid picture of what the personal 
toll of brucellosis might feel like. Because of the painful and draining nature of the disease, 
the affected veterinary surgeon felt unable to continue with his job. This was despite 
having a sympathetic employer, who had reassigned him to lighter desk duty, and 
colleagues who supported him through the treatment, as also a relatively young age. It is 
quite likely that the physical and emotional burden of a disease like brucellosis might be 
even more pronounced with someone in a less privileged position.  
The non-specific, intermittent nature of the disease symptoms makes it difficult to 
diagnose, and easy to confuse brucellosis with unrelated diseases. This was indeed borne 
out by his experiences of being tested for diseases such as malaria and dengue, and being 
treated with short courses of non-specific antibiotics. Even after the veterinary surgeon 
arrived at a diagnosis for his condition, his treatment strategy was far from clear.  
The treatment for brucellosis among humans involves the use of a combination of 
antibiotics for a six-week treatment to begin with. Around 10-20% cases report relapses 
after the first course of antibiotics, requiring another prolonged course of a second set of 
antibiotics (Corbel, 2006, pp. 36–8). The selection of the specific antibiotics regimen would 
require expertise in infectious disease management and microbiology.  
In the quote above, one can sense a note of disappointment with the physicians who had to 
be guided by the affected veterinarian himself at crucial stages of screening, diagnosis and 
management. Making such decisions when in a state of distress, and which could 
potentially have life altering implications, would not have been easy.  
Brucellosis is strongly associated with unhygienic farm conditions, which are more 
common among poorer farmers. On the other hand, it is quite likely that once the disease 
is introduced into a herd, poorer farmers are more likely to face the worst impact of the 
disease. This might comprise of decreased productivity of the animals to increased 
chances of getting sick themselves and facing a long, uncertain and expensive treatment 
process, if they are lucky enough to be diagnosed with the disease in the first place.  
Grace and colleagues (2017, 2012b) have mapped the associations between poverty and 
endemic zoonoses, including brucellosis, globally as well as in India. Given the high 
numbers of poor livestock owners in India, it is possible that a typical patient suffering 
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from brucellosis might experience features similar to the veterinarian in the quote above, 
but whose effects might be more exaggerated in a society where even small illnesses can 
assume catastrophic expenses (Pandey et al., 2018).  
Once we think of the suffering brought about by a silent, but widespread disease like 
brucellosis, the disease burden figures cited in Section 7.2 and in Table 10 start conveying 
impressions of a different order of magnitude and seriousness.  
Being a vet is often a lonely business (Figure 29). Most veterinary surgeons do not have 
access to support staff as I had been used to seeing in the public health sector. They often 
work in small teams in remote villages, with few personal protection measures. Given the 
severity of brucellosis and the risks posed to them, which I discuss in the next section, 
translates into safety concerns for veterinarians and animal handlers. 
 
Figure 29: A para-veterinarian vaccinating a cow at Kavla village in Surat, Gujarat. 
7.3.2 Occupational risks  
Continuing the discussion from the previous section, I can now understand why many 
veterinarians were so concerned about brucellosis. The risks to veterinary professionals, 
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including para-vets and animal handlers, were substantial (see Table 10). Their 
apprehensions about the risks from the disease were also driven by the social stigma that 
came to be attached to brucellosis, as explained in the quote from a brucellosis expert 
below: 
Then we were getting lot of cases because we were working on brucellosis…. 
People used to come from other states. Because they know if you are 
diagnosed with brucellosis in (their) state, you become victimised. 
(Q: So there is a stigma attached to having brucellosis as well?)  
Yes, yes, yes. Accept it, accept it. You know what, it is attached to your 
infertility, your sanity…. It is a very painful disease. Our people are dying out 
of brucellosis (A8, 3 August 2015). 
The veterinary officer, affected with brucellosis, was an exception in the way he openly 
identified his disease and recounted his experiences to me. Brucellosis is known to attack 
different parts of the reproductive system, resulting in potentially embarrassing 
conditions such as testicular swellings. As recounted to me by some senior veterinarians, 
the disease is suspected to be transmitted sexually and also cause sterility within many 
veterinarian couples. Given this set of presentations, it is to be expected that most 
veterinarians have this to say about the disease, as recounted by B2: 
They say don't disclose (your condition) to anyone. (Laughs) I said, “Why 
shouldn’t I? Let me disclose so that other veterinarians are aware of it”.  (The 
reason is) stigma. I told you right, when they say brucellosis suddenly they 
think scrotal edema. They talk, “They had one, and they had one”. They don't 
tell “I had (Brucellosis)”, these people. Not most of them; most of it is 
undiagnosed (B2,  22 Feb 2016). 
Given the levels of apprehension around brucellosis, it is to be expected that many of these 
carried over to its primary intervention as well. The National Brucellosis Control 
Programme uses live Strain-19 vaccine, which is the most established vaccine in use for 
more than 60 years.  
However, S-19 being a live vaccine, its use still inspired mixed feelings among veterinary 
professionals I met. While the veterinarians remain concerned about occupational 
exposure of the disease, the same anxieties are also transferred to the main intervention 
for brucellosis in India, which is vaccination by the live Strain-19 vaccine. The risk to vets 
of contracting brucellosis is non-trivial. However, this does lead to less than enthusiastic 
take-up of disease control strategy or, in the words of a dairy manager:  
In brucellosis, there is live (vaccine)... So doctors, they don't get ready for 
vaccination very quickly. (D7, 18 Aug 2015). 
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When I was starting out in my fieldwork, it was difficult to understand the precise reasons 
for the reservations against the vaccination programme. After all, I reasoned, I had had 
personal experience of vaccinating squirming infants and toddlers in the vaccination room 
during my medical training, and how different could it be? While I could relate to the 
potential for finger pricks to vets, I did not fully appreciate the risks involved until I 
actually observed animal vaccination camps for myself in Gujarat as well as in Tamil Nadu.  
 
Figure 30: Administering vaccine in the field: Kavla village in Surat, Gujarat.  
While it seems reasonable to me now, the first major point of difference in vaccinating 
human babies and animals is their sheer size and strength. Wriggling babies, at least in my 
limited clinical experience, could generally be immobilised by their mothers or nurses, 
either by physically holding them, or by swaddling them in blankets.  
Vaccinating large animals, such as cows or buffaloes, required restraints of different sizes. 
Some villages had ramps made of parallel bars in central locations that could be used to 
immobilise the animal (see Figure 29 and Figure 30) during the vaccination camp, for 
instance. I was informed that in case of cows, their hind legs were tied together as they 
have a tendency to kick, whereas in the case of buffaloes, their front legs are tied together 
to prevent restless movements. Of course, if the vaccination takes place without ramps, as 
shown in Figure 31, the vet will have to seek assistance from the owner and other people 
to restrain and calm the constantly moving, potentially kicking animal.  
The technique of vaccination is also quite different to what I had seen being practised in 
humans. Instead of cleaning the skin and inserting a loaded syringe directly, the vets 
seemed do it in two stages. After cleaning the skin, I saw them insert a plain needle 
through a quick slap near the neck while holding a prepared syringe in the other hand (as 
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can be seen in Figure 30). After calming the animal down, they held the needle with one 
hand and inserted a loaded syringe into it with the other hand before pressing the plunger 
in. I did not notice any use of gloves across multiple vaccinations I witnessed across 
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu.  
 
Figure 31: Vaccinating a cow without ramps, Vellore, Tamil Nadu. 
While the veterinarians and para-vets I observed seemed well-trained and experienced 
vaccinators, I still felt there were multiple occasions when the vaccine could have spilled 
over or a needle prick could have taken place when the animal moved. For many animal 
veterinarians who have to conduct large vaccination camps in short timelines in distant 
villages, I could see they had several reasons to be apprehensive, even as this leads to low 
coverage levels of the vaccine in many places.  
For one, even though S-19 vaccine against cattle brucellosis (B. abortus) has had a long 
history, it is a live vaccine that has resulted in occasional exposures to veterinarians and 
vaccine manufacturers. For instance, a recent publication recalled an outbreak of 
brucellosis in a vaccine production unit in Argentina where 21 people tested positive for 
the disease, many of whom did not recall any possible exposure (Wallach et al., 2008, p. 
806). 
While there are risks of the vaccine itself, these are amplified by the unsafe nature of work 
of the veterinarians, both in the laboratory as well as in field settings. I visited a vaccine 
research production centre in Tamil Nadu, the IVPM51. Seeing the dilapidated state of 
                                                             
51 Institute of Veterinary Preventive Medicine is a state-run producer of vaccines and diagnostics in 
Tamil Nadu (see http://ivpm.webs.com/products.htm). 
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infrastructure there (see Figure 32), there is no reason to believe that similar outbreaks 
might not be replicated in vaccine manufacturing units in India where concerns have been 
raised about their ability to meet WHO GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) standards 
(Laxminarayan and Ganguly, 2011; Milstien et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 32: Library at IVPM, Ranipet, Tamil Nadu 
Moreover, the apprehensions of the veterinary workforce are likely also to be influenced 
by the attitude of their employers towards their safety. One way the state governments 
used to respond to occupational health concerns of the veterinarians in the past, and the 
way it has changed since is reflected in the following quote from a retired veterinary 
epidemiologist from Tamil Nadu: 
I handled with raw hands. I washed hands in Dettol with no gloves. We were 
very bold in doing that and now they don’t allow it. We were doing 
vaccination also and we gave anthrax vaccine and no protection was there 
and no safety. Because of this, a risk allowance was given with brucellosis 
and anthrax of 100 Rupees and now I think it is 400 to surgeons but not to 
any other staff (former veterinary epidemiologist, 24 July 2015). 
Apparently, the old way of addressing veterinarians’ concerns about risks of contracting 
diseases was for the government to throw some money at the problem. That too was 
apparently limited to the more influential veterinarians only and did not extend to the 
subordinate para-veterinary staff.  
While I discuss this point in more detail later in chapter 8, it is worth discussing the 
bureaucratic cultures that promote apparently cavalier attitudes to staff safety concerns. 
Given the risks involved in handling animals in the field, it must be difficult to motivate 
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veterinarians and paravets to put their personal safety at risk for the sake of meeting 
departmental goals. Apart from giving risk allowances, this was how one former 
epidemiologist used to motivate new veterinary recruits to take care of their personal 
safety and deliver on the programme:  
Now that the national campaign programme is there…I keep telling (every 
veterinarian) it is your professional right, it is your birth right not to be 
infected. You have joined to attend the population. It is your personal right 
not to get brucellosis (A8, 3 August 2015). 
It is not only the veterinary staff who are exposed to the disease, the farmers owning the 
sick animals are likely to be at an even higher risk of developing the disease. Not 
surprisingly, farmers appear to have their own reservations about veterinary 
interventions that they felt had a potential for causing harm. As narrated to me by a 
district programme manager: 
So…through these cooperative societies, milk samples are…collected, and 
after pooling of their milk, test is conducted at the (village) society level itself. 
But (the results of this test are)…not given wide popularity for various 
reasons because the farmer might have some kind of stigmas. 
See, supposing a farmer owns an animal, which is suffering from 
brucellosis—and we all know that it is of zoonotic importance—and, 
naturally, when other villages will come to know of this, they would 
immediately try to segregate the farmer and his animal. And even his milk 
sample will not be allowed to be pooled and collected by the cooperative (C3, 
7 Mar 2016). 
In a country where the majority of cattle are housed with the poorest populations in 
conditions of poor hygiene (and therefore higher risks), and where there is limited ability 
to track movement of individual animals and enforce quarantine or culling, the official 
government policy has had to make several modifications to the standard preventative 
measures against brucellosis.  
As told to me by programme managers, the focus of the newly developed brucellosis 
control programme is on identifying villages or farms with high levels of brucellosis 
instead of tracing individual, diseased animals.  
In the absence of robust compensation mechanisms, very few farmers would permit the 
identification, quarantining or culling of diseased animals. The state, on the other hand, 
does not have the capacity to identify and track movements of individual animals and, 
therefore, does not want to want to take the risks of precipitating distress selling by 
farmers.  
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Therefore, it seemed to me that an adversarial relationship exists between the famers and 
the state, with both trying to outwit each other, the whole process being mediated by the 
veterinary services, themselves weighed down by their perceptions about the disease 
risks and social stigma and cooperatives who rival the government department in terms of 
size and visibility.   
The farmers are trying to secure their livelihoods and ensure animal productivity with the 
resources available to them. In the absence of social and legal sanctions for slaughter of 
diseased animals, they might not want to be burdened with the upkeep costs of a non-
productive animal in a capital intensive industry. On the other hand, it is in the 
government’s interests to keep its citizens in the dark so as to prevent any undue attention 
to the disease.  
The veterinarians have mixed feelings about the intervention, promoting its advantages, 
yet privately being uncomfortable with the increased risks (to themselves) of delivering it. 
As I explain later in the chapter, this is operating in an environment with limited 
understanding about the burden of disease and where an honest discussion around cattle 
trade cannot be initiated by the government given the politics of cow protection being 
practised by it, also discussed later in the chapter. The next section examines the framing 
of brucellosis as a neglected diseases and analyses the characteristics of neglect in the case 
of brucellosis.  
7.4 NEGLECTED DISEASES: FRAMINGS AND DIMENSIONS 
Once I heard a Joint Director of (King Institute52 at Guindy) telling – (that) in 
(over 100) years of (the) Guindy (research centre’s existence), there was not 
even one record of bovine tuberculosis in human beings whereas there are 
hundreds of human tuberculosis in cows (A8, 3 August 2015). 
As the well-known aphorism goes, an absence of evidence cannot be considered to be an 
evidence of absence. Unfortunately, as shown in the quote above, this truism is often 
forgotten in the case of diseases that are already neglected such as bovine tuberculosis, or 
brucellosis. I will attempt to expand upon this theme in this section and demonstrate how 
scientific understanding of brucellosis is constructed in a way that neglects several aspects 
of the disease and the implications of this neglect on decision-making around the disease. 
Citing some of the evidence presented earlier in the chapter, I will demonstrate how the 
limited information regarding the actual disease burden led to ignoring other, possibly 
                                                             
52 A specialist infectious disease research centre and hospital in Guindy area of Chennai, Tamil 
Nadu. 
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more important aspects of brucellosis as well. For example, despite a number of studies 
demonstrating high levels of brucellosis in livestock and pointing to high levels among 
exposed humans too, there is limited consensus within the veterinary and public sectors 
about acknowledging the existence of a problem. 
As is the case in other diseases (Leach et al., 2010a), even within the animal health sector, 
it appears some livestock diseases get more attention that others, in research as well as 
policies. Lastly, I will examine the association between disease framings and resultant 
policy gaps.  
7.4.1 Dimensions of neglect 
As discussed earlier, the precise disease burden of brucellosis remains unclear despite 
several decades’ worth of research that has been conducted in India. One reason is the 
difficulty to generalise from these estimates because many of these studies are laboratory-
based, and they do not report population denominators from which a sample has been 
drawn, thus making it difficult to estimate incidence and prevalence rates. In addition, 
most studies estimate disease loads by looking for immune response among livestock 
using simple tests that cannot distinguish between vaccine-promoted immune response 
and the disease-provoked positives, so they cannot make a definitive claim either about 
vaccine coverage or disease incidence. 
While a big range for brucellosis positivity for different livestock species is listed in Table 
9, it nonetheless allows us to claim that there are pockets within India with extremely high 
levels of brucellosis in almost all livestock species, including cattle, buffalo, sheep and 
goats.  
Compared to the animal sector, there is even more scattered and patchy evidence around 
brucellosis burden among humans in India. However, as discussed earlier, the limited data 
and inferences drawn from contributing factors would indicate a much higher burden of 
brucellosis than is generally recognised. 
The above discussion around the limited extent and scope of research that exists around 
brucellosis logically leads to the question – what explains a lack of coherent picture of 
brucellosis despite indications of its established nature in India? I cite three possible 
explanations for the continued policy neglect of brucellosis that has prevented the 
development of an effective disease control strategy. These include the professional 
cultures of the involved disciplines that encourage their practitioners to focus on specific, 
narrow aspects of the problem, or indeed, allow them to ignore many others as well. I also 
draw parallels from the neglected diseases literature to cite structural factors that could 
contribute to such neglect by leading institutions. I carry the discussion forward to the 
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next section on the politics of disease control where I cite additional, more political factors 
that could also explain the reason for limited visibility of brucellosis on policy agenda.  
7.4.2 Professional cultures 
As described in Section 7.3, I found the members of the veterinary community, particularly 
the practitioners, to be quite concerned about the threats brucellosis poses to their 
profession as well as to the farmers and animals themselves. The veterinary researchers 
have responded to the disease by carrying out sero-prevalence studies, which measured 
the immunity against brucellosis among animals and exposed humans. As a result, we now 
have a substantial body of literature that documents levels of brucellosis circulation as 
reported by different laboratories in the country. However, most of these studies suffer 
from the veterinary predilection for conflating microbiology and public health, which 
prevent the findings of most of the studies of either giving population-based rates or their 
findings to be generalized to a larger setting.  
During my fieldwork, I called upon a professor of veterinary public health whom I knew 
from before. I commented on the overlap of microbiology with veterinary public health 
and asked him to explain how his discipline could be distinguished from the fields of 
microbiology and preventive medicine as taught in his veterinary college. He was very 
clear in his explanation that while all zoonotic pathogens were covered under the subject 
of veterinary public health, all other pathogens were covered by the other disciplines 
(Field notes, B6, 25 Feb 2015). 
A similar conflation of epidemiology and microbiology is reflected in the brucellosis 
publications and activities of the National Institute of Veterinary Epidemiology & Disease 
Informatics (NIVEDI), the national centre expressly mandated to work in veterinary 
epidemiology. NIVEDI is among the newest research centres under the institute of Indian 
Council for Agriculture Research, formally established only in 2013, another testament of 
relative novelty of the discipline of epidemiology in animal health sector. In contrast, the 
public health analogue of the institute, National Institute of Epidemiology (NIE), 
sponsored by the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) was established in 1999 and 
now runs a school of public health.  
There are several key papers on brucellosis epidemiology from NIVEDI and its precursor 
institute (Isloor et al., 1998; Renukaradhya et al., 2002; Shome, 2014). Other publications 
from NIVEDI’s recent work on brucellosis are available at 
http://www.dbtbrucellosis.in/publication.html. As even a quick perusal of the titles will 
demonstrate, almost all these papers are based upon laboratory sampling with very 
limited scope for epidemiological contextualisation. The inability to draw in 
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epidemiological expertise in their work means the veterinarians are not able to provide a 
big picture quantification of the disease burden. As Ijaz et al. (2012) state in the context of 
International Health Regulations, “what gets measured, gets done”. 
The situation on the public health side, in the case of brucellosis, is no less alarming. The 
operating principle here seems to be, ‘since we have not heard about it, we do not need to 
look for it’. This was best exemplified in my interactions with the chief disease surveillance 
officer of Gujarat. Coincidentally, he was a microbiologist himself and so more aware about 
brucellosis than might have been the case had he been trained in another medical 
discipline. While he recognised the importance of looking for brucellosis, citing his own 
clinical training, he reported there was no data on human brucellosis because no tests 
were being done. When prompted about high levels of disease data being reported from 
animals, he said:  
Now that you are asking me this question, it definitely seems plausible to me 
that there might be brucellosis in the state. I remember during my residency 
in microbiology, we had charts in our labs instructing us how to process 
brucellosis tests, so I am sure it must have been done in those times, but 
somehow got discontinued... I will put in an indent request to procure 
brucellosis test kits this year to see if we can test samples (E10, 24-Aug-
2015). 
In a classic illustration of challenges faced in neglected disease control, it is quite possible 
that the public health researchers are missing the disease simply because they are not 
looking for it. As researchers elsewhere have found, brucellosis is one of the most common 
diseases misdiagnosed as malaria (Crump et al., 2013). Investigations in India hint at a 
similar underestimate as well (Kadri et al., 2000; Kejariwal et al., 2014; Mantur and 
Amarnath, 2008; Pathak et al., 2014). 
I realise it is probably simplistic to generalise the work of entire disciplines in a single 
assertion. Even as the bulk of studies have not progressed beyond sero-prevalence studies, 
many veterinarians as well as public health researchers recognise the importance of social 
and political factors in disease spread and control. In addition, several researchers have 
pointedly questioned the neglect of larger systemic factors around brucellosis and other 
neglected zoonoses in the Indian subcontinent.  
For instance, researchers have consistently highlighted the associations between poverty 
and zoonoses in different countries (Grace et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2013; Perry and Grace, 
2009). Several Indian researchers have highlighted the importance of brucellosis as a 
zoonosis (Kurian et al., 2014) and suggested systems and policy research needed for their 
control (Sekar et al., 2011). In their review of challenges facing brucellosis policy-making 
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in India, Kumar and Singh (2013) repeatedly highlight the significance of social and 
political factors that need addressing for achieving brucellosis control, which I will discuss 
in the next section. 
However, despite these discussions, brucellosis continues to face official apathy at 
multiple levels. This was only partially redressed when the new national disease control 
programme for brucellosis was launched in 2011. While the programme faces major 
conceptualisation and implementation challenges, even this policy announcement is likely 
to have precipitated as a result of an urgent crisis in the dairy sector, as explained later in 
the chapter.  
7.4.3 A case of neglected diseases syndrome? 
In addition to the local factors already discussed, there could be a larger systemic issue 
responsible for the continued neglect of many zoonotic diseases, such as brucellosis. Citing 
Shaw (2008), Coker et al (2011, p. 327) cite the following explanations for neglect of 
zoonoses:  
First, veterinary services had been given responsibility for control of these 
diseases, but had neither the farm-level economic incentives nor the societal 
resource allocation to fulfil this role. Second, zoonoses in both human beings 
and animals are generally underdiagnosed. Third, zoonoses tend to affect 
rural, often poor, people with poor access to health services. Fourth, 
mechanisms to control and to restrict food-borne diseases are difficult and 
complex.  
We might add to this list several additional reasons: including the challenges 
of interdisciplinary collaboration…and the upstream nature of prevention 
activities and their temporal and causal distance from human consequences. 
In a remarkable illustration of the above factors, the international agencies that are 
mandated to provide technical leadership in public health agenda setting, such as the WHO 
and OIE, themselves do not seem immune from neglect suffered by diseases such as 
brucellosis. For instance, the priority accorded by WHO to brucellosis is reflected in the 
paucity of content on its website, compared to its page on rabies—a disease likely causing 
less than 10% global mortality than brucellosis, but included in the official list of 
‘neglected diseases’53 (see Figure 33). 
                                                             
53 Visit http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ 
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Figure 33: Screenshots of WHO pages on brucellosis and rabies 54 
The lack of activity in brucellosis is also reflected in the publications posted on its website, 
which does not appear to have been updated in more than two decades.55OIE does have 
detailed guidelines with regards to food safety and for controlling the spread of brucellosis 
in its flagship publications, the Terrestrial Manual & the Terrestrial Code, aimed at 
veterinary public health departments (OIE, 2018a, 2018b). However, there is surprisingly 
limited discussion on epidemiology and spread of enzootic brucellosis. The OIE website 
only catalogues a Disease Summary Card and not a Technical Card for the disease, which I 
have interpreted as an indication that the organisation does not identify brucellosis as 
among the priority 34 animal diseases of importance to the organisation. More 
                                                             
54 URLs: http://www.who.int/topics/brucellosis/en/&http://www.who.int/rabies/en/; Accessed: 
10 June 2018. 
55 Visit http://www.who.int/zoonoses/resources/brucellosis/en/ 
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surprisingly, the OIE lists brucellosis as now being “closer to elimination” with little 
justification (OIE, n.d.). 
Based upon what I have read and heard about brucellosis control in India, this seems to be 
another proof of the disease burden of brucellosis not translating to corresponding 
political priorities. Guidance from agencies such as WHO and OIE frequently serves as 
templates for national governments to develop their own response strategies. It is no 
wonder that in the absence of intellectual leadership from these agencies, the national 
brucellosis control strategy seems to be floundering.  
The case of brucellosis also serves a useful illustration of the neglect faced by many 
diseases of poverty, including zoonoses. As pointed out by Hotez (2008b) and Coker et 
al.(2011, p. 327), when diseases affect marginalised and underserved communities and 
are inherently difficult to diagnose, there will be little disease information available. This 
can lead to a self-perpetuating cycle of neglect (see Figure 34).  
 
 
Figure 34: Self-perpetuating circle of neglect for ignored zoonoses 
This absence of clinical, epidemiological and economic numbers affords poor visibility to 
the disease in popular and specialist discourse. This is both an indicator as well as a factor 
for decreased interest by stakeholders who could advocate for increased investments in 
the disease. None of the key opinion-makers such as researchers, donors or technical 
institutions might be interested in taking up the case of a disease that does not seem to 
exist.  
Global level disease burden assessments, such as Pappas et al.(2006) for brucellosis or 
Müller et al.(2013) for bovine tuberculosis, ignore disease presence in India while arriving 
at conservative estimates. These estimates might be methodologically sounder, but the 
ethics of whitewashing disease presence might be highlighted, especially when such 
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estimates  lead others to conclude that the reported disease does not exist, or allows an 
agency like the OIE to claim that brucellosis is now close to elimination.  
In the absence of any disease information, discussions or interests expressed by donors to 
support research or interventions in the disease, there is even lesser chance of any further 
data to emerge about the disease.  
I realise that this cycle does not represent the full picture. Not all research and 
intervention need to be donor funded; individual clinicians and researchers can continue 
some work on diseases, and public pressure can be a great mobiliser of policy attention as 
well as interventions. A second caveat is that the mere presence of numbers does not 
automatically translate to policy attention. Diseases with smaller numbers but framings 
that are more attractive might achieve greater notoriety (Leach et al., 2010a). 
Indeed, according to the ‘multiple streams’ explanation of agenda setting, it is the interplay 
of political opportunism with framing of problems and solutions that is likely to result in 
substantial policy innovations (Kingdon, 2010; Zahariadis, 2007). Nonetheless, such a 
schema describes the process by which diseases become to be neglected and tremendous 
odds are required for them to gain recognition on the policy radar. Building upon this 
discussion, I now analyse the unique nature of politics that helped push brucellosis onto 
the policy agenda, but which, nonetheless, also acted to restrict the scope of interventions 
envisaged for brucellosis control in India.  
7.5 POLITICS OF BRUCELLOSIS CONTROL  
Politics cannot be distinguished from the production and use of knowledge, or the 
everyday practices of professionals (Jasanoff, 2011). Therefore, even as the earlier 
sections in the chapter focussed on specific aspects of politics, I aim to use this section to 
examine the discussions around the national bovine brucellosis control programme 
launched around five years ago.  
However, I want to preface the discussion on programmatic strategy by analysing the 
political significance of bovine in India. I argue that cattle draw their importance from two 
distinct sources – first, from the political imagery of cow as a sacred animal and second, 
from the economic contributions of the dairy sector in India.  
I then introduce the current brucellosis control strategy and explain how the political 
capital surrounding the cattle and dairy industry might have resulted in the way in which 
brucellosis control strategy came to be shaped in India, including limiting the effectiveness 
of the programme.  
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Lastly, I examine the role of key stakeholders playing a role in brucellosis control. I 
describe their stance on brucellosis control as explained by their role in the political 
economy of brucellosis.  
7.5.1 Importance of the cow in India  
While doing fieldwork among epidemiologists and clinicians, I had repeatedly to justify my 
research interests. However, even if I were harbouring any doubts about the evolving 
nature of my research, the newspaper headlines were enough to convince me about the 
importance of factoring in politics while analysing the performance of public health 
programmes.  
 
Figure 35: News reports related to cows; 10-11 Feb 2016 
The newspaper clippings shown in Figure 35 are all from front-page stories that appeared 
in the local edition of the leading national English broadsheet, the Times of India, while I 
was visiting Surat for my fieldwork in Gujarat. Within a span of two days (10-11 February 
2016), the daily newspaper published three stories relating to cows in Gujarat. These 
stories covered aspects of concern on welfare of cows being abandoned to eat plastics 
(Times News Service, 2016), a sense of nationalistic shame that indigenous cattle breeds 
had to rely on imported semen for preservation (Dave, 2016), and sheer politicking by a 
right-wing politician keen to whip up sentiments about banning cow slaughter (Times 
News Network, 2016b).  
The three angles of the ‘cow stories’ covered in the newspaper serve as convenient 
illustrations of the unique place cattle have come to occupy in the political discourse of 
present-day India, and also help me structure the rest of the discussions on the subject. I 
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present an explanation of the political symbolism of cows in national political discourse 
and the economic contributions made by the dairy industry, which is based upon cattle 
(and buffaloes). While cow-welfare is supposed to be an integral component of both chains 
of discussions, I will argue that cows and their health are secondary, and distinct, to the 
political and economic capital that accrues from them.  
 
Figure 36: "The Cow with 84 deities" by Ravi Varma Press (1897, Life: 1848-1906)56 
Political imagery of the cow  
By about the last quarter of the nineteenth century the cow in India had 
emerged as a political animal…the cow symbolised the resistance of 
traditional Indian religious values to the values of secular progress. The cow 
symbol was used to domesticate modern Indian politics (Parel, 1969, p. 179). 
As reflected in the turn-of-century lithograph in Figure 36, cows had begun to be used as a 
metaphor for a certain version of Hindu philosophy much before Independence. In this 
particular picture, cows are described literally as embodying divine characteristics of 84 
different deities and nourishing all communities, exemplified by the western-style-dressed 
European, the Parsi and the token bearded Muslim. The sword-flashing demon was 
supposed to represent all that was wrong in a modern, meat-eating society. According to 
some scholars, lithographs like these were quite popular for most of the twentieth century, 
                                                             
56 Source: Under public domain, sourced from (Wikimedia Commons contributors, 1897) 
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with their religious iconography becoming an important part of developing national 
religious identity (Mohanty, 2015; Pinney, 2004). In this particular case, because of the 
potential of the Muslim or untouchable butchers to be misrepresented, the colonial 
government got the publisher to remove the image in subsequent prints (Pinney, 2004, p. 
112). 
The alluring power of this imagery has not faded. In fact, it only appears to have been 
reinforced in recent times. In their summary of key political developments in India in 
2017, scholars Chhibber and Jassal (2018, p. 92) state, “The cow emerged as an important 
motif of contentious politics in the country”. They refer to the rise in political rhetoric 
against cow-slaughter, a spate of public lynchings of suspected cow smugglers by vigilante 
gangs of ‘cow-protectors’, as well as a series of government orders restricting the sale and 
transport of cattle.57 The political idiom of preventing cow-slaughter became a sure-fire 
way to polarise citizens and categorise them as vegetarian upper caste leaning Hindus 
versus others, a category which might include Dalits, Muslims and Christians (Sarkar and 
Sarkar, 2016). 
Even a state like Tamil Nadu did not escape being politicised around cows, albeit for 
different reasons, when the Supreme Court banned the organisation of traditional bull-
taming festival, the jallikattu.58 At a time when the leadership of both the key political 
parties in the state were in a state of transition, it became an opportunity for alternative 
forms of popular mobilisations, and ultimately led to the government reinstating the 
festival (Kalaiyarasan, 2017).  
As exemplified in the tweet depicted in Figure 37, people advanced a mix of arguments to 
make the case for continuing the bull-taming festival. While for some, a traditional festival 
originally confined to a few farming communities became a question of Tamil identity, to 
others, jallikattu’s importance lied in its role in preserving indigenous breeds and 
promoting healthier milk (Kalaiyarasan, 2017; Sudeepkumar et al., 2013).  
The rhetoric of cow protection, inevitably, was not able to keep pace with the public 
sentiments it mobilised. As cattle vigilantes tightened their grips on the national highways, 
the transport and sale of cattle fell dramatically in a way that started affecting the viability 
of the dairy sector. While young female calves remain in demand, the male calves and 
                                                             
57 A reading list of key news stories around the issue of beef-bans and anti-cow-slaughter laws is 
available at https://scroll.in/article/833901/reading-list-getting-to-the-meat-of-the-matter-on-
cow-slaughter-and-indias-beef-politics.  
58 A traditional harvest festival, Jallikattu involves the release of a bull into a crowd of young men 
who attempt to hold onto the hump and bring the bull to a stop 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jallikattu).  
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older cows started being abandoned so much that in some cases, they were referred to as 
having gone feral and attacking village crops. It is likely that the cow protection laws might 
lead to a drop in cattle trade itself in favour of equally productive, but less politically 
sensitive buffaloes (Chari, 2016; Daniyal, 2017; Rajan, 2017). 
 
Figure 37: A tweet explaining support for Jallikattu59 
The above discussion establishes the nature as well as significance of the cow as a political 
metaphor in India. Having accumulated such political capital, it is reasonable to expect a 
high level of prioritisation for efforts to control a disease that affects cows. However, just 
as the politics of protecting cows had likely not been about the cows alone, the impacts of 
                                                             
59 Source: https://twitter.com/HariKri09165395/status/814505185296941056, Accessed 31 May 
2018  
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a bovine brucellosis control programme would never be felt by cows alone but would also 
affect other stakeholders in myriad ways.   
Such a political profile of cows should facilitate raising the profile of a cattle-specific 
programme. However, on the other hand, heightened political sensitivities around cattle 
would also serve to restrict the scope of activities within politically acceptable confines. In 
the case of a brucellosis control programme, this would mean that culling diseased 
animals would be an unlikely intervention, as would the identification of a diseased 
animal, which might favour distress selling. Arguments around harnessing the economic 
potential of a religiously revered animal present their own contradictions, some of which 
are discussed below. 
Economic aspects of dairying in India 
Following the green revolution in India in the 1960s, possibly the most significant 
agricultural development in independent India came in the form of Operation Flood. Over 
a period of 25 years starting from 1970, the Indian government, with international aid 
assistance, invested in developing a cooperative-led procurement and supply model for 
milk and dairy products all across India (Achaya and Huria, 1986; Cunningham, 2009).This 
rise in dairy production is reflected in Figure 38, which shows a consistent increase in per 
capita availability since 1970 and has made milk the largest agriculture crop in India, with 
a market value of $ 65 billion in 2014 (Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation 
Limited, 2015, p. 6). 
 
Figure 38: Increase in milk production and consumption following Operaton Flood  
(Cunningham, 2009, p. 16) 
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The cooperatives engaged a large number of landless farmers into rearing cattle and 
established centralised milk processing and chilling facilities, thus increasing consumption 
and safety of milk in urban markets and providing economic benefits to rural farmers. 
While there is no denying the economic impact of the dairy cooperative movement in 
Gujarat, which claims to have membership of 3.6 million households spread across more 
than 18,000 villages (see Figure 39), it has faced a long standing critique of consolidating 
local power hierarchies by promoting growth of landed farmers at the expense of landless 
and lower caste communities (Baviskar and George, 1988; Ebrahim, 2000; Rawal, 2003). 
With the establishment of a neo-liberal political regime in the state, recent scholarly and 
journalistic investigations have highlighted how these political dynamics have become 
even more deeply entrenched in the Gujarat cooperatives (Rajshekhar, 2018a, 2017; 
Scholten and Basu, 2009).  
 
Figure 39: Gujarat dairy co-operative supply chain60 
                                                             
60 From 2015 Annual report (Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited, 2015, p. 22) 
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But there is no denying the size of the dairy cooperatives in the state. The financially 
sustainable model of the cooperatives helped them employ a large veterinary workforce, 
such that in states like Gujarat, they have become more dominant players than even the 
state animal husbandry department. According to a cooperative officer:  
Our extension work is so huge that we have almost 1200-1300 people 
working in the villages regularly…. We have equal to 1200 extension workers, 
who (run our) extension education programme, in (which) we talk about 
animal health. 
(More vets were employed by the cooperatives) than by the agencies…. There 
are 923 vets this year (D7, 18 Aug 2015). 
This means that the costs and impacts of brucellosis and its interventions are felt not only 
by the animals and their owners, but also involve large marketing bodies negotiating sales 
worth billions of dollars in thousands of retail outlets within India as well as 
internationally (Figure 39). Therefore, given the size of the dairy industry, these have the 
potential for economic repercussions in markets outside the state. This added level of 
complexity will necessarily need to be addressed in any discussions related to brucellosis 
in Gujarat and other Indian states.  
Gujarat produced about 10 million tonnes of bovine milk in 2012-13 – which 
is around 1.3 per cent of the aggregate world milk production and 7.6 per 
cent of the country’s production. What’s more, the output is increasing at 
about five per cent per annum (NDDB, 2013, p. 44). 
In Gujarat, since the ownership of animals is ultimately in the private sector, the state 
government does not enjoy the same level of control as it does in Tamil Nadu. Moreover, 
given the rapidly expanding dairy industry in Gujarat (with sales projected to increase 
from $3.4 billion in 2014 to $8 billion in 2019 (Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing 
Federation Limited, 2015, p. 20), there are powerful interests concerned with the health of 
cows that go beyond veterinary health, farmers and cooperatives, to the extended 
ecosystem of food processors, traders, financers; all possessing at least some political 
clout.  
The economic important of cattle, thus, both increases the profile of the sector as well as 
the risk aversion among the major actors to any discussion that might have even a 
marginally negative impact on the industry. This is especially so, because India has been 
negotiating with EU for decades on relaxing food safety-related non-trade barriers to 
allow dairy imports from India, but “which India has never been able to break” (Debroy, 
2005; Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited, 2015, p. 10). Any adverse 
publicity regarding the food safety standards in the dairy sector are likely to adversely 
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impact these negotiations, as well and therefore creates further incentives to quieten 
discussions around brucellosis in the country.  
This might explain their reluctance to acknowledge the presence of a brucellosis like 
zoonoses, which is food-safety as well as an occupational health issue. This resistance is 
best reflected in the below quote from a dairy manager who, when confronted by reported 
figures of brucellosis in Gujarat, tried to deflect the problem by citing another state as the 
origin of the problem: 
There are many cases of brucellosis in northern states. The animals that have 
come to us from there, because of that only, it has come to our Gujarat. 
Otherwise, earlier I had never seen a case. Because of imported animal only it 
has spread. Now we have asked the farmers to not get animals from outside 
(D7, 18 Aug 2015). 
7.5.2 National brucellosis control programme  
The national brucellosis control programme was launched less than five years ago. The 
disease had been a concern with veterinarians for a long time. However, there was little 
consensus about how to control the problem because of the restrictions against animal 
slaughter and the risks posed by the vaccine.  
According to some respondents who used to work on brucellosis in the last few decades, 
brucellosis was popularly considered to be a self-limiting disease in animals. This was 
because usually after 1-2 abortions, the cows became productive again. Even if the once-
infected animals became carriers, since individual animal testing is not done and because 
brucellosis is easily destroyed in pasteurisation, it was not a priority for the government.  
Therefore, there were not many efforts to change the status quo, except to insist on 
consumption of packed and pasteurised milk. However, this changed once the spread of 
brucellosis became such that it started hurting the productivity of the dairy sector. 
According to an officer formerly involved in calf rearing programme: 
As far as brucellosis is concerned, nobody was bothered, or is bothered. The 
only people really bothered are those who are producing semen (for artificial 
insemination), because those bulls have to be brucellosis-free. If that herd has 
to be kept disease free, every village within a radius of 10 kilometres is 
vaccinated 100 percent by the same station. 
So, we reached a stage where we could not get disease-free, brucellosis-free 
bulls for the semen station. That is when everybody woke up. Otherwise, 
brucellosis was not on any agenda.    
There were villages where you could not find disease-free bulls...if one 
household has brucellosis, I can't pick up (bulls) from that whole village. Now 
I have invested in that village, by putting this expensive semen into those 
female, and by the time, I go to collect the calf, I know I cannot collect it.    
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Then I start all over again. First I have to test all the animals in that village, 
(ensure it is) disease free and then go...so till we started collecting bull calves 
in a serious way… Because productivity was not on anybody's agenda (then), 
nobody took brucellosis… seriously. (D4, 19 Aug 2015) 
I met several scientists, all now retired, who recalled their interaction with key Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) officers, or presented at key meetings at ICAR, 
which, they felt, could have convinced them to initiate the national control policy. 
Whatever might have been the immediate precipitating factor, once the seriousness of 
brucellosis as a threat to dairy productivity started being recognised, the veterinary 
administrators had to devise a brucellosis control strategy that was feasible in the Indian 
political context.  
A guidance publication from the Veterinary Council of India defined the political and 
practical constraints for a national brucellosis control strategy:  
Brucellosis control and eradication is best achieved by a combination of 
vaccination with test and slaughter of positive animals. Exclusive test and 
slaughter strategy should be limited to the regions/ areas with very low herd 
prevalence supported with well-established veterinary services, adequate 
budget and political will.  
In all other situations, vaccination should be considered as a basic control 
tool. Since test and slaughter is not practicable in India, eradication should 
not be targeted leaving control of brucellosis the only option. The whole 
population vaccination should be considered, where the herd prevalence is 
high and control on animal movement is not effective (Kumar and Singh, 
2013, p. 7). 
Social context of livestock rearing 
The sheer number of poor livestock owners in India illustrates the financially precarious 
nature of most livestock keeping, despite the achievements of the cooperative movement 
(Grace et al., 2012b). And, as a veterinarian described earlier, other villagers might not 
prefer pooling milk with animals from a farm with suspected brucellosis. Combined with 
the relative lack of veterinary services, it is easy to see why farmers might want to cut 
their losses by resisting diagnoses in their animals and consider quickly selling off animals 
suspected of carrying a disease rather than incur financial losses. 
And, if it (the animal) has got brucellosis, then you have (no option) but to 
sell it. In our country, an animal with T.B. or any other disease cannot be 
destroyed, you have to carry the disease in your country. So, we will always 
be a nation of endemic diseases (D4, 19 Aug 2015). 
This is why the guidelines for national brucellosis control programmes advise against 
identifying diseased animals and instead recommend testing of pooled milk samples. They 
suggest better farm hygiene and segregation of animals. The recently convened Brucella 
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free network, convened by NIVEDI, perhaps realising the limitations of this strategy in 
achieving elimination of brucellosis, has called for identification and tracing of diseased 
animals in its pilot project (Department of Biotechnology and Veterinry Council of India, 
2016). 
Small ruminants and other animals: A big gap 
Goat plays a significant role in providing supplementary income and 
livelihood to millions of resource poor farmers and landless labourers of 
rural India. Small ruminant rearing ensures self-employment and acts as a 
cushion in distress situations like drought and famine (Department of Animal 
Husbandry Dairying & Fisheries, 2017, p. 1). 
The above quote can easily be applied to sheep-rearing as well. India is supposed to house 
the biggest goat population and is the biggest producer of goat milk globally, largely for 
domestic consumption (Department of Animal Husbandry Dairying & Fisheries, 2017, p. 
1). 
Smaller animals such as sheep and goats are generally owned by poorer households as a 
supplemental income source. Despite their size, the sheep and goat keeping sector is not 
organised in the same way as the dairy cooperatives (Kumar and Pant, 2003; Nandi et al., 
2011). Most small animals are owned either in small numbers in backyard farms, or by 
nomadic communities which practice open grazing, as shown in Figure 40 (Nandi et al., 
2011; Prasad et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2013). As a result, this sector does not command the 
same level of visibility as more organised and stable farms.  
 
Figure 40: Leading a flock of sheep to pasture in Surat, Gujarat. 
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The main vaccine of choice, S-19, is unfortunately not effective against the B. melitensis 
strain of brucellosis and therefore these species are not targeted upon in the current 
version of the brucellosis control programme. The vaccine for B. Melitensis (Rev.1) has not 
been introduced by the national programme so far, apparently because of challenges with 
its availability (Kumar and Singh, 2013). 
In the relatively more organised dairy sector, milk is pasteurised and thus safe from 
brucellosis. On the other hand, goat milk is primarily used for domestic consumption, 
which means there are more chances of melitensis-caused disease. Given what we know of 
the presence of melitensis in the country, it is very likely that the more relevant 
brucellosis variant (for human health) is not being addressed in the current efforts and 
must constitute a significant burden, mainly in families which can least afford such an 
illness. 
7.5.3 Brucellosis: A ‘hushed up conspiracy’ 
Thus, the key message from this section would be about the strongly political nature of 
brucellosis – both because of the species associated with it, as well as the interventions 
devised against it. This makes brucellosis hard to talk about and challenging to control.  
Earlier I established the significance of cattle to political as well as economic debates in 
India. The importance of cattle is felt at the level of individuals as well as at a societal level, 
in different ways. Many people in India have multiple associations with cows; they could 
be worshipping the divine presence in the animal, or could be rearing it for the economic 
benefits, or, in case of many other, might obtain some nourishment from the cow.  
The cow is perhaps even more important at a macro level, because of its used in political 
discourse as a motif. An equally significant aspect of cattle is the size of economic sectors 
built upon the dairy, leather and meat industries sourced from the animal61. The size of 
economic investments and the large number of actors, including cooperatives as well as 
corporates, riding on the animal ensure that the government takes a conservative 
approach towards the sector.  
The problem with the huge prominence of cows in the national imagination, at least as far 
as brucellosis is concerned, is that a single animal subsumes the attention that should also 
go to other related animals and interventions: for instance, buffalo, which is an equal 
                                                             
61 India is among the largest exporters of beef (carabeef, drawn from buffalo, a less politically volatile 
animal), as well as leather products (Ramkumar, 2013). For various reasons, these two primarily export-
oriented industries occupy less space in political discourse and have therefore not been discussed in this 
chapter. But it is likely that, at least in the case of meat industry, it would have a similar influence on 
brucellosis discourse as does the dairy industry. 
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contributor to the dairy industry as well as to the export-oriented meat industry. Other 
obvious examples are the smaller livestock species of sheep, goat, and to a lesser extent, 
pigs, all of which are reared by poorer and lower caste communities for meat.  
Having discussed the political significance of the species associated with the disease, the 
interventions against brucellosis provide additional challenges to the programme 
managers. Tracing and culling diseased animals is neither cost efficient for a widely spread 
disease like brucellosis in India, nor politically suitable. The key interventions against 
brucellosis, therefore, are surveillance for diseased animals and their quarantining to 
prevent them from spreading the disease and vaccination among the healthy animals to 
prevent them from catching the disease.  
Since most farming livestock in India are not tagged, it is not possible to trace individual 
animals. Moreover, since identification of individual diseased animals is likely to result in 
distress selling, the official national policy is to conduct the screening at village or farm 
level in pooled milk samples. Therefore, quarantining of sick animals becomes difficult to 
achieve as well. This leaves us with the last and strongest intervention measure against 
brucellosis which has helped many countries control brucellosis – vaccination. While the 
vaccine itself is quite effective, the animal health professionals do not like handling it 
because of increased risk of catching the disease, which carries with itself another level of 
stigma and challenges.  
Thus, to summarise, the cooperatives prefer pasteurising milk to considering the presence 
of brucellosis among their livestock. Farmers likewise, because of economic as well as 
social reasons do not want to be told that their animal has the disease. The veterinarians 
are fully aware about the disease in animals, but do not like to discuss their vulnerability 
to the disease because of the social stigma attached to it.  
Brucellosis, therefore remains an intractable political problem, in the present 
circumstances, and the reluctance to discuss the disease, surely points to a hushed up 
conspiracy as an apt metaphor to describe it. 
7.6 COLLABORATION  
Even as brucellosis is a major challenge for veterinarians and is likely a significant illness 
among humans too, its framing remains as that of an animal health issue. It is this lack of 
awareness among the human health sector that the veterinarians appear to be most 
exercised about. In fact, a major grievance against the public health sector held by many of 
the veterinarians I spoke to was not about the lack of collaboration or lack of activity on 
the public health front for brucellosis. Rather, it was something even more basic—the 
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veterinary public health community was constantly disappointed at the apathy exhibited 
by the public health professionals as far as brucellosis as concerned, a sentiment echoed in 
this WHO publication: 
The veterinarians are often at the front line of dealing with zoonotic diseases, 
but receive little support from medical colleagues; there is a lack of 
awareness and responsibility for human health-related problems. There is a 
real need for integration of veterinary and medical sectors for disease 
prevention. Veterinary staff also lack the facilities for efficient diagnosis 
(WHO, 2006, p. 7). 
As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, almost all veterinarians I met with had had a 
personal association with someone who developed brucellosis, and who had to prompt 
their physician to test and diagnose brucellosis.  
On the subject of intersectoral collaborations around brucellosis, I found across the board 
there was a strongly felt need for animal-human health collaborations within the 
veterinary sector, on the lines of the sentiments expressed in the principal WHO 
publication for brucellosis control: 
…the disease in man can only be prevented effectively by elimination of the 
animal reservoir. This necessitates a close interaction between the medical 
authorities concerned with public health authorities on the one hand and the 
veterinary authorities on the other.  
This collaboration is only the first step in establishing an effective control 
programme. For a successful outcome, all sections of the community need to 
be involved in the process and to lend their support (Corbel, 2006, p. 68). 
However, when probed further about the purpose of the collaboration, let alone how such 
a collaboration was supposed to work, there was very little by way of response. It appears 
that the expectations from the public health side regarding brucellosis had been set in 
such a manner that the overwhelming focus was on developing awareness among 
physicians about the existence of brucellosis as a possible public health problem.  
A report from a government deliberation on developing a brucellosis control strategy lists 
the following contours for animal-human health collaboration around brucellosis:  
The successful implementation of a brucellosis surveillance, prevention and 
control programme requires strong intersectoral collaboration, especially 
between the public health and veterinary sectors, at all levels. To strengthen 
intersectoral collaboration for effective control of brucellosis and other 
zoonotic diseases, measures of particular importance include establishment 
of: a) Advisory committees on zoonoses; b) Veterinary public health units In 
ministries of health; c) Compulsory sharing of information and cross-
notifications of case; d) Joint outbreak investigations; and e) Joint training 
activities (Kumar and Singh, 2013, p. 8). 
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Given the fact that I could find only one public health researcher mentioned in the list of 
participants at this meeting, I propose reading this list more as a charter of expectations 
from the animal health side, rather than as a framework for developing comprehensive 
intersectoral collaborations around brucellosis prevention and control. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Brucellosis, a disease well-established in Indian livestock and, very likely, in human 
populations, has experienced a mixed fate in India, not uncommon to other zoonoses. It 
has gained notoriety both because of its high levels of presence in the animal population, 
and consequent threats to the economic potential for the livestock sector. It is also looked 
upon suspiciously by veterinary professionals because of the risks posed by the disease 
(and the interventions) to their health and social standing.  
On the other hand, despite abundant, but patchy, evidence around the disease, especially 
in the animal health sector, it appears none of the professions has managed to develop a 
convincing narrative about the quantum of the burden in animals and humans alike.  
A lack of a convincing, broad narrative about the importance of the disease, in turn, has 
resulted in it being neglected, at least until a counter-narrative of brucellosis as an 
economic threat was developed among the animal health profession. Within the human 
health sector, the lack of awareness about the prevalence of brucellosis as a health 
problem continues.  
Of late, brucellosis’ rise to prominence, marked by the launch of a national control policy, 
has been constructed around the politics and economics of cows and the associated dairy 
industry. However, as discussed earlier, the significance attached to the cow itself gave 
more incentives to the key actors to distort, obscure or highlight the disease in different 
ways.  
Thus a combination of discourses that focus on disease risks among animals rather than 
humans, and the politics of the cow as religious symbol and the dairy industry as an 
important economic sector, has meant that intersectoral collaboration around brucellosis, 
despite the evident impacts on human health, continues to be ignored.  
Differences in the training, worldview and motivations of animal and human health 
professionals mean that the space for collaboration remains limited, until a more 
convincing framing of the disease becomes prominent, and which encourages more 
assessments within the human health sector as well.  
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8 INTERSECTORAL COLLABORATIONS 
Having concluded the chapters on three disease-based case studies, this is a good place to 
recap the major findings and arguments covered so far before bringing the discussion back 
together towards the underlying theme of the thesis, namely how and why intersectoral 
collaborations happen, or do not.  
Thus far, I have made a case for the importance of studying the politics of the development 
and workings of animal-human health intersectoral collaborations if prevention and 
control of zoonoses in India is the goal. I have used the examples of three zoonotic 
diseases in two different states in India to identify and analyse the discourses, practices 
and politics of intersectoral collaborations.   
Earlier in the thesis, I prefaced the disease-based chapters by describing the broader 
discourse around zoonoses prevention, the intersectoral collaborations called One Health 
internationally and within India. I discussed the long-standing history of collaborations 
preceding and parallel to the discussions around One Health. I then discussed the specific 
requirements expected from One Health intersectoral collaborations that could work 
within the federal governance structures in India and the sometimes-contrasting 
mandates of the involved sectors, while discussing specific examples of zoonoses 
collaborations at the national and state level in India.  
The larger context thus laid out, I used the subsequent three chapters to examine disease-
based intersectoral collaborations in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. The themes I analysed, 
included, among others, the local disease and political contexts underlying the 
intersectoral collaborations, the contrasts in practice with the ideals of a One Health 
approach, the politics of using scientific knowledge for decision-making, the everyday 
practices of front-line workers, as well as the nature of Indian bureaucracy in influencing 
the interpretative process. 
Drawing upon examples from response to brucellosis and anthrax, I argue how animal-
based diseases can simultaneously provoke dismissal and alarm, based upon the 
perceived severity of their manifestations. Witnessing first-hand the response to an actual 
outbreak of anthrax, I saw for myself how sector-based power dynamics could be flipped 
and the veterinarians could actually be the ones in the driving seat dictating the policy 
agenda by virtue of their deeper engagement with zoonoses.   
The chapter on leptospirosis described how the compulsion to preserve a success story 
narrative meant that the government restricted access to disease information in order to 
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regulate the direction of narrative. The cases of both leptospirosis and anthrax involved 
prophylactic use of antibiotics in large populations. This was simultaneously a populist as 
well as a defensive response by the state to potentially serious public health emergencies, 
even when the scientific opinion weighed against such an approach. This case illustrates 
the contested nature of the role of scientific expertise in decision-making as well as the 
tensions that govern the interactions between officers of the state and the public whom it 
is supposed to govern.  
The chapter on brucellosis dealt with the framing of disease narratives and investigated 
the associations between the availability of epidemiological information and political 
prioritisation afforded to a disease. I was surprised to find that the presence of the former 
did not automatically result in the latter. In most cases, there were other factors that 
influenced how available scientific knowledge was translated and packaged into framings 
that informed popular understandings about the disease.  
Anthrax and leptospirosis, despite their zoonotic transmission, represented outbreak-
causing diseases that were perceived by the state agencies to be exclusively the problems 
of animal and human health sectors, respectively. In contrast, the disease of brucellosis 
had silently spread to large segments of the livestock population, as well as to the human 
population, but was still ignored as a public health challenge, while only attracting a half-
hearted response from the animal health sector.  
The response to leptospirosis echoed findings from the other two diseases in showcasing 
the instrumental nature of intersectoral collaborations, politics of interpreting and 
translating scientific evidence to inform decision-making, and an ever-present desire 
among government agencies to be seen by their constituent public as being in control.  
Together the three case studies thus proved useful in offering a disease-based and place-
based explanation of the development and functioning of intersectoral collaborations. In 
the current chapter, I propose to build upon the discussions so far and conduct a wider 
analysis, drawing together the findings from the disease case studies, comparing 
intersectoral collaborations across diseases and geographies in India. In the process, I will 
refer back to my original analytical framework and structure the discussions along three 
broad categories of politics, discourse and practices to assess whether these intersectoral 
collaborations are comparable and, if so, what are some of the overarching factors that 
help us understand them. This is essential if ‘One Health’ ideals are to be realised in 
practice.  
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8.1 POLITICS OF DECISION MAKING 
Any discussion of the politics of decision-making around zoonoses cannot be completely 
divorced from the politics of representing ideas, as well as the discretionary nature of 
translating policy discussions into everyday practices. However, the discussions in this 
section will have a more limited scope, as the other themes are covered in subsequent 
sections. In this section, I focus on three strands in analysing the politics of decision-
making around zoonoses in India. The first seeks to compare the local political 
characteristics and their influence upon zoonoses-related discussions at the state level. 
This will include state-level characteristics such as political culture, institutional capacities 
as well as the relationships of state institutions with the central government.  
The second strand revolves around the nature of bureaucracy in India, including its use of 
technical advice as an explanation for the decision-making observed across different 
zoonotic diseases in the earlier chapters. Finally, the last strand in this section dissects the 
tensions that exist between the animal and human health sectors as well as their parent 
disciplines of veterinary sciences and medicine, respectively. I discuss the professional 
cultures informing the practices in both sectors and the power dynamics that exist 
between the professions. I contrast the differences in operational incentives as well as 
institutional capacities that exist in both the sectors and how these are used as a source for 
furthering the divide as well as forming bridges across both the sectors.  
Comparing place-based politics in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat 
In the earlier chapters, I described the performance of intersectoral collaborations 
developed around specific diseases at the state level. While the chapters highlighted some 
of the peculiarities of my study states, I aim to bring the discussion together in this section 
and examine the role state-based politics can play in decision-making around zoonoses. 
The differences in approach to zoonoses, specifically among my study states of Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu, is best illustrated by the specific examples of ‘One Health’ collaboration 
recounted to me by officers in both the states, as described in chapter 3. 
As described earlier, whereas veterinary officers in Gujarat organised a ‘seminar’ 
addressed by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and state political leadership as a 
means to promoting the idea of One Health in the state, officers in Tamil Nadu chose a 
different, more ambitious approach. The chief bureaucrats of Health and Animal 
Husbandry departments co-chaired a meeting to develop plans for a formal One Health 
unit in the state with the aim to institutionalise regular coordination between both the 
departments. While both the collaborative mechanisms displayed administrative 
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innovations that catered to local concerns, they differed in the scope of activities and, 
more importantly, the time horizon envisaged for the intersectoral collaborations.  
The seminar in Gujarat appeared to be addressing more immediate concerns of acquiring 
visibility for the Animal Husbandry department in front of the Chief Minister and gaining 
credibility for a One Health approach. The discussions in Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, 
aimed to establish an administrative framework for a longer term, and more substantive, 
collaboration. While it is possible to identify several possible explanations for the 
differences in approach towards intersectoral collaborations in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, 
ranging from institutional capacities and openness to administrative innovations, most 
explanations identified in chapter 3 are, ultimately, a product of the political and 
administrative cultures prevalent in the states which, in turn, govern the prioritisation 
accorded to such innovations.  
While justifying my choice of studying intersectoral collaborations at the state level, in 
chapter 2 & 3, I highlighted how health was classified as a state subject in the Indian 
constitution, making states the most consequential theatre of policy-making when it 
comes to zoonoses (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2018). However, as I demonstrate below, 
even if it were not for the argument about jurisdictions, it would still be important to study 
the characteristics of state-based politics in order to explain zoonoses policies in India.  
As discussed in chapter 2, and reflected in the works of Indian scholars, place-based 
politics is an especially important factor in shaping public agendas in India and deserves 
comparative political analysis (Deshpande et al., 2017; Harriss et al., 2005; Manor, 2010). 
Two recent publications demonstrate the relevance of comparative analysis in the specific 
context of my research by comparing the political regimes and developmental outcomes in 
the state of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, both arriving at similar conclusions (Joshi and 
McGrath, 2015; Kalaiyarasan, 2014).  
The long-standing debate on growth and development has been renewed in 
recent works of Jagdish Bhagwati and Amartya Sen. This paper intervenes in 
this debate with evidence from Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu, which, unlike 
Kerala, did not have initial advantages over Gujarat, outperforms the latter 
on nearly every development indicator at the level of indicators as well as in 
the rate of change. This is despite Gujarat having a slightly higher economic 
growth rate. Tamil Nadu’s relative success is the result of state intervention 
in providing essential public services. Further, the history of social 
mobilisation in the state has been crucial in ensuring the formulation and 
efficient execution of social welfare measures (Kalaiyarasan, 2014, p. 55). 
Similar to Kalaiyarasan (2014) quoted above, Joshi and McGrath tried to examine the links 
between political ideologies, administrative cultures and developmental outcomes, 
182 
 
specifically in the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. They credit Tamil Nadu’s “more 
egalitarian ideology and higher quality of public administration” as being “crucial to Tamil 
Nadu’s success in simultaneously improving human and economic development”. This, they 
found, was in contrast to the “lopsided” growth experienced by Gujarat (Joshi and McGrath, 
2015, p. 465).  
Joshi and McGrath’s findings echo the conclusions of more detailed assessments of 
political scientists and developmental researchers conducted in both the states. While 
both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu are large and economically well-off states, both have 
experienced different social and economic trajectories that have influenced the current 
state of political and economic affairs, as I will demonstrate below.  
 
Figure 41: Nurses protesting promotion policies, DMS Office, Chennai. 
For example, the emphasis on universal social protection in Tamil politics, combined with 
its caste characteristics, led to the development of a unique brand of populism and 
expressive politics (Figure 41) in the state (Fuller and Narasimhan, 2015; A. Wyatt, 2013a, 
2013b). This stands in contrast to the emphasis on politics of promoting big business and 
majoritarian politics that has characterized social development in the state of Gujarat 
(Berenschot, 2010; Jaffrelot, 2015).  
On the other hand, weak delivery capacities of the Gujarat state means that people have to 
turn frequently  to political mediators to gain access to their entitlements (Berenschot, 
2015) or, alternatively, depend upon private philanthropic institutions for gaining access 
to other services (Dekkers and Rutten, 2018; Haynes, 1987).  The initiatives that tended to 
be more popular in Gujarat were those set up on the lines of the dairy cooperatives or the 
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more recent Chiranjeevi yojana in animal and human health sectors, respectively, which 
operate largely outside the government systems. Whereas the cooperatives organised and 
self-funded initiatives that managed all levels of dairy value chain with minimal inputs 
from the government, Chiranjeevi scheme allowed poorer pregnant women to seek 
delivery services at a private facility subsidised by the government. The scheme proved 
popular among public health circles as it, apparently, allowed the government to increase 
institutional delivery rates without creating infrastructure for the same.  
However, despite early indications of positive outcomes (Mavalankar et al., 2009), later 
evaluations showed that the scheme “had no significant impact on institutional delivery 
rates or maternal health outcomes” (Mohanan et al., 2014, p. 187). This was likely due to 
the lack of availability of gynaecologists in rural areas and selective selection of ‘safe’ cases 
by the participating physicians (Acharya and McNabee, 2009).  
Thus, it transpired that even a ‘hands-off’ intervention like Chiranjeevi accomplished little 
due to the weak capacities of the state and ended up exacerbating the inequalities 
underlying the larger Gujarat society. Similar to the health scheme, media reports have 
demonstrated that despite its history, even the famed dairy cooperative movement has 
suffered major setbacks as political interests have trumped profitability or quality 
(Rajshekhar, 2018b, 2018c).  
In chapter 6, I refer to the Gujarat government’s predilection for projecting an image of 
being in control (see Figure 42) and propagating a ‘success narrative’ in relation to disease 
outbreaks. Apart from leptospirosis, this tendency was particularly highlighted during the 
Zika outbreak in Gujarat. At the time, instead of reporting the disease as per its obligations 
under International Health Regulations (IHR), the government buried the news as the 
outbreak coincided with the conduct of a major trade conclave (Biswas, 2017). The ruling 
regime’s preference for announcing major schemes with limited follow-up on the ground 
has been remarked by many political commentators who have referred to it as ‘event 
management’ politics (Indian Express, 2014; The Economist, 2017). 
If Gujarati politics is seen as having symbolic, neoliberal and majoritarian characteristics, 
the unique brand of populism practised in Tamil Nadu has been labelled by some as 
‘technocratic populism’ due to its emphasis on both making welfare commitments as well 
as ensuring its delivery through effective administrative mechanisms (A. Wyatt, 2013b, 
2013a).  
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Figure 42: Projecting authority: Health Commissioner’s office, Gujarat. 
Institutional capacity and centre-state relations 
Having discussed political cultures, what are the other explanations for the differences in 
practices and cultures of administration in both the states? One predictor of the presence 
of intersectoral collaborations is the depth and variety of its institutional capacity in 
research of and response to zoonoses. This is also supported by One Health proponents 
who argue that it is difficult to achieve sustainable collaborations in the absence of 
minimal capacities among all sectors (Bogich et al., 2012; Stephen et al., 2004).  
The phenomenon of institutional capacities is not completely divorced from the politics of 
place. The (state) government is likely to invest in technical expertise if it values effective 
delivery of services, while decreased role of technical advice means decision-making in the 
state is likely to lack technical credibility and might not be as effective.  
In addition to informing the decision-making process, other advantages are likely in 
having in-house or readily accessible sources of expertise at the state level. By decreasing 
the knowledge asymmetries with that of central government, local technical expertise 
appears to strengthen the hand of state governments in their negotiations with central 
government within the framework of centre-state relations practised in India, as explained 
below.  
As a bureaucrat who had retired at a senior position, pointed out in the quote below, while 
the Constitution has made state governments responsible for animal and human health 
areas, the central government can still influence decision-making in states by exploiting 
the technical and financial superiority of its institutions.  
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Centre-state relations...are constitutionally structured. In our sector, it is important 
because health is a state subject. And, in principle, the state (government) can do 
what it wants. I cannot, off-hand, think of a case where a state has gone against 
national policy... Because, by and large, states realise that the central government 
has much more resources in the manner in the matter of devised policy. (For 
instance) the big research institutions are all central (A10, 01-Mar-16).  
Thus, central agencies can dictate state agendas by using different means. One relatively 
straightforward way they can do so is by funding large programmes of activities that are 
tied to standardised operational guidelines. If the state government wants to access the 
funding, it would have to follow the norms set by the centre.  
Another way for the centre to gain influence in state-level policies is by exercising its 
technical superiority. This could be by providing access to laboratory facilities of central 
agency institutions to state governments at times of need, such as in the case of an 
outbreak. This is what happened in the case of plague, leptospirosis and Crimean-Congo 
haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) outbreaks in Gujarat, where visiting teams of experts from 
Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and National Centre for Disease Control 
(NCDC) ended up advising (and assuming credit on behalf of) the state governments.62 
Countries in South Asia lag behind those in other regions in terms of institutional capacity 
for One Health research and response (Chatterjee et al., 2017). Therefore, if any state 
manages to create even small pools of local expertise, this is likely to give it an edge over 
other state governments. On the other hand, if a state is as heavily invested in technocracy 
as Tamil Nadu, it is easy to imagine the advantage it must enjoy during its negotiations 
with central government agencies. This point was brought home to me from an anecdote 
related to me by a friend whose work in the central health ministry involved developing 
an annual plan of activities for his division based upon the workplans sent by different 
states. As the deadline for submitting state plans approached every year, he remembered, 
his whole team used to be thinly stretched working on submissions from 28 different 
states. As a result, the workplans from states like Tamil Nadu, which had the capacity to 
develop well-justified proposals on their own, were much more likely to be accepted and 
their requests granted without many revisions. This allowed the central teams to prioritise 
their time to work with those state governments that could not develop plans on time 
without their help.  
                                                             
62As discussed in the chapter 6, the definitive statements on the initial outbreaks of CCHF, plague 
and leptospirosis were made by scientists from ICMR and NCDC, respectively, and not by Gujarati 
researchers (Mishra et al., 2011; Ramalingaswami, 1995; Zoonosis Division - National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases, 2006). 
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Possibly this is one reason why the bureaucracy enjoys a strong position in Tamil Nadu 
due to the political mandate to deliver on the entitlements promised to the electorate. 
Within the bureaucracy, especially in the health sector, the technical officers are unusually 
empowered compared to other states (Gupta et al., 2010). A recent news story highlighted 
the elevated profile of the Director of Public Health (highest ranked public health officer) 
in the state in a way that even undermined the leadership of the more senior health 
secretary (and possibly other health cadres as well) (Rajshekhar, 2016).  
In addition to anecdotal evidence by commentators (Gupta et al., 2010), the technical 
superiority of public health institutional expertise in Tamil Nadu can be assessed by 
counting the number of institutions working on zoonoses there. An earlier analysis of 
published research from India attempted to do just that. As depicted in Figure 43, we 
found the maximum number of institutions publishing research on zoonoses to be in Tamil 
Nadu. Gujarat came much further down the list (Kakkar and Abbas, 2012).  
   
Figure 43: Distribution of zoonoses research institutions in India, by state  
(Data from zoonoses research conducted on 20 priority zoonoses published from India between 2001 and 11 - 
n= 293). Data source: (Kakkar and Abbas, 2012) 
For a variety of reasons, Tamil Nadu is equipped with a large number of national and 
regional institutions with expertise in public health and infectious diseases that has helped 
the state over time. One of the reasons why technical expertise is valued in Tamil Nadu is 
by consistently demonstrating value and acquiring credibility for decision-making to the 
political leadership. Tamil Nadu has always enjoyed an educated workforce, initially 
composed of upper caste Brahmins seeking a professional occupation (Fuller and 
Narasimhan, 2015), and also by the virtue of being the first southern capital of British 
India, which made Tamil Nadu the site for multiple public health interventions (Kavadi, 
2007).  
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On the contrary, in Gujarat, apart from clinical oriented teaching institutions and a handful 
of newly opened research centres in public health, there is no established centre for 
offering public health advice to the state government. Even within the veterinary sector, 
apart from some newly established veterinary colleges in Gujarat, most of the expertise 
resides in the autonomous cooperative administered National Dairy Development Board 
(NDDB), where even the technical staff are designated as managers and not scientists.  
In a state where the technical officers are clearly at a disadvantage within the bureaucracy 
(explained below), it is easy to see this as one possible explanation for the way the NCDC 
rode roughshod when the state was trying to manage leptospirosis outbreaks, and 
possibly why I detected similar underpinnings of tension with ICMR taking the credit for 
CCHF efforts in Gujarat (see chapter 6).  
Bureaucracy 
In the discussion above, I described how the availability of independent technical 
institutions could strengthen the hand of technocrats and improve the quality of technical 
advice available for decision-making, and imbue the decision-making process with a more 
forward-looking perspective. But in some ways, the above explanation makes certain 
assumptions about the nature of bureaucracy as also the tension supposedly inherent 
between generalist bureaucrats and specialist technocrats.  
If we really want to understand the way policies are put together, it is important to subject 
the assumptions above to a more critical examination. In this section, therefore, I will try 
first to examine the characteristics, motivations and functioning of the bureaucracy. I will 
follow this up with an analysis of the role of technical advice and technical advisors in the 
decision-making process.  
Similar to the UK, the political leadership in India (at the state and in the centre) is advised 
by career bureaucrats. Almost all the government departments are headed by senior 
bureaucrats belonging to the IAS, a holdover from the colonial Indian Civil Service (Potter, 
1996, 1986). 
Having a strong cadre of generalist civil servants was deemed to be essential for 
protecting the central character of the Indian republic in the initial decades following 
independence. However, even after 70 years, the bureaucracy has not been able to let go of 
these powers and, indeed, in some ways, appears to have consolidated them even further. 
The IAS has managed to preserve its seniority in most departments, prevented later 
recruitment into bureaucracy and, as exemplified by the health department in Gujarat, 
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even subsumed roles of other cadres into its fold (Radin, 2007; Vaishnav and Khosla, 
2016).  
The senior IAS officer, referred to as the Secretary of a department, in turn, manages 
several additional levels of bureaucracy, comprising of more junior IAS officers as well as a 
cadre of technical specialists who oversee actual implementation on ground by frontline 
staff. The chief role of these multiple levels of bureaucracy is to ensure that the priorities 
of the political leadership, concerns of influential interest groups as well as the mandate of 
the department itself are all reconciled in everyday functioning of the government.  
 
Figure 44: Projecting order & control: Department of Animal Husbandry, Gujarat. 
Managing competing priorities in an ‘argumentative’ democracy like India (Sen, 2006) 
with weak delivery capacities requires a well-thought out strategy developed over 
decades of cumulative experience. The chosen strategy of all senior bureaucrats I have met 
seems to be to project an air of authority and an appearance of being in control (Figure 
44). In my admittedly limited interactions with a handful of IAS officers, I have found that 
unlike many other government officers I have met, they appear to speak in very low, 
measured tones that forces the audience to be quiet and equally affords authority to the 
speaker as someone who does not need to shout to get heard  
A former colleague once described to me how IAS officers tend to work. According to him, 
they tend to ‘dominate’ in all meetings by asking technical questions to administrative 
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personnel and holding technical officers to account for administrative deliverables. Like 
many myths, this recollection reveals as much about IAS officers themselves as it does 
about the people they work with—in this case, a retired public health officer who must 
have endured numerous such exchanges with senior bureaucrats during his stint in the 
health ministry.  
It is also important to add a disclaimer that not all IAS officers would try to ‘dominate’ all 
their meetings all of the time. Nonetheless, the idea that one can get their point of view 
carried out by virtue of ‘dominating’ a discussion and, by extension, ignoring alternative 
perspectives offers a peek into how government officers might view themselves, their 
organisation, and the way things get done.  
This is also in keeping with my observation elsewhere in the thesis chapter 6 about the 
popular understanding among civil servants that good leaders are those who know how to 
‘extract work’ from the system.63 What implication does such a style of working and 
organising individuals have on how decision-making occurs around zoonoses and 
intersectoral collaborations? 
In such a conceptualisation of bureaucracy, where even the senior leadership feels that 
they are allowed to and, indeed, have to,  ‘extract work’ coercively from reluctant 
professionals, it is easy to see that those lower down in the hierarchy might feel a loss of 
agency and limited sense of ownership of their work.  
This also means that in those institutions where the distinction between technical and 
generalist bureaucrats is clearly demarcated and placed in a rigid hierarchy, the level of 
engagement and quality of technical advice for decision-making is likely to suffer. 
Something similar was observed in the case of leptospirosis in Gujarat (chapter 6) where 
the post of chief public health officer in the state (referred to as Commissioner of Health) 
had been taken over by the generalist, but privileged IAS cadre officers. Unlike specialists 
from the public health cadre who are invested in a department for most of their careers, 
the more senior but generalist IAS officers often have a relatively short tenure of 
approximately three years or so within each department. In addition, because of their 
position within the bureaucratic hierarchy, the IAS officers are responsible for advising 
the ministers – the political leadership. Both the ministers and their IAS advisors have to 
                                                             
63 A possible explanation of the working culture within the bureaucracy is discussed in section 8.3 
on Practices  
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demonstrate credible outcomes within a 3-5 year period before the next elections or 
transfers, respectively.  
The longer term vision and investments required for credible policy impact will not carry 
much weight in such an institution, especially if the system is organised in a way that the 
perspectives of the leadership ‘dominate’ over those of the ‘subordinates’.  
This is probably why Gujarat finds it easier to establish episodic collaborations focussed 
on individual diseases rather than adopting a longer term, and more formal collaborative 
platform being discussed in Tamil Nadu that would likely take a couple of years and 
multiple levels of negotiations to mature.  
On a related note, and as captured by Jasanoff (2011), it is also worth examining whether 
the distinction between the specialist and generalist functions in a bureaucracy are really 
as demarcated on the ground as they appears in the discussion above. In the course of my 
fieldwork, I met with bureaucrats who tried to convey their understanding of the technical 
nuances, and also with subject-specialists who appeared more comfortable in their roles 
as officious bureaucrats.  
Programme managers working within the formal bureaucracy of the health or animal 
husbandry department are tasked with implementing the government agenda. Therefore, 
it did not surprise me to find them adopting the methods, speech and biases of the 
government bureaucracy they were so much a part of. 64 
However, what proved to be a bigger surprise to me was to find academics, who were 
working in notionally autonomous public universities, adopting the persona of 
government officers. For instance, decking up their official vehicles in the manner of 
government-issued Ambassador cars (see Figure 45). The adoption of a government 
officer persona by academia was also expressed, memorably for me, by the refusal to 
discuss leptospirosis in Surat by senior professors in Government Medical College, Surat 
citing government restrictions, even when the government officers themselves were keen 
to do so. 
To summarise, while it is useful to visualise state officers as having a technical or specialist 
function, it is important not to treat this as an exclusive categorisation and realise that 
                                                             
64For instance, following a formal, paper-based culture that insisted upon ‘official’ applications and 
a rigid interpretation of ‘guidelines’ before allowing me access to government officers or 
documents, both in Tamil Nadu as well as Gujarat. 
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administrators tasked with implementing a political vision will not hesitate to make use of 
technical experts, nor will the technocrats cease to make use of generalist expertise.  
  
Figure 45: Professor or public servant? (Picture at Madras Veterinary College) 
Vets and Medics: Professional cultures and tensions 
Any discussion involving collaboration among animal and human health sectors will be 
incomplete without an examination of the dynamics between the two sectors themselves. 
Literature on intersectoral collaborations repeatedly highlights the importance of pre-
existing networks and relationships between partnering organisations as a condition for 
intersectoral collaborations to develop (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006).  
While historically, the parent disciplines of both the sectors were closely aligned (Woods 
and Bresalier, 2014), on the policy front, there are considerable impediments to the 
coming together of both the sectors. Some of these are described by a senior public health 
manager in Tamil Nadu as follows: 
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It’s the revenue generating department—agriculture—so they make sure 
that their focus is food production, food safety and economic productivity. So, 
if the animal is very sick…it will cost a couple of hundred rupees or thousand 
rupees. But they just sacrifice the animal because there is cost to each and 
every animal as it’s not (in) human health.  
Different departments have different incentives. (For) human health, you 
want to give in money and you make sure that human health is not lost. 
Animal health… can’t spend too much money… because they can’t generate 
income and animals’ lives are not worth that much.  
And second issue is that people who are vets are those who wanted to become 
doctors. A lot of them, not all of them, could not get through (the competitive 
medical school entrance tests) for whatever reason. So, it is the power 
dynamic… (even though the) animal doctor may be dealing in multiple 
species and have much better understanding about zoonosis (B10/ 04-Jul-
15). 
The above quote contains several salient points with respect to practical challenges facing 
animal-human health sector collaborations. The first, and foremost, among them is the 
mismatched, sometimes conflicting, mandate of both the departments and the resultant 
difference in expectations from the officers participating in collaborative discussions. This 
runs counter to the overarching narrative around animal-human health collaborations 
that is promoted by the One Health movement focussed almost exclusively on health 
protection as its raison d'être. Without getting into the related critique of 'whose health' 
they are talking about, almost all One Health discussions seem to have the following as an 
underlying assumption —"protection from diseases will lead to better health, which is a 
public good. Therefore, everyone needs to come together in order to work more 
efficiently/effectively". 
This might sound like a reasonable ideal to work towards. However, at the level of the 
livestock programme managers whose performance is measured in terms of food 
production (and safety), they cannot justify going into expensive intersectoral 
collaborations unless they are directly and visibly affected by zoonotic concerns. 
The quote also alludes to a subtle dynamic at play between the veterinary and medical 
professions that anyone who has done secondary schooling in India would be aware of.  In 
a country with high educational aspirations and limited employment opportunities in the 
formal sector, there is a lot of competition to get into training programmes for the 
supposedly 'safer' professions of medicine and engineering. As a result, medical and 
engineering entrance examinations have become absurdly competitive in India with a 
single mark deciding the fate of thousands of students. Those who are not able to secure 
admission to a public-funded medical school and are not able to afford the fees of a private 
medical school either try their luck next year or, alternatively, get into one of the other 
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professional courses open to secondary school graduates from biology stream, such as 
veterinary medicine, agriculture sciences or paramedical course. 
In a society that promotes hierarchies based upon caste, class, religion, gender and 
geography, disciplinary segregation of 'animal doctors' from the more successful ‘human 
doctors’ is a given. The disdain for veterinary professionals and their profession gets 
reflected in subtle, and sometimes, not so subtle ways, as described by a veterinary 
epidemiologist below:  
So we had seen that always health department, whenever there is a zoonotic (disease 
event)...health department does lot of blaming. (They say), “It is because of your 
animals it has happened”. So a war starts from these words. And then after sitting 
and discussing with them...we let them into the knowledge that we people are doing 
so many things... (E6/10-Feb-15) 
Based upon my conversations with veterinarians, most would have experienced 
interactions like the one described above. It is natural that many would be hesitant about 
investing a lot of personal capital in nurturing intersectoral collaborations with the human 
health sector if they feel their contributions will not be valued.  
The preceding discussion outlines some of the differences in perspectives, mandates, 
power and capacities that exist between the animal and human health sectors and their 
professionals. While these appear to be major impediments towards developing 
intersectoral collaborations, nonetheless, as I will attempt to show below, many of the 
same points of difference can actually help nurture interdependencies and a 
complementarity of strengths between the sectors, which, in a different set of 
circumstances, might actually end up promoting collaboration. 
While the veterinarians and physicians have different academic training and focus, there 
are still several commonalities and, indeed, many areas where the veterinarians enjoy 
greater field exposure than most physicians. For starters, the veterinarians are trained to 
diagnose and treat diseases in multiple species, a skill set clearly lacking in human 
physicians (Frank, 2008). Second, the veterinarians have dedicated modules on laboratory 
as well as clinical aspects of zoonoses. This is in contrast to the human physicians who are 
largely unaware about zoonoses as a disease category (Kakkar et al., 2011b). 
In fact, as alluded to in the above quote, it is not unusual to find that once the barriers to 
collaboration are lowered (mostly in the face of an outbreak), and both the sectors have an 
opportunity to work towards a common goal, public health counterparts are able to 
develop an appreciation of the unique expertise of the veterinarians. 
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In addition to the above quote, which relates to the contributions of the veterinarians to 
controlling CCHF outbreaks in Gujarat, I came across multiple instances in my fieldwork 
where the veterinarians got a chance to prove their capabilities and managed to even flip 
the power dynamics inherent in most animal-human health interactions. For instance, as 
discussed in the chapter on anthrax, the veterinary officer was the only member of the 
outbreak response team who had a first-hand experience of controlling the disease and 
ended up directing the response measures of senior public health officers. Also in Tamil 
Nadu, an officer with the Director of Public Health recalled how he started appreciating 
the expertise of the veterinarians while working closely with them over a period of two 
weeks in a remote district trying to identify and control a suspected outbreak of avian 
influenza. According to him, this was one of the experiences that fed into the development 
of a proposal for establishing a formal One Health intersectoral collaboration in the state 
(Field notes, 18 July 2015). 
Even the supposed mismatched incentives of both the sectors could be used as an 
advantage, a veterinary programme manager pointed out to me in an earlier interaction. 
He suggested that while drawing up proposals for disease control programmes, he could 
only cite production statistics as that was what was available with him. He argued, he 
could make a stronger case if he could add data around human health impact of the 
diseases as well. Similarly, by using economic productivity data in addition to human 
health risks, it might be possible for public health program managers to make a more 
effective funding case for their disease control programmes as well.  
The difference in objectives of both the departments which leads them to assess their 
performance using different sets of metrics, if combined, could make a stronger case for 
interventions by both the sectors. 
8.2 DISCOURSE 
Having discussed the role of place-based political and administrative cultures and power 
dynamics in influencing decision-making around zoonoses, this section analyses the 
related theme of discourse. As I explained in chapter 4, I use the term discourse, both in 
the Foucauldian sense of analysing the power exercised in the generation and 
interpretation of knowledge, as well as in a somewhat narrower sense of plotting the 
narratives and storylines around the way zoonoses and collaborative policy action were 
framed and given meaning to.  
In this section, I reflect on three ways through which plurality of framings and contested 
meanings help influence the debates and set the agenda related to zoonoses policies and 
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collaborations in India. These include disconnect between global rhetoric and local 
perceptions; framing of disease narratives; and finally, the use of expertise in decision-
making.  
Global rhetoric vs local realities 
As discussed in the introductory set of chapters, of late the One Health approach has been 
subject to multiple critiques and commentators have sought to refine the initial vision 
behind One Health with increasing sophistication. These include historical 
contextualisation for viewing animal-human health partnerships (Woods et al., 2018; 
Woods and Bresalier, 2014); examination of social drivers of disease emergence (Bardosh, 
2016; Craddock and Hinchliffe, 2015); as well as the challenges to governing One health at 
global (Lee and Brumme, 2012) and national levels (Okello et al., 2014).  
However, despite a proliferation of these critical voices, the dominant narrative seems to 
rest on a similar outbreak-focussed premise as the earlier framings of One Health; such as 
the Manhattan Principles, which outlines the rationale for what turned out to be One 
Health approach as “preventing epidemic / epizootic disease and for maintaining ecosystem 
integrity” (Cook et al., 2004). 
Following an initial period of confusion about the global stewardship of the One Health 
movement (Lee and Brumme, 2012), it appears that the agenda for its implementation is 
now being led by multilateral agencies, such as the WHO/FAO/OIE tripartite, along with 
the World Bank. This, too, is not without its problems. A perusal of recent publications on 
‘Operational Frameworks’ from these agencies, such as those by WHO-OIE-World Bank 
(2014) or the one by the World Bank and Ecohealth Alliance (2018) shows that they 
conceptualise multisector collaborations as formal and institutional bureaucratic 
mechanisms instead of the messy, political, reactive and informal characteristics that 
many of the collaborations I discuss in this thesis display.  
International agencies, like large bureaucracies elsewhere, have always attempted to 
fashion the world in their own image, which meant a bureaucratised and depoliticised 
reading of development. This is not a new criticism and has been cited for the work of the 
WHO (Bruen and Brugha, 2014) and the World Bank (Harriss, 2001). Ferguson (1994, p. 
176), while introducing his description of the ‘Anti-Politics Machine’, critiques 
development projects in Lesotho in a language that might equally apply to the field of One 
Health 25 years later: 
“Development” projects in Lesotho have consistently failed to achieve their 
stated objects, not least because they are based on a “construction” of the 
country that bears little relation to prevailing realities. They do, however, 
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succeed in expanding the field of bureaucratic state power in people’s 
everyday lives… 
Here is another example of the disconnect that exists between the global rhetoric around 
zoonotic diseases espoused by international agencies and global civil society and the felt 
needs of affected countries. While the dominant zoonoses narratives focussed on exotic 
and emerging infections, disease priority setting exercises in multiple African and Asian 
settings have shown that managing existing diseases is a bigger priority than exclusively 
focussing upon risks for emerging diseases (Salyer et al., 2017; Sekar et al., 2011; 
Venkatesh et al., 2016).  
As in the case of Lesotho above, the field of implementation for One Health envisaged by 
international agencies also appears to be a depoliticised construction having little bearing 
with the realities of requirements, constraints and local politics facing stakeholders at the 
country level. This remains a major limitation of the One Health movement. As the next 
section will demonstrate, selective framings of complex problems will have an impact on 
how the solutions are framed.  
Framings and agenda setting 
In the chapters on anthrax and leptospirosis, I demonstrate how their framings as animal 
and human health diseases, respectively, influenced the development of their disease 
control strategies. I also discuss how the conventional categorisation of these diseases as 
being either epidemic-prone, or an endemic and neglected zoonoses doesn’t correspond 
the realities of their presentation in the field and the public’s perception perceptions of 
them.  
This is because framing of most disease narratives, by its very nature, presents an 
incomplete and simplistic view (Gordon, 2015) of the complex social constructs 
represented by diseases (Conrad and Barker, 2010).  
Most zoonotic diseases combine elements of the exotic as well as the endemic. Diseases 
like anthrax are generally forgotten about till they erupt as outbreaks and prompt an 
urgent response. Moreover, as demonstrated in the case of Ebola and Lassa fevers by 
Leach and Hewlett (2010), the disease narratives are selective and imperfect readings, 
often shaped by institutional and political pressures.  
Despite their reductive nature, however, narratives convey the arguments and scenarios 
underlying a policy option and help policymakers in taking decisions  in conditions of high 
uncertainty where the precise nature of truth is not known (Roe, 1994, p. 3, 1989). Such 
narratives can help focus public attention on specific issues, for example the discussions 
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regarding disease emergence and global health security following the SARS and avian 
influenza outbreaks (Elbe, 2011; Scoones and Forster, 2008) and, which resulted in a 
threat-based, outbreak-focussed approach to zoonotic diseases, at least in the early days of 
the One Health movement (Leach, 2008).  
However, while they may help focus attention on highlighted aspects of a problem, a 
downside to promoting the selectively framed narratives is that they can also deflect 
attention from other competing narratives. For example, framing diseases as health 
security issues didn’t just lead to their politicization and international competition (Elbe, 
2010), but it also resulted in shifting focus away from other compelling One Health 
narratives, such as those framing zoonoses not as emerging diseases, but diseases the poor 
were living with and getting affected by.  
There are other parallels as well. As discussed in chapter 5, a systematic underestimation 
of anthrax eventually resulted in reduction of vaccine production and reduced 
preparedness levels in the states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, a selective 
framing of leptospirosis as a human health issue or that of brucellosis as an animal health 
one, meant there was little interest to conduct joint assessments of the distribution and 
transmission of these diseases from both the sectors.  
What happens to the diseases that get neglected? Recalling the discussions from the 
chapter on brucellosis, lack of attention to a disease from the public discourse is likely to 
lead to a self-perpetuating cycle of neglect, wherein lower attention from researchers lead 
to lower rates diagnoses, poorer and lesser information, further neglect from the media 
and the public, leading to lesser funding and other incentives for research in the area. It 
can be argued that a counterpoint to this cycle of neglect also exists – a self-perpetuating 
cycle of visibility. Once a disease framing finds public attention, it is easier to mobilise 
more attention, discussion and funds for continuing to discuss different aspects to it.  
However, there are three sets of assumptions that underpin this visualisation. The first, 
already established in the case of brucellosis in this thesis, and by other scholars for other 
diseases, facts like burden or risks for the diseases do not matter (greatly) in agenda 
setting. Shiffman and Smith (2007) have identified multiple factors that can influence 
agenda setting in global health where the interests of the actors involved and their 
political motivations seem to matter as much as the framing of the policy ideas 
themselves. Secondly, individual diseases can have multiple framings – as in the case of 
anthrax framing as a potential bioweapon and a disease of poverty. It is quite possible that 
one framing might enjoy more attention than the other. Finally, like all narratives, there 
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are always competing framings for diseases. As such the dominant framings, when 
challenged, can break the cycles of neglect, or of visibility.  
This was observed, most notably, in the case of brucellosis itself. While most policy change 
is supposed to be incremental in nature, major shifts in policy stance take place in 
suddenly placed, infrequent intervals (Baumgartner and Jones, 2010). However finding 
explanations and locating agents for policy processes is always a challenge (Shore et al., 
2011, pp. 9–11). From the brucellosis chapter it appears that most stakeholders were 
either not aware about the disease, or preferred that it not be discussed lest their interests 
get hurt. The agronomists and dairy scientists’ views regarding the barriers to 
sustainability of the artificial insemination programme (due to high prevalence of 
brucellosis) appears to have achieved a policy shift in a way that the epidemiologists’ 
disease numbers hadn’t. In the language of Kingdon (2010), it appears that when a policy 
window was created by the seeming difficulty of continuing cattle insemination 
programme, policy entrepreneurs like NDDB and ICAR scientists were able to frame a new 
policy image by presenting the problem of brucellosis as an economic one which resulted 
in the launch of a national brucellosis control programme. 
This brings us to a related question – what kind of framings ensure higher visibility for 
associated diseases and what could be the explanation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
policy-making is a messy, non-linear process and policy discourses do not always proceed 
in a predicted direction. However, based upon the experience from my study, it seems to 
me that framing a disease as being visibly life-threatening, and having the potential to 
impact key opinion-makers – ‘people like us’ will generate greater traction than framings 
around associations with poorer and marginalised groups, or framed as causing silent 
morbidity. Within my limited sample of three diseases, it appears that leptospirosis 
elicited the strongest response from the public, in terms of demands for services, as well 
as the government. Response to the outbreak of anthrax was also very prompt, but of 
questionable efficacy; though given the short duration of the outbreak, it is difficult to 
predict how the response would have unfolded over a longer period.  
The response to leptospirosis got much more urgent and stronger once the disease 
entered Surat district, and then the city itself. Brucellosis, on the other hand, kept being 
ignored by human physicians as well as animal health program managers till its impact on 
the dairy sector, and hence wider ramifications on the society became clearer. Urban 
populations in Surat, milk consumers in the organized sector, are more similar to the 
working urban middle-class population from which the journalists and government 
servants come from, than do poor farmers and shepherds living at the margins of urban 
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imagination. And maybe this is the reason why their plights (and diseases) receive less 
attention than others.  
Politics of scientific advice 
Unlike the relatively simple explanation of use of scientific advice to craft a new policy 
narrative, cited above for brucellosis, scholars of science and technology studies have 
problematised the process of giving scientific advice. They argue that sharing of political 
advice is seldom a linear (or scientific) process (Boswell and Smith, 2017). There are 
different types of expertise, each serving their role (Collins and Evans, 2007), often under 
the compulsion to provide actionable recommendations even when operating under 
uncertainties (Stirling, 2010). All of this goes on to show that politics plays an integral part 
in shaping and use of expertise to ‘inform’ policy debates, even if the experts themselves 
are not always aware about it.  
As seen in the case of brucellosis above, and also shown by Stirling & Gee (2002), 
differences in disciplinary perspectives and understandings can lead to experts from 
different backgrounds framing a problem in different ways> therefore, it is likely that the 
precise nature of the outcome of policy discussions will depend upon who has been 
invited to the room. Taking the example of the anthrax outbreak in Vellore chapter 5, the 
presence of a veterinary officer in the response team, who was the most experienced and 
aware about anthrax outbreaks, had a definite influence on the ultimate decisions of 
chemoprophylaxis.   
To be sure, there were other references suggesting chemoprophylaxis such as the CDC 
guidelines for inhalational anthrax, as well as the manual on anthrax control published by 
the NCDC, which also have contributed to the final decision choice. However, it is quite 
likely that the confidence and assurance of the veterinary officer on the topic of anthrax 
and the use of chemoprophylaxis was the decisive factor in the decision to distribute 
antibiotics to the village residents at risk of catching the disease.  
Jasanoff (1992) has commented upon the blurring of identities that might occur when 
experts themselves become a part of the decision-making process. Also, the fact that the 
public health and veterinary officers in the anthrax response team were direct employees 
of the state government ensured that their recommendations were more influenced with 
ensuring the government’s objective of preventing the political fallouts of the outbreak 
than with minimizing the risks of adverse effects and antibiotic resistance in the 
community.  
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The way expert bias shapes a policy response, can also be seen, to opposite ends, in the 
aftermath of the leptospirosis outbreak recounted in chapter 6. The key decision-makers 
appeared to have little interest in discussing the animal part of the disease transmission 
cycle, even in 2016 with me, when much more was known about the limitations of current 
strategy. It is quite likely that lack of awareness, coupled with the overwhelmingly medical 
nature of the expert group as well as the politically sensitive environment would have 
resulted in the animal components to disease control efforts being dropped over the years.  
Scientists might have different motivations for conducting boundary-work at policy 
venues ranging from demonstrating ‘impact’ of their work or for validation of their 
approaches in a more practical setting. But it can be argued that policymakers might, in 
some cases, derive more benefits from engagements with scientists than the scientists 
themselves – both from the value of their advice in informing the decision-making process, 
as well as from the derived authority of their work. Boswell (2008, p. 472) argues that 
expert knowledge, in addition to serving an instrumental function of offering strategic 
advice, serves a largely symbolic role – through legitimising the credibility of the advised 
institutions and by substantiating its authority to work in the area.  
The medical experts advising the government of Gujarat on leptospirosis control appear to 
have played the roles theorised by Boswell above. Senior medical researchers were used 
by the public health department to assist them in assessing the situation, developing 
appropriate response and as well as clinically managing the affected individuals 
themselves.  
While this assistance must have been extremely useful in a relatively-resource constrained 
setting, over successive years of engagement, it is likely that an even more important role 
emerged for the medical faculty – to legitimise the government’s response strategy, and 
subsequently, to reinforce the success story narrative crafted by the government. Even if it 
was possible to critique the leptospirosis strategy for being overtly reliant on a clinical 
approach, as Prasad (2000) does in the early years of the outbreak, it would be difficult to 
doubt the intentions of the response team when all the top doctors in the district were 
advising the government. 
Political scientists have also discussed the tragedies that can occur when those giving 
advice are themselves unaware of the political forces underpinning their work (Jaeger, 
2007). Once their purpose was fulfilled and the disease numbers looked like coming down, 
the surveillance database was taken over from the medical college and restrictions put in 
place for publishing analysis outside a restricted academic setting. Successful policy 
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advisors know how to navigate the politics and influence policymaking process (Sohn, 
2018), and it is clear that while engaging with policymakers, the scientists should know 
what they are getting into. 
 
Figure 46: Discarded files, Chennai: Policy messes 
8.3 PRACTICES 
The earlier sections in this chapter have discussed the role of politics and discourse in 
influencing policy outcomes and help us understand the larger dynamics at play. However, 
if we want to gain an understanding of how these dynamics help shape policy outcomes on 
the ground, then we have to study the actions of different actors and their negotiations 
take place in the field (Ortner, 1984).  
In this section, I argue that the everyday practices of the middle level bureaucracy – the 
focus of my research – is marked by informality and discretionary practice. I explain their 
rationale for adopting these practices, citing the nature of their work involving bounded 
rationality, decision-making under ambiguity and a dual nature of their relationship with 
the publics.  
The argument is that, in practice, on the ground, particularly in remote district offices, 
people have to improvise, and innovate. They must adapt to often fast-changing 
circumstances. Their aim is to deal with the disease, but often their official, professional 
knowledge is not enough. They have to use tacit, experiential, local knowledges, and 
interact with others (including villagers) in ways that allow One Health to emerge in 
practice, but not by design. 
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Everyday practices 
The focus of my research, as explained in chapter 3 on Methods, was on the middle level 
government officer, who lay claim to technical expertise and work in a specialist role for 
the government — in my case to do with preparedness and response to infectious disease 
outbreaks. The conventional image of lab coat wearing scientists does not apply to most of 
my respondents. Instead of working on solving exclusively scientific problems, the role of 
these scientist bureaucrats is to reconcile the political objectives of their leadership with 
the interests of the affected community, all the while operating within the bounds of 
predefined administrative and scientific norms.  
This section examines the motivation and understandings of those involved with 
translating the policy mandates into tangible actions. It does so by interrogating the 
everyday practices of these actors viewing them as policy translators (Lipsky, 2010) and 
as mess managers (Roe, 2016b) (Figure 46).  
As argued by Gupta (2013, 2012), even within strong bureaucracies having rigid rules to 
govern the professional conduct and decision-making of their officers, individual officers 
end up exercising a lot of discretion in selective interpretation of these norms. This 
exercise of individual agency is not because of ambiguity or absence of rules; rather, it is 
precisely because of a surfeit of such rules. The bureaucracy in South Asia was established 
in colonial times and saw itself as belonging to a distinct class from the public which had to 
be controlled and ruled. This conceit of ruling over the affairs of the natives also carried 
over to the relationships with members of the lower bureaucracy, who came from the local 
populace and therefore, whose professional lives needed to be controlled by similar 
‘technologies of rule’ as the normal public (Corbridge et al., 2005; Potter, 1996). 
 
Figure 47: Managing policy messes from the control rooms. 
As a result, when following all the rules becomes impossible, in the interests of expediency 
and to ‘get any work done’, some of these rules are overlooked as long as the larger 
objective of the activity (as interpreted by the innovating officer) can be preserved. These 
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kinds of reinterpretations and innovations with policy norms are not conducted at the 
rarefied levels of the policy elites who have to maintain their faces of controlled calmness. 
Rather, it is the managers of the policy messes who in their everyday practices are in 
closer contact with different stakeholders in the policy processes (Figure 47).  
This is illustrated from the example of the district public health officer in Vellore, who rang 
up the district veterinary officer to exchange notes on the anthrax outbreaks response 
efforts between themselves, rather than arranging for formal letters through their 
respective superiors, as the protocol would dictate. Such collaborations are likely to be 
reactive, instead of proactive, disease-based, limited in scope and informal in nature. This 
is very much opposite of the top-down clean institutional collaborations envisaged by 
international agencies (WHO SEARO et al., 2008).  
The role of these technical managers of the ‘middle’ order is also unique in the way they 
straddle both technical and administrative as they can create a wider operating zone for 
themselves than might be mandated by official norms or scientific guidelines, respectively. 
Mangers like these can consult (and interpret) CDC guidelines on a smartphone in a 
village, as well as call upon experts from the local medical college to advise, and use both 
as sources of legitimacy to argue for a particular plan of action with their political 
superiors – all in the interest of getting the work done even when the task is not clear.  
This is why, I argue, it might be easier for a public health officer to propose 
chemoprophylaxis as a way to allay public anxieties about risks from a disease outbreak, 
than for more senior political or bureaucratic leadership to have done on their own. 
When such critical cases appear, you can't say that this is not recommended, 
this is not done. See… then it is public health challenge and that too a crisis—
there needs to be visibility of program.... People should feel that something is 
happening and there should be some effectiveness of it and science of 
intervention (D16/9 Feb-16). 
In many ways, the role of the middle level technical programme managers is best 
described as high reliability professionals and mess managers in the sense used by Roe 
(2013). Examples of such professionals include control room manager of power 
companies, or indeed, state surveillance officers in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. They work in a 
continuous fire-fighting mode, lurching from near crisis to another near crisis. While a 
utility manager is anticipating where the next surge in demand will come from and how to 
meet it, the State Surveillance Officer supervising several disease outbreaks all over the 
state every week, and putting in place a response plan in anticipation of how it might 
unfold.  
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Figure 48: Sign spotted in a health department office in Gujarat. 
Unlike managers of quantifiable, and predictable risks, managers like these have to 
operate under greater conditions of ambiguity (Leach et al., 2010b, p. 53). Their aim, 
therefore, is not to achieve control of the situation, but to simply manage the mess using a 
mix of pattern analysis and deploying second best compromises while learning from the 
experience (Roe, 2016a), not unlike the message I found hanging near the office of state 
surveillance officer in Gujarat (Figure 48).  
Echoing the literature on resilience and adaptive governance (Dietz et al., 2003), literature 
on policy mess (Roe, 2016b; Roe and Shirky, 2014) argues that instead of wishing away 
uncertainties and pretending that the dynamics of the world are predictable, it is better 
the systems become attuned to managing uncertainties, rather than trying to avoid them 
altogether. Responding to a complex dynamic situation would require an element of 
adaptability, willingness to experiment and even tolerate some degree of failure if we are 
to learn from our actions—not unlike the advice on the sign hung in a corner of an obscure 
government building in Gandhinagar, Gujarat.  
Publics: Whose risk counts? 
Straddling as they are, the interface of science and government, these middle level 
managers can extract more room for iterative decision making than either pure scientists 
or administrators would have been able to do on their own.  
205 
 
However, while celebrating/commenting upon the degree of autonomy and freedom to 
experimentation negotiated by these managers, it is important to bear in mind that the 
subject of most of their experimentation is the ‘other’ members of the public (Figure 49).  
 
Figure 49: Publics & uncertainty: Visitors passing a temple at entrance to the Secretariat, Chennai. 
In the course of the three disease case studies, I have discussed the different ways in which 
state officers interacted with affected citizens. These interactions have ranged from 
contestation and discouragement to being highly responsive to the public as a group.  
In the case of anthrax outbreak, the district veterinarians recounted to me how they 
discounted the number of sick animals reported as dead by the villages as they saw in this 
a ploy to extract more compensation from the government for the animal losses. Within 
the same village, however, the public health officers were clearly worried about the 
possibility of a political crisis. And, therefore, as way of assuaging the concerns of the 
affected village residents, they opted to distribute antibiotics in the village.  
This points to an interesting – dichotomous view of the publics by government officers. 
Anthropologists like Marsland (2014) have reported on the dehumanising and amorphous 
understanding of the publics as perceived by health officers in Tanzania. Much of this 
certainly holds true in the Indian context as well, where the divide between citizen and 
state, though problematised, still exists to a degree (Partha Chatterjee, 2006; Fuller and 
Bénéï, 2001). Moreover, even public health practitioners cannot escape this tendency of 
applying a homogenising and reductive label to the publics (Krieger, 2012).  
However, in addition to the above example from anthrax, there is another quote from a 
public health officer explaining the reason for expanding the deployment of 
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chemoprophylaxis all over the district, citing the difficulties in convincing local political 
leadership of the public health rationale for limiting the distribution of antibiotics (see 
chapter 6).  
In both these descriptions, it appears that while the government officers certainly retain 
elements of disdain for the ‘publics’ expressed by Marsland’s respondents in Tanzania, 
there is an added layer of understanding of the publics – that of a level of fear or even 
respect. Whether it be Vellore officers’ distribution of antibiotics fearing anthrax being 
made a political issue, or the Surat officers’ distribution of antibiotics because of the 
implacable nature of political demands – in both these cases the officers feared potential 
for repercussions if the public were to get local politicians to exert pressure or make a 
political controversy. This would likely mean additional public scrutiny of other activities 
of the department as well as additional pressures from departmental superiors.  
Political scientists and anthropologists have commented on the blurring of boundaries 
between the citizen and the state in the context of the everyday state in India (Berenschot, 
2010; Fuller and Bénéï, 2001; Gupta, 1995) and others have commented on the 
increasingly fluid nature of the term (Warner, 2002). This understanding, needs to be 
applied to the notion of ‘publics’ of public health as well.  
Another way in which the ‘othering’ of the publics was replaced by a more sensitive 
understanding is best conveyed by a quotation from a public health researcher in chapter 
6. The researchers shared how, following community-based surveys, the research team’s 
understanding of the amorphous public affected by leptospirosis outbreaks changed into 
something much more personal and nuanced, and the way this affected the leptospirosis 
control strategy. 
The earlier understanding was that anyone, especially those exposed to stagnant water in 
the affected villages, might be at risk of developing the diseases, such as paddy cultivators. 
However, upon gaining first had experience and conducting large surveys, they realised 
that in many villages in the marshlands, it did not matter what their occupation was—
even if one were a teacher, one had to cross the same fields and was possibly as exposed 
as the poor worker in the paddy fields. 
8.4 ANALYSING COLLABORATIONS 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to unpack instances of animal–human health 
intersectoral collaborations centred on individual diseases. As brought together in this 
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chapter, I have analysed the role played by larger, structural as well as more locally 
relevant contextual factors in each of these collaborations.  
In this section, I aim to bring the discussion together in order to formulate a more direct 
response to my research question – Under what conditions do intersectoral collaborations 
for prevention and control of zoonoses in India occur (or don’t)? 
Politics 
Based upon a review of examples covered in this thesis, it is possible to say with 
confidence that collaboration does not come in a single form, but tends to vary depending 
upon the local needs and political and administrative conditions facilitating these. In the 
beginning of this chapter, I cite place-based political analysis to highlight the role of 
political cultures of the ruling regimes as a major factor in influencing the shape of 
collaborations emerging in both my study states.  
The emphasis on technocratic populism, combined with the social acceptance of a 
paternalistic politics in Tamil Nadu could explain the high degree of institutional and 
workforce capacity within the state and a reliance on the administrative machinery to be 
able to deliver on the government’s commitments. This is the reason why the anthrax 
outbreak response team in Vellore did not need to import expertise from outside and 
every member, including the ‘experts’, were all government staff. This would also explain 
how the state government, building upon its experiences of a formal rabies coordination 
committee, and work in avian influenza, proposed a formal collaboration mechanism in 
the form of a state One Health unit.  
Gujarat, on the other hand, scarred from the public shaming it received during the 1994 
plague outbreak, and having a culture of limited government presence in public health, 
chose to respond differently. The discussions on collaborations there appeared to be more 
ad hoc, reactive, informal and disease-centric in nature – a characteristic that runs 
contrary to the ideals of the One Health movement. Yet, it seemed to have done a 
reasonable job of managing CCHF and leptospirosis, albeit with some limitations. In the 
case of leptospirosis, the government was quick to leverage expertise of academicians 
from outside the department and mount a major public health response. The anxiety not 
to repeat the failures of 1994 manifested in multiple ways, including the provision of 
advanced medical care in remote hospitals as well as crafting a success story narrative by 
demonstrating the disease was brought under control. Of course, the narrative had several 
shortcomings, including reliance on flawed epidemiology and lack of critical analysis, but 
these never came in the way of politics. 
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The third case study on brucellosis, demonstrated how too much politics could also 
become detrimental to advancing policy debates. Cattle is one of the species affected by 
brucellosis and they occupy a very important position both in the political as well as 
economic consciousness of India. This level of visibility did not actually serve the cause of 
disease control, and might have delayed action on brucellosis because of powerful political 
and economic actors that did not want to suffer adverse impacts through a public 
discussion on the disease.  
Politics of knowledge: Framing and expertise  
When introducing my analytic framework, I discuss how the characteristics of individual 
diseases, such as the species involved, and disease manifestations, might go on to influence 
the discourse, politics and practices of collaborations, and eventually result in the outcome 
of collaborations themselves. While I still agree with the assertion, I now feel that more 
than the disease itself, it is the narrative that gets framed around a disease that affects how 
different actors – scientists, practitioners, publics and decision-makers – respond.  
Framing leptospirosis as an exotic infection leads to publications in international journals, 
or discussing anthrax as a potential bioweapon provides scientists with more public 
recognition, and funds. This provides an incentive to knowledge producers, such as 
scientists, or brokers, such as the media, to frame diseases as more threatening and exotic 
than they are in reality. While the role of media in constructing disease narratives is no 
less problematic (Saliba et al., 2016),  my research has been focussed on examining the 
role of technical experts and the bureaucrats.  
Zoonoses policy debates require specialist expertise, and for this reason, are often 
conducted away from the public gaze. This is all the more reason why the role of scientific 
advice and scientific institutions, in zoonoses debates in India, needs to be examined 
further. Despite attempts at analysing the research-policy divide (Abbas and Kakkar, 
2013) and assessing institutional capacities for zoonoses research (Kakkar and Abbas, 
2012) the political role of scientific institutions in zoonoses debates has not been 
problematised sufficiently. For example, there were two instances where the form and 
shape of scientific guidelines impacts decisions made in the state – both relate to 
chemoprophylaxis. In case of anthrax, the guidelines from NCDC did not refer to any 
published source of evidence, nor offer any other justification. Similarly, in the case of 
leptospirosis control in Gujarat. It appears that the NCDC, again, was the guiding force 
behind adoption of chemoprophylaxis as an intervention, even though its effectiveness 
ended up being questioned by local experts later. While keen to establish their technical 
authority, the NCDC does not seem accountable to the states for its role, for example the 
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refusal to test rodent samples for leptospirosis or their refusal in crediting authorship of 
their guidelines to the Surat experts.  
Differences in perspectives and practices of veterinary and public health professions can 
also have a role in framing disease narratives. For instance, while the public health 
epidemiologists are traditionally skilled in assessing disease incidence rates and trends, as 
took place in Surat, the laboratory-focussed approach in veterinary public health could 
have prevented veterinarians in assessing disease incidence and crafting a more attention-
grabbing disease narrative around brucellosis.  
Another aspect of professional cultures that can directly have an impact on collaborations 
is that of the power dynamics between veterinary and medical professionals. The case of 
the anthrax response is a useful illustration of the fact that no matter how entrenched, 
these dynamics can be reversed with the use of knowledge. Similarly, by demonstrating 
their superior expertise while responding to an avian influenza scare in Tamil Nadu, the 
veterinarians managed to convince the public health director about the usefulness of 
collaborations with them. These examples, also make a case for developing collaborations 
based upon a complementarity of strengths between two sectors which, according to some 
scholars, is likely to make collaborations more robust than those built merely by adding 
redundancies (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Thomson and Perry, 2006).  
Practices 
As discussed earlier, while the politics and framings shape the overall contours for 
zoonoses-based collaborations, the exact nature of these collaborations are likely to be 
shaped by the everyday practices and constraints within which the bureaucracy of the 
middle operates. These middle level bureaucrats interface with the political leaderships, 
their administrative superiors, scientific community, engaged members of the public as 
well as the lower bureaucracy.  These bureaucrats utilise their technical expertise and a 
tacit knowledge of their system to anticipate and navigate potential challenges while 
giving shape to the political vision of the ruling regime in a way that is acceptable to all. 
Unlike the uncluttered nature of the policy statements framed at the level of the political 
leadership or technical agencies, these bureaucrats deal with everyday messy realities. 
Recognizing that it might not be possible to develop perfect solutions in a dynamic 
environment full of uncertainties, they are comfortable negotiating compromises and 
second-best solutions.  
The collaborations negotiated by these bureaucrats are generally reactive, disease-based, 
and limited in scope. Many instances of intersectoral collaborations, especially at the 
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district level, are negotiated on the basis of personal networks, rather than developed 
through formal notifications. While unlikely to sustain over a long time, such 
collaborations might be more adaptive and better able to respond to exigencies of 
changing conditions than more formally conceived top-down implemented bureaucratic 
collaboration superstructures.   
This is not to discount the importance of institutional models of intersectoral 
collaborations. Rather, it is important to highlight the informality underpinning most 
formal intersectoral collaborations. The converse is true as well. Many informal 
interactions between animal and human surveillance officer, for instance, might not take 
place, in the absence of a bureaucratic approval at some level. Therefore, formality and 
informality in collaborations co-exist and it is impossible to have one and not the other.  
8.5 CONCLUSIONS  
The One Health approach has set out an ambitious and idealistic, agenda for addressing 
zoonotic diseases. However, one major source of criticism facing the movement is that of it 
being divorced from local field realities and imposing a reductionist, standardized 
approach to intersectoral collaborations. In my review of disease based animal-human 
collaborations in India, I found that, while these criticisms are definitely valid, addressing 
them will require us to step back and take a more nuanced look at the political dynamics 
underlying intersectoral collaborations.  
I have summarised some of the key take-away findings of my thesis for One Health and 
related debates below: 
One Health & Intersectoral action for health 
It is important to interrogate the assumption underlying most discussions on One Health 
and multisectorality; namely that intersectoral collaborations take the form of formal 
meetings and committees and are universally helpful and relevant.  
Instead, if movements like One Health are to gain traction, it might be more useful to 
consider the local social and political realities; professional dynamics and interests; and 
presence of informal (and formal) networks before discussing what forms of 
collaborations might be useful.  
One size does not fit all 
Even within the limited scope of this study, I have demonstrated that intersectoral 
collaborations come in different forms. Before we discuss the relevance of different forms 
of collaboration, it is necessary that we develop a typology of collaborations in the first 
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place, something currently lacking in the literature. Two ways of classifying collaborations, 
based upon my case studies, could be by degree of informality, or by strength of 
collaborations. 
This level of nuance about different forms of collaboration is absent within policy 
discourse and is also deficient in academic literature, and this needs addressing. 
Politics of science, scientists and scientific institutions 
More than the disease burden or risks, it is the public perception about diseases that is, in 
turn, informed by the narratives framed around them, which drives policy action. Given 
the specialist nature of zoonoses discourse, critical debates around framings of disease 
narratives can only take place if they are opened up to non-science, non-health voices 
representing alternative perspectives such as livelihoods, security and sustainability.  
A necessary precondition for such critical appraisal of zoonoses discourse to take place is 
the recognition of politics underlying the advice given by scientists and scientific 
institutions. This might not be a novel insight in science studies and other streams of social 
science, but nonetheless, given the depoliticised nature of public health policy discourse in 
India, this is a gap that needs contribution from academia and the media alike.  
8.6 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS AND A RESEARCH AGENDA 
While not unaware about the political nature of policy processes, I started my PhD with a 
very limited focus on the politics of actors and power interests. Possibly because of my 
previous interactions with veterinarians and work on zoonoses, I also started with a 
realisation that the current discussions on multisectorality do not meet all stakeholders’ 
needs, and the solutions are not likely to be found within the confines of a single discipline 
or topical area.  
My choice to do a PhD in development studies spoke to both of the above concerns. 
Readings throughout my thesis work exposed me to academic literature in political 
science, anthropology, agronomy, public administration and science and technology 
studies, among other fields.  Even while aware of the differences in country contexts and 
disciplinary languages, I was struck by the similarities I came across when reading about 
policy processes, collaborations, expertise and governance in fields other than public 
health and countries other than India.  
I feel my PhD has equipped me to appreciate better the role of larger, systemic as well as 
local, political factors in driving the development and the performance of multisector 
collaborations. In addition, the last four and a half years of reading, research and reflection 
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have also helped me to identify other areas of inquiry that I would like to pursue based 
upon my research. I share some of these below. 
Translation across disciplines and sectors 
Lack of communication and empathy for other sectors’ points of view was one finding that 
came up significantly in the case of brucellosis, but was also in the background in many of 
my other discussions in the field. While not denying the importance of larger political and 
structural dynamics at work, I feel that, at least in some specific situations, the lack of 
understanding could be driven by the fact that different disciplines have languages and 
meanings unique to themselves, which renders cross-disciplinary collaborations difficult 
to initiate and navigate.  
Such differences can be illustrated in the way veterinary epidemiologists establish the 
presence or distribution of a pathogen using lab-based absolute numbers, whereas public 
health epidemiologists require population based incidence rates. This can also manifest in 
the way impacts of a disease are measured, such as the use of mortality and morbidity 
rates in public health, and economic productivity indices in the animal health sector. 
Approaching the intractable challenges of rabies, brucellosis or even antimicrobial 
resistance from the perspective of linguistic differences, rather than merely practicalities 
of collaboration, could offer fresh insights into tackling these challenges.  
Agenda setting as an exercise in translations 
As also referred to earlier in the thesis, several policy analysts visualise policy processes 
from agenda setting to implementation as a cycle of translations, wherein the policy vision 
of one set of actors gets renegotiated or reformulated based upon the exigencies involved 
at a different level in the process. While the role of policy elites, as well as the street level 
bureaucrats present in the bureaucracy is widely discussed, there is a missing black-box of 
policymaking that appears to have eluded academic scrutiny.  
I interacted closely with the public health or veterinary specialists who were a part of 
policy processes, but whose roles, I feel, were not sufficiently represented in the academic 
literature. Roe’s (2016a) depiction of policy mess managers and high reliability 
professionals comes closest to describing these actors. However, the importance of these 
‘middle-level’ technocrats, who give shape to public policy goals through their technical 
expertise and through their negotiation with other actors, needs further examination.  
Political role of public health research institutions in India 
This research helped me move beyond my public health stance and adopt a more critical 
and political lens for understanding decision making in India. With regards to infectious 
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diseases and outbreaks, I have not come across political analysis of the professional and 
institutional politics driving the scientific advice given by national agencies in India. Even 
though social scientists have critiqued the social implications of different disease control 
strategies, I have yet to come across any focussed examination of the politics of scientific 
advice within infectious diseases in India, especially from an insider perspective.  
Mechanics of multisectorality 
As I have discussed in the literature review, multisector collaborations are not a new 
concept and have been discussed in the programme management literature for several 
decades. While some scholars of public administration (Emerson et al., 2012; Thomson et 
al., 2007) have developed big-picture frameworks of collaboration, I have not come across 
their applications or criticisms from the development sector. With increasing prominence 
of multisectorality and convergence in health, as well as in other sectors, through the 
Sustainable Development Goals, it is important to discuss the politics as well as the 
mechanics behind multisector collaborations. 
8.7 EPILOGUE 
My research has demonstrated that intersectoral collaborations are more organic, political 
and dynamic in nature than the program literature would have us believe. Collaborations 
are products of the popular framings of diseases, the politics of interests and relationships 
between different actors who all promote narratives suiting their agendas, and finally the 
practices of actors at each level of implementation, who translate these policy visions in 
keeping with their needs and interpretations.  
Zoonoses policy discussions involve the use of specialist knowledge, and are spread across 
multiple sectors that sometimes have a conflicting set of incentives. Developing 
multisectoral collaboration in zoonoses, therefore, would also require navigation of 
professional hierarchies, possibly through informal relationships, and critical examination 
of scientific advice, possibly using a shared language.  
Thus, if collaborative approaches like One Health are to take root, the emphasis should be 
on developing mutual trust and communication among collaborators, while allowing the 
contingencies of everyday politics and practices to give shape to locally appropriate 
collaborations, and have the focus on frameworks, institutional reforms and standardised 
responses recast.   
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS 
CCHF Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CMC Christian Medical College, Vellore 
DAH Department of Animal Husbandry 
DDGP Deputy Director General (Programmes) 
DGHS Director General of Health Services 
DHS Department of Health Services 
DM District Magistrate 
DPH Director of Public Health 
EIDs Emerging Infectious Diseases 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FETP Field Epidemiology Training Programme 
FMD Foot and Mouth Diseases 
FUO Fever of Unknown Origin 
GMC Government Medical College 
GMP Good Manufacturing Practice 
IAS Indian Administrative Service 
ICAR Indian Council of Agricultural Research 
ICMR Indian Council of Medical Research 
IHR International Health Regulations 
IMA Indian Medical Association 
IMCAPI International Ministerial Conferences on Avian and Pandemic Influenza 
IVCZR  Institute of Vector Control and Zoonoses Research 
IVPM Institute of Veterinary Preventive Medicine 
KFD Kyasanur Forest disease 
LMICs Low & Middle Income Countries 
NCDs Non-communicable diseases 
NCDC National Centre for Disease Control 
NDDB National Dairy Development Board 
NICD National Institute of Communicable Diseases 
NIE National Institute of Epidemiology 
NIH National Institutes of Health 
NIMR National Institute of Malaria Research 
NIV National Institute of Virology 
NIVEDI National Institute of Veterinary Epidemiology & Disease Informatics 
NTDs Neglected tropical diseases 
OIE World Organization for Animal Health  
PHFI Public Health Foundation of India 
PSM Department of Preventive & Social Medicine 
PVS Performance of Veterinary Services 
RBT Rose Bengal Test 
RCZI Roadmap to Combat Zoonoses in India 
RRT Rapid Response Team 
RTPCR Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction 
WCS Wildlife Conservation Society 
WHO World Health Organization 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
NATIONAL LEVEL RESPONDENTS 
S. 
No. 
Labe
l 
Designation Organization Sector City 
1.  A1 Deputy 
Commissioner 
(Animal Health) 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India 
Animal 
Health 
New Delhi 
2.  A10 Ex Health 
Secretary 
Department of Health, 
Govt of India 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
3.  A11 ADG (Animal 
Health) 
Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research 
Animal 
Health 
New Delhi 
4.  A12 Ex-Head, Zoonoses 
Division 
National Centre for 
Disease Control 
Public 
Health 
New Delhi 
5.  A2 Director (Animal 
Health) 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India 
Animal 
Health 
New Delhi 
6.  A3 NPO 
(Microbiology) 
World Health 
Organization (India 
office) 
Public 
Health 
New Delhi 
7.  A4 Medical Officer Centers for Disease 
Control (India office) 
Public 
Health 
New Delhi 
8.  A6 Scientist 'F' National Institute of 
Veterinary 
Epidemiology and 
Disease Informatics 
Animal 
Health 
Bangalore 
9.  A7 Scientist 'F' National Institute of 
Veterinary 
Epidemiology and 
Disease Informatics 
Animal 
Health 
Bangalore 
10.  A8 Retd Director Project Directorate of 
Animal Disease 
Monitoring and 
Surveillance  
Animal 
Health 
Bangalore 
11.  A9 Former Health 
secretary 
Government of Orissa Public 
Health 
New Delhi 
12.  B4 Scientist 'F' National Institute of 
Epidemiology 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
 
RESPONDENTS FROM GUJARAT 
S.No. Label Designation Organization Sector City 
13.  E1 Director (Animal 
Husbandry) 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
14.  E11 Asst Dir 
(Epidemic 
Control) 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
15.  E14 Secy Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
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16.  E2 Dy Dir (Epidemic 
Control) 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
17.  E6 Dy Dir (Epidemic 
Control) 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
18.  E8 Director Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
19.  E9 State Animal 
Disease Lab 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
20.  D12 AGM Bajipura Surat District Co-
operative Milk Producers' 
Union  
Animal 
Health 
Surat 
21.  D14 General manager National Dairy 
Development Board 
Animal 
Health 
Anand 
22.  D3 Vet Officer 
Bajipura 
Surat District Co-
operative Milk Producers' 
Union  
Animal 
Health 
Surat 
23.  D4 Ex-Chairperson National Dairy 
Development Board 
Animal 
Health 
Anand 
24.  D5 Senior Manager National Dairy 
Development Board 
Animal 
Health 
Anand 
25.  D6 Vet Officer 
Bajipura 
Surat District Co-
operative Milk Producers' 
Union  
Animal 
Health 
Surat 
26.  D7 Advisor Gujarat Cooperative Milk 
Marketing Federation 
Animal 
Health 
Anand 
27.  D8 ADIU Surat Department of Animal 
Husbandry, Government 
of Gujarat 
Animal 
Health 
Surat 
28.  D9 CEO Surat District Co-
operative Milk Producers' 
Union  
Animal 
Health 
Surat 
29.  E10 Prof of Micro + 
State PH Lab 
Officer + Dy Dir 
(ME) 
Dept of Health Services, 
Govt of Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
30.  E12 Medical Officer 
(Epidemics) 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
31.  E13 Principal Secy & 
Commissioner 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
32.  E3 Assoc Prof Indian Institute of Public 
Health, Gandhinagar 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
33.  E4 State Lab 
Coordinator 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
34.  E5 Addl Director 
(Public Health) 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
35.  E7 Asst Director 
(Epidemics + 
Urban Health) 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Gandhinagar 
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36.  D1 MO PHC Vallad Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
37.  D10 Dist 
Epidemiologist 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
38.  D11 Regional Dy 
Director 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
39.  D13 ex-Prof of 
Medicine 
Government Medical 
College, Surat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
40.  D15 Current faculty 
member 
Government Medical 
College, Surat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
41.  D16 Ex Prof of PSM Government Medical 
College, Surat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
42.  D2 IEC Officer, CHC 
Bardoli 
Department of Health 
Services, Government of 
Gujarat 
Public 
Health 
Surat 
 
RESPONDENTS FROM TAMIL NADU 
S.No. Label Designation Organization Sector City 
43.  B1 
 
Institute of Vector 
Control & Zoonoses 
Research 
Public 
Health 
Hosur 
44.  B10 
 
Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
45.  B11 Director of Public 
Health 
Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
46.  B12 Veterinary Officer Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
47.  B13 Asst Dir (Technical 
Support Unit) 
Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
48.  B14 Joint Director Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
49.  B15 Professor Tamil Nadu Veterinary 
& Agriculture Sciences 
University 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
50.  B16 Jt Director (VBD) Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
51.  B17 Ex-Rinderpest 
Officer 
Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
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52.  B18 Secretary Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
53.  B19  Sr Entomologist Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
54.  B2 Veterinary Officer Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
55.  B3 Sr Research Officer Central Referral Lab, 
Govt of Tamil Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
56.  B5 State 
Epidemiologist 
Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
57.  B6 Professor Tamil Nadu Veterinary 
& Agriculture Sciences 
University 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
58.  B7 Ex-Director Central Referral Lab, 
Govt of Tamil Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Chennai 
59.  B8 Secretary Health Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Chennai 
60.  B9 Veterinary Officer Institute of Vector 
Control & Zoonoses 
Research 
Public 
Health 
Hosur 
61.  C1 ADIU Vellore Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Vellore 
62.  C10 Prof & HoD (Micro) Christian Medical 
College, Vellore 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
63.  C11 Ex- Prof Christian Medical 
College, Vellore 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
64.  C12 Field researcher Christian Medical 
College, Vellore 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
65.  C13 Field researcher Christian Medical 
College, Vellore 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
66.  C2 I/C ADIU Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Vellore 
67.  C3 Regional Jt Director Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Vellore 
68.  C4 DDHS Vellore Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
69.  C5 DDHS Vellore Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
70.  C6 District 
Epidemiologist 
Department of Health, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
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71.  C7 Ex Prof of 
Microbiology 
Christian Medical 
College, Vellore 
Public 
Health 
Vellore 
72.  C8 Specialist / Asst Dir Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Vellore 
73.  C9 Specialist / Asst Dir Department of Animal 
Husbandry, 
Government of Tamil 
Nadu 
Animal 
Health 
Vellore 
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APPENDIX C: ETHICAL APPROVALS 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
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PUBLIC HEALTH FOUNDATION OF INDIA 
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APPENDIX D: CONSENT FORM & INFORMATION SHEET 
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